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ABSTRACT 
Social work's person-in-environment perspective has 
been a professional guide for many decades. A major 
difficulty is its tendency to minimize conceptualization of 
the person/nature construct. This study generates a 
reconceptualization of person-in-environment that 
articulates a distinct description of connections between 
person and nature. 
This study uses a qualitative methodology combining 
phenomenological and grounded theory approaches. It 
investigates the research question: What are key themes in 
radical environmental thought, particularly deep ecology 
and ecof eminism, that may be useful in reconceptualizing 
person-in-environment? 
The major finding is a proposal to replace person-in-
environment with the terminology of person-with-
environment. This formulation derives from a revised 
theoretical basis allowing for the integration of a more 
theoretically congruent and descriptive language of 
person/nature relationship. It establishes a new link 
between theory and practice having specific implications 
for a range of professional thoughts and activities. 
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PREFACE 
The human race has entered a critical stage of 
reflection about how it will continue its existence on 
this earth. Issues concerning human survival are ever-
looming; the determination to ignore nature and her 
limits and our accelerated drive towards consumption and 
affluence as we have known it, must be examined. 
The social work profession has also come to a 
turning point; a critical apex of self-examination. The 
looming environmental catastrophe in which we find 
ourselves must inspire an attempt to discover more 
refined alternatives to theory and practice that would 
better correspond to our own and our clients' humanity. 
In order to fully address the problems facing the 
profession and our clients, we must step back from our 
everyday lives in the technological setting and think 
differently; even radically. 
Developing an appreciation for the attractiveness of 
the natural world and what is effectual and possible in 
the face of it, the argument in the following pages 
illustrates a new kind of thinking we must do in order to 
reason maturely and act more effectively as 
professionals. My greatest aspiration for this project 
would be that it launch a radical reorientation within 
the profession. 
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This work represents a culmination of several years 
of scholarly examination, reading, thinking, writing, and 
rewriting. It is also a refiection of very personal 
stirrings in my soul which began to emerge some twenty 
years ago; the growing awareness that for many of my 
adult years I have been missing something in and about 
this huge world which seemed so apparent to me at an 
earlier time. 
My beginnings as a small boy growing up in central 
Kansas provided me with the deepest personal appreciation 
for wide-open natural spaces, for the ever-present wind 
blowing across the prairie and for the marvel of nature's 
ceaseless cycles of quietude and bombast. I was at home 
in my small place on earth. Nature wasn't frightful; she 
was companion, comforter, an unending, almost speechless, 
marvel. I even now, find that my soul races with an 
impending thunderstorm. It harkens a connection back to 
an earlier time of finding the simple excitement of 
watching the rain roll in, the lightening crack the 
prairie like a large neon whip against the dark sky. I 
can even now clearly recall a time when, upon discovering 
I was lost during explorations away from home, I actually 
found a familiar tree and hugged it, until I regained my 
sense of direction toward home. As I moved to the city 
and fell deeper into the modern era's focus on control 
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and consumption I could, and still can, feel the longings 
for a place unobstructed by buildings and cement, 
billboards and traffic, devices and deadlines. 
I have often wondered what my life would be if not 
for at least the memory of wind, trees, the tall grass, 
and the open range. Would I have the appreciation for 
it, had I not had the memory of it? The greater question 
aroused within me is how, as a human race, will we 
function together as we get further and further from the 
memory of being at home on earth? 
The reader will find that some of the ideas and 
concepts of this work may be difficult to understand, are 
not easily captured and organized, and are somewhat 
abstract and outside one's conventional frame of 
reference. These ideas, however, are also an attempt to 
put into words what has, and continues, to be at its very 
core, a deeply personal, experiential journey of life 
transition; a transition fraught with struggles to again 
be at home with and to live out of a deeper connection 
with the beauty, the wonder, and the values which are 
found in nature. 
So, though the current work may be abstract and 
theoretical, I assure the reader that the history of my 
ideas are not born exclusively of intellect. They are a 
culmination of not only scholarly examination of 
x 
historical literature and current critical thinking, but 
perhaps most importantly they flow out of a sense of 





Early on social work writers clearly recognized that 
humans are related to and impacted by the environment. 
In fact social workers began to separate themselves from 
other helping professionals by claiming as their 
particular jurisdiction a unique and dual concern for 
both person and environment. In practice, however, the 
person-environment orientation has become problematic 
partly because of the difficulty associated with 
attending equally to personal and environmental issues. 
The persistent tendency has been to focus on knowledge 
and services directed to the personal domain while the 
breadth of knowledge concerning the environment has 
become constricted (Weick, 1981; Saleebey, 1992; Kemp, 
1994) . Much of what social work finds troublesome in 
satisfying its primary goal of optimizing fulfillment of 
both person and environment in combination (National 
Association of Social Workers, 1993) has to do in one way 
or another with its struggle to conceptualize and act 
upon its person and environment commitments. 
Nowhere is this conceptual difficulty more profound 
than in social work's nearly complete disregard for 
integrating a comprehensive understanding of the natural 
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environment and its influence on human behavior, quality 
of life and the definition of self. While social work's 
person-environment focus is routinely affirmed in the 
literature and in leading social work textbooks (Pincus & 
Minahan, 1973; Germain & Gitterman, 1980; Dorfman, 1988; 
Compton & Galaway, 1989; Hepworth & Larson, 1993), the 
literature itself contains little explicit discussion of 
the natural environment. With the exception of a few 
recent contributions (Resnick & Jaffee, 1982; Gutheil, 
1992; Rosen, 1993; Hoff & McNutt, 1994), the concept of 
natural environment is rarely delineated in the 
literature even though it is addressed, albeit 
tertiarily, in larger thematic discussions. Throughout 
its century-old history, social work has tended to view 
the natural environment as the broad, static, benign and 
somewhat vague backdrop for more fundamentally important 
personal processes (Ewalt, 1982; Waldfogel & Rosenblatt, 
1983, Gutheil, 1992; Kemp, 1994). It has not recognized 
the deeper influences that natural environment has on 
these processes. 
Weick (1981) has suggested that though social work's 
person-environment construct implies synthesis, it is, in 
reality, a problematic "ideological seesaw" (p. 141). A 
conceptual dichotomy has arisen which, in practice, makes 
the person-environment construct highly problematic in at 
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least three ways. First, attention is pulled from the 
environment to the person, resulting in an imbalanced 
emphasis on knowledge and skills directed toward 
individual functioning. The tendency is thus to elevate 
the personal construct over the environmental. Secondly, 
the preoccupation with the personal dimension of human 
development has tended to narrow the definition of 
environment. Environment has come loosely to mean the 
immediate personal space and/or the social situation (the 
cluster of immediate relational and situational factors) 
affecting the individual (Siporin, 1972; Strean, 1978; 
Weick, 1981; Kemp, 1994). Finally, this has resulted in 
the failure of social work to articulate a distinct 
description and explanation of the connection between 
person and the natural environment even though the 
profession rhetorically conceives of its orientation as 
uniquely situated at the interface of these constructs. 
This continues a long history of neglect of the natural 
world in social work's person-environment construct. This 
trend continues to persist even now in the midst of 
mounting evidence that degradation of nature has profound 
implications for human well-being. 
Critical theorists and historians have identified a 
number of possible explanations for the bias toward the 
personal and the constriction of the environmental in 
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social work. Weick (1981), Rosen (1993), Specht and 
Courtney (1994), and Kemp, (1994) see the profession's 
early reliance upon psychoanalysis, and its later 
psychodynamic orientations that situate problems in the 
person, as significant contributory factors. Popple 
(1985), Trattner, (1989), Wenocur and Reisch (1989) and 
Kemp (1994) see social work's tilt toward an 
individualistic orientation to human behavior as strongly 
influenced by its drive for professional status and its 
search for a consistent body of knowledge to support this 
aspiration. Psychodynamic theories provided this 
accessible and, apparently, coherent framework. 
Another factor has also been suggested for social 
work's configuring of its professional identity in ways 
that minimize the environmental construct. Weick (1981, 
1987, 1991), Imre (1982, 1991), Roberts (1990), Saleebey 
(1991, 1992) see this as resulting from social work 1 s 
embeddedness in the logic and methodology of the 
modernist worldview and its associated scientific and 
technological paradigm. The philosophical assumptions of 
modernism typically narrow the definition of person and 
environment by removing the idea of nature from both 
constructs. The result is an alienation of person from 
environment. Nature becomes essentially other--separate 
from any identification with person (Berman, 1984; 
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Rochberg-Halton, 1986; Griffin, 1988). Person as a 
constellation of natural processes and environment as an 
aggregate of natural phenomenon are unrecognizable. In 
effect environment and self become de-natured (Fox, 1990; 
Roszak, 1992). This has resulted in social work's being 
unable to develop a language necessary to describe and 
explain the character of the connection between self and 
the natural realm. Even though the profession conceives 
of itself as uniquely situated at the interface of 
person-environment, it is hard-pressed to describe what 
this means in practice (Weick, 1981; Saleebey, 1992; 
Kemp, 1994; Rogge, 1994; Tester, 1994). 
Provisional Definition of Environment 
It is difficult to provide a comprehensive 
definition of environment within the social work 
profession because the concept has been both compressed 
and enlarged in different historical periods. The aim 
here will be to give a general view of the parameters of 
the concept from the perspective of current social work 
theory. More detailed discussion of the concepts of 
environment and person will ensue in chapter three of 
this dissertation. What follows will be a provisional 
working definition which will function as a embarkation 
point for further elaboration in this study. 
Several social work theorists have provided helpful 
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typologies of environment (Germain/ 1979, 1983, 1991; 
Weick, 1981; Saari, 1992; Hoff & McNutt, 1994). Germain 
(1979, 1983, 1991) defines environment as having 
physical, social, and cultural aspects which are involved 
in complex interactions between their different elements 
and the person. Germain understands the physical 
environment as comprising the natural as well as the 
built world. The social environment comprises the network 
of human relations while the cultural environment 
constitutes larger interplay of persons within specific 
community matrices. Germain also differentiates between 
the broader macro-environment and the immediate micro-
environment. Siporin (1983) has added to this 
characterization the idea of the mezzo-environment which 
is an intermediate layer constituting a series of life 
situations such as work, school and church. Recently, 
Germain (1991) has suggested that social work's 
traditional person-in-environment specification should be 
replaced by person:environment in order to signify a more 
holistic, unitary merger between the concepts. 
One of the most helpful definitions of environment 
has been developed by Weick (1981) . She distinguishes 
among four multi-dimensional aspects of environment which 
she calls the internal-social, external-social, internal-
physical, and external physical. The first two include 
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intrapsychic processes--emotions and thoughts--as well as 
social structure, technology and economic/political 
arrangements. The last two include the concepts of organ 
functioning, adaptive capacity and genetic traits, as 
well as biological, climatic, and atmospheric conditions. 
Weick suggests that: 
The internal and external social environments 
together have formed the basis of the person-in-
environment paradigm ... this emphasis on social 
environments has produced a peculiar one-dimensional 
focus. Attention has been paid to the social 
environments to the exclusion of the physical ones. 
Hoff and McNutt (1994) extend the definition of 
environment to a deeper appreciation for nature. They see 
nature as having a complex link to personal development 
and address the implications of nature's degradation and 
its transcendent value for social work theory and 
practice. For perhaps the first time in social work 
history, Hoff and McNutt (1994) explore the reenchanted, 
more wholistic, interconnected side of nature. 
Building on the work of Thomas Berry (1988), Hoff 
and McNutt conceptualize the natural environment as 
spheres of activity made up of interconnected elements. 
Human life and development are integrally related to, 
dependent upon, and emergent from the natural 
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environment. The natural environment is thought to 
consist of the geosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere, 
biosphere, and noosphere. The first of these alludes to 
facets of the soil, water, air, and biological species 
which impact human survivability. The noosphere, on the 
other hand, represents a deeper, atavistic connectedness 
with nature which lies beyond physical existence but 
which is nonetheless absolutely indispensable for human 
development. 
Hoff and McNutt argue that by destroying and 
disregarding the natural environment: 
... we destroy ourselves -- our irreplaceable source 
of sheer physical sustenance, as well as the source 
of our imaginative capacities for experiencing the 
penultimate realities of the good, the true, and the 
beautiful. Moveover, without the metaphorical 
resources from nature, to express those realities, 
our unique capacity to communicate consciousness of 
self and other would be severely impoverished, if 
not impossible. (p. 5) 
It is clear that social work's person-environment 
perspective has not led social workers to place emphasis 
on assessing the significance of nature on human 
development. Hoff and McNutt's definition suggests that 
nature affects not only our biological existence but the 
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way we relate to others. At a more fundamental level it 
has consequences for the way we perceive ourselves. 
Berry (1988) captures something of this relationship with 
this image: 
If we lived on the moon, our mind and emotions, our 
speech, our imagination, our sense of the divine 
would all reflect the desolation of the lunar 
landscape (p. 11). 
Social work's failure to attend to the deeper 
relevance of nature exists at the very same time that the 
larger society is sensing a growing awareness of the 
separation between humans and nature. The perception is 
widening that self must again be defined in terms which 
include the natural world (Capra, 1982; Berman, 1984; 
Schmookler, 1984; Brown, 1988; Sancton, 1989; Rifkin, 
1991; Sine, 1991; Smart, 1992; Piacenti, 1993). This 
recondite interdependency of self and nature represents a 
primordial connectedness which endures beyond cultures, 
religion and time itself (Rifkin, 1983; Berry, 1988; Fox, 
1990,1991; Macy, 1991; Berry & Swimme, 1992; Callicott, 
1994a, 1994b) . Even though the philosophical assumptions 
of modernity and the accompaning scientific, 
technological paradigms have obscured our memory of this 
tie, a need is being expressed to find a way to regain 
entry into nature. 
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This archaic connection with nature has not found 
reputability in social work's consideration of 
development (D. Saleebey, personal communication, May 5, 
1995). Social work doesn't generally see the connection 
between person and nature or inquire into it, or develop 
theory around it, or place it in its computations of 
what's important to those the profession serves. 
Searching for language and descriptions to help social 
work better depict and explain the relationship between 
self and the natural realm will and should change the 
character of all transactions with which social work 
concerns itself. It is entirely possible that, with a 
deeper consciousness of nature, social work will become 
more than environmentally sound. This consciousness may, 
in fact, be physically, socially, spiritually and 
transpersonally indispensable to social work's role in 
supporting the full range of human development. 
The purpose of this dissertation is thus not to add 
to the roster another thing to which the profession 
should attend. Rather it is intended to broaden and 
clarify the way we conceptualize person and environment 
by focusing on the character of the relationship between 
person and the natural realm, and on the way we derive 
individual and collective meaning from this connection. 
Taking as a starting point a provisional definition 
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of environment as inclusive of nature; understanding 
nature as the sphere of influence which has not only 
biological and social interconnections with human 
development but also resonant, atavistic attachments, the 
goal of this study will be to develop a comprehensive 
reconceptualization of the relationship between person 
and environment that is not limited to conventional and 
prevailing social work perceptions of these constructs. 
This research goal will be undertaken through a thorough 
and careful critique and analysis utilizing insight from 
two contemporary ecophilosophies: deep ecology and 
ecological feminism. It will also address issues and 
present implications for social work knowledge, theory 
and professional practice. 
These research goals will be pursued in the context 
of a thorough historical and sociocultural review of the 
emergence of social work's conventional and current ideas 
of person-environment. Because this dissertation is 
focused on developing a reconceptualized perspective 
based on different assumptions about the relationship 
between person/environment, it is appropriate to examine 
how these concepts evolved within the assumptions of a 
very distinct sociocultural worldview. 
Individuals and professions interpret connections 
between themselves and environment through their own 
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highly specialized set of lenses. This is no less true 
of social work whose views of person and environment 
reflect not only its distinctive intellectual legacy but 
the current working model of the profession (Weick, 1981; 
Kemp, 1994) . This contextual orientation has been 
referred to by many names (O'Riordan, 1976; Harman, 1979; 
Drengson, 1980; Catton, 1980; Coates, 1981; Cotgrove, 
1982; Dunlap and Van Liere, 1983), but for purposes of 
this study the term modernity or its derivative modernism 
will be used (Lyotard, 1985; Habermas, 1987; Vattimo, 
1988; Giddens, 1990; Goldsmith, 1993). 
Modernity is a ethos, a mood, and a feeling as well 
as a series of characteristics and attributes of 
contemporary life which" ... imposes itself throughout the 
world" (Baudrillard, 1987, p. 63). The context of 
modernism and its technoscientific paradigms have defined 
both the development and trajectory of social work's 
person-environment perspective. Without a critique of 
the logic and culture of modernism it would be difficult 
to conclude how social work came to uniquely configure 
its own person and environment constructs. 
Summary of Research Problem and Research Goals 
The research problem addressed in this study can be 
summarized as involving (1) social work's neglect of a 
distinct description and explication of the atavistic 
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connection between person and the natural environment, 
and (2) this exists even though the profession conceives 
of its orientation as uniquely situated at the interface 
of person-in-environment. The research goals are 
summarized as follows: (1) To generate a comprehensive 
reconceptualization of social work's person-in-
environment perspective that will aid in the development 
of a more expansive, theoretically congruent view of 
these constructs and that will contribute to furthering a 
balanced view of this significant guiding principle (2) 
To specify implications of a reconceptualized person-in-
environment perspective for a range of social work 
thoughts and activities. 
Perspectives, Rationale and Assumptions of the 
Dissertation 
Professional perspectives 
This research began as the quest to explore the 
temper of emerging ideas in ecology and environmentalism 
and their potential relationship to social work's 
knowledge development, theory and practice. In 
particular, I have been influenced by the methodolgical 
insights and experiential/spiritual ideas of Canda (1986, 
1991, personal communication 1996), the theoretical 
thoughts of Weick (1981, 1991), Saleebey (1990, 1992), 
and the historical ideas offerred by Franklin (1990) and 
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Kemp (1994) in helping to frame the problem of person and 
environment in a social work context. I was drawn to the 
areas of deep ecology and ecological feminism by 
observing the remarkable similarity between their 
processes of defining connections between persons and 
environments and what social work claimed, at least 
rhetorically, to be its particular domain. I had been 
troubled for some time by the almost complete absence of 
comprehensive discussions of the natural environment in 
social work literature. It is difficult to comprehend 
how social work could claim an environmental 
concentration while at the same time overlooking the 
natural facet of the environmental construct. To date 
only a very few social work writers have begun to address 
systematically relationships between persons and the 
natural realm. 
I was also drawn to this topic by a deep wish to 
extend my own professional work toward understanding both 
the problems and potential of nature for how social work 
defines person and environment and how it goes about its 
work with these concepts in mind. I had an intuitive 
feeling that approaches to deep ecology and ecofeminism 




Given the uncertainty and longevity of social work's 
mixed relationship to its person and environment 
constructs, as defined in the research problem, it is 
timely and important to evaluate and reconceptualize 
these from a critical perspective. Since social work is 
committed to action, its theoretical preferences are not 
simply a matter of scholarly debate but have a direct 
impact on what social workers actually do (Kemp, 1994) . 
The decision to pursue this study is logically grounded 
in a number of factors. (1) If social work claims it 
works at the person-in-environment interface but, in fact 
emphasizes individualistic psychotherapy, a serious 
question must be raised: At what point does social work 
dominated by an individualistic orientation implicit in 
psychotherapy and inattentive to natural, environmental 
issues cease to be social work as generally defined? (2) 
If social work claims concern for people in context of 
environment but knows and, therefore, does more relative 
to person than environment, then in practice social work 
is something other than what it claims. (3) If social 
work defines its professional commitment in terms of 
person and environment but depends nearly exclusively, 
for explanation and method, on narrow bands of 
psychological theory, the result is a continuation of the 
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polarization between professional purpose and practice. 
(4) If social work is to continue to meet pressing human 
needs and to foster development of full human capacity, 
then revised conceptualization of person's integral 
relationship to the natural realm must emerge. Current 
guiding principles of practice must be reappraised, and 
social workers must reorient themselves to the 
development of new models of both individual and 
collective meaning. (5) If an emergence of a new 
epistemology of self and nature calls for humans to be 
reawakened to the association between their essential 
identity and nature, then it is significant both to 
reflect critically on the historical, contextual 
trajectory and logic underlying social work's 
conventional person-in-environment perspective and to 
reconceptual this perspective in the light of this 
changing epistemology. (6) If depletion and pollution of 
the natural environment becomes a major influence on the 
welfare of individuals and entire societies, then social 
work must pay more refined attention to understanding and 
conceptualizing its personal and environmental constructs 
to better forge a integrative language tailored to 
respond to these exigencies. 
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Research assumptions 
A number of major assumptions underlie the pursuit 
of this study. This dissertation assumes that (1) 
without clarity concerning (a) the meaning of person and 
environment in social work discourse, (b) the extent to 
which these constructs have been and are conditioned by 
historical and dominant contextual factors, and (c) how 
these constructs may be reconceptualized in more 
expansive, resonant, cohesive ways; social work will 
continue to give priority to personal inner life domains 
while ignoring the reality of the deeper, natural 
environment. 
This dissertation further assumes that (2) critical 
reflection on the intellectual, theoretical development 
of an important guiding principle of practice and 
particularly on the larger sociocultural forces that 
influenced it, can (a) illustrate traditional processes 
of knowledge acquisition and development and (b) 
illuminate application of these. Critical reflection 
will facilitate new conceptual and practical directions 
in social work. Finally, this dissertation assumes that 
(3) critical awareness of the development of conventional 
concepts of person and environment and reconceptualizing 
these concepts will contribute to narrowing the dualism 
that now exists between these constructs. 
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Research Questions and Structure of Dissertation 
Research questions 
Building on the research problem and research goals 
thus far established and having considered the 
researcher's professional perspective, rationale, and 
major presuppositions, the central and adjunctive 
research questions can now be addressed. This 
dissertation is organized around two central research 
questions: 
1. What are the key themes, and key concepts in 
deep ecology and ecological feminism that may 
be useful in reconceptualizing social work's 
person-in-environment perspective? 
2. What are the specific conclusions and 
implications of a reconceptualized person-in-
environment perspective for social work 
knowledge, theory and practice? 
Three adjunctive and preliminary questions are also 
considered in preparation for the primary research tasks: 
1. What are the philosophical assumptions 
underlying the modernist worldview and its 
associated technoscientifc paradigms and how 
have these constrained or supported the 
development of social work's person-in-
environment perspective? 
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2. How have the conventional ideas of person and 
environment historically developed in social 
work theory over the course of the last number 
of decades? 
3. What is the current status of person-
environment as it is configured in contemporary 
social work? 
Structure of dissertation 
The dissertation proceeds through six chapters. In 
addition to the current introductory chapter, chapter two 
summarizes the major assumptions of the modernist 
worldview and its associated scientific, technological 
paradigms. Chapter three reviews the historical 
development and the current status of social work's 
person and environment concepts. It will critique these 
conceptualizations by examining the impact of the larger 
context of modernism (summarized in chapter two) on the 
trajectory of the person-environment concept. Chapter 
four discusses methodological considerations. Chapter 
five will summarize the results of an analytical 
literature review of deep ecology and ecofeminism and 
discuss major similarities and differences between the 
two approaches. Chapter six will reconceptualize social 
work's current person-in-environment perspective. This 
will be generated from the insights gained through 
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analysis of the literature in deep ecology and 
ecofeminism. It will also present the conclusions of the 
present analysis through a discussion of implications for 
social work thought and activity. 
Limitations and Anticipated Outcomes 
Limitations 
Limitations of this study center around methodology 
and scope of content. Methodologically, this study is 
limited to a qualitative, descriptive design. While 
allowing for robust depiction and imaginative innovation 
in concept generation, descriptive methods also preclude 
the development of precise "testable explanatory theories 
or hypotheses" (Goldstein, 1993, p. 89). The open-ended 
character of the research process does not mean that the 
process lacks rigor. As chapter four will describe in 
detail, the current study is driven by a clearly defined 
and precise research strategy. The current study will 
contribute to an ongoing exchange among theorists rather 
than attempt to provide a definitive account of 
conclusive meaning. 
A second limitation of this study involves the 
content area. Several features of ecophilosophies make 
exploration with any precision problematic. First, they 
are not a product of a single individual or a particular 
group or organization of people. Second, because 
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ecophilosophies are contemporary phenomenon, they are 
still in the process of developing. New ideas, 
individuals, writings, and organizations representing 
some form or aspect of ecophilosophy continue to come 
into existence, and the thoughts of the individuals and 
groups involved continue to evolve. Consequently, this 
work is limited to writings which are available in 
English and which are accessible in the United States and 
Canada. This means that the current study will have a 
decidedly North American cast. 
Another limitation of the current study related to 
the content involves the range of inquiry. 
Ecophilosophies are analyzed predominantly as 
philosophies rather than as political movements. This 
study focuses on the ideas of ecophilosophy-how it 
conceives of problems and how it envisages addressing 
them. This study does not attempt to canvass the various 
individual and group efforts to bring about 
transformation or discuss the merits or effectiveness of 
such efforts. These issues will not be ignored but will 
not be a principal focus of the current study. The 
primary interest will be to understand what meaning 
ecophilosophies provide for social work rather than to 




The anticipated outcomes of this study are: 
(1) Development of a reconceptualized person-in-
environment perspective for social work based 
on the ideas discovered through the analytical 
literature review. 
(2) Refinement of the concepts of self and nature 
applicable to enhancing social work's models 
and methods. 
(3) Alerting the profession to the influence of 
socio-cultural factors impinging upon model 
development. 
(4) Informing the profession of a different kind of 
awareness with relevance to the epistemological 
enterprise of social work. 
(5) Cultivating a collaborative base that will 
increase alliances and dialogues with diverse 
individuals and professionals in a 
consideration of alternative systems of 
meaning. 
(6) Engendering implications for social work's 




THE ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND ASSUMPTIONS OF THE 
MODERN, WESTERN WORLDVIEW: CONTEXTUAL BACKDROP 
FOR PERSON AND ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
Purpose 
This chapter is essentially a critical reflection on 
the origin, development and character of the modernist 
worldview and its associated scientific and technological 
paradigms which support a highly restrictive view of both 
person and environment. This will provide a context in 
which to observe and evaluate social work's conventional 
and current construction of person-in-environment and how 
it has been and is being used to define problems and 
generate solutions in the profession's theory and 
practice. 
The Core of Modernism: Anthropocentrism 
Many have suggested that we are living in a time of 
great transition which is characterized by a growing 
belief that Western Culture has outgrown the institutions 
and doctrines that have served it in the past ( Capra, 
1982; Schmookler, 1984, 1988, 1989; Eisler, 1987). One 
of the seminal features of this time of transformation 
has been a growing willingness to analyze critically the 
beliefs, values and assumptions which underpin the 
modernist view of reality ( Geertz, 1979; Capra, 1982; 
23 
Rifkin, 1983, 1985; Berman, 1984; Berry, 1988; Griffin, 
1988; Stone, 1993; D'Antonio, Sasaki, Yonebayashi, 1994; 
Callicott, 1994). In recent years social work has also 
vigorously debated the professional usefulness of many of 
the dimensions of modernism (Heineman, 1981; Gordon, 
1983; Imre, 1982, 1991; Weick, 1981, 1987, 1991; Canda, 
1991; Saleebey, 1991, 1992). 
The ongoing critique of modernism has emphasized 
challenging its anthropocentric core. Anthropocentrism 
assumes the universe to be essentially human-centered. 
Fox (1990) describes anthropocentrism as "human self-
importance" and suggests it has: 
been the single deepest and most persistent 
assumption of all the 'dominant' Western 
philosophical, social, and political traditions 
since the time of the classical Greeks. (p. 9) 
Anthropocentrism fundamentally separates and 
differentiates persons from the environment in which they 
live and from all other creatures on Earth, over which 
they have dominion (Catton and Dunlap, 1980; McLaughlin, 
1993). From this perspective the natural environment is 
seen as devoid of any subjective, experiential reality 
(Griffin, 1988). Environment is purely objective in 
character and merely a collection of largely unlimited 
natural resources which humans are entitled to use and 
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exploit. 
Anthropocentrism understands people as masters of 
their own destinies and capable of independently and 
individually choosing their own goals and learning to do 
whatever is necessary to achieve them. The 
anthropocentric bias of modernism rejects any inherent 
connection between the person and the natural 
environment. Creating this dichotomy between humans and 
the natural environment has narrowed the 
conceptualization of both people and environment. Nature 
has been removed from our understanding of environment 
and from our understanding of person. In effect both 
have been denatured (Roszak, 1992). The divorce of 
western humanity from nature is described clearly by 
Berman (1984) : 
... there is no ecstatic merger with nature, but 
rather total separation from it. Subject and object 
are always seen in opposition to each other. I am 
not my experiences, and thus not really a part of 
the world around me ... everything is an object, 
alien, not me; and I am ultimately an object too, an 
alienated 'thing' in a world of other, equally 
meaningless things. This world is not of my own 
making: the cosmos cares nothing for me, and I don't 
really feel a sense of belonging to it. What I 
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feel, in fact is a sickness in the soul. (p. 3) 
The modernist, anthropocentric view of separated 
person and environment sharply contrasts with what was 
for all but the last few hundred years a far more 
compassionate, wholistic and balanced view of humans and 
nature (Oelschlaeger, 1991; Ponting, 1991; Scheffer, 
1991; Hughes, 1975). Although the debate over the 
essential cosmology of primal peoples is hotly contested; 
it seems clear, based on a large body of recent 
scholarship, that most societies in prehistory and those 
emerging into the historical period were infused with a 
organic, nature-oriented cosmology that expressed itself 
in all of life's activities. For them an intuitive 
awareness of the natural, organic processes included the 
all of everything, from soil to sun, the magna mater 
(Oelschlaeger, 1991, p. 2). 
These sacred, organic cosmologies ordered the lives 
of most hunter/gatherer and many pre-enlightenment 
peoples and determined their values. They acted as both 
an individual and social ethic. As Merchant (1992) 
observes the analogy of earth as nurturing, sustaining 
mother permeates many early organic cosmologies through 
the Renaissance period. This earth/mother metaphor 
limited action for "one does not readily slay a mother, 
dig into her entrails for gold, or mutilate her body. As 
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long as the earth was conceptualized as alive and 
sensitive, it could be considered a breach of human 
ethical behavior to carry out destructive acts against 
it" (p. 43). 
The modern anthropocentric mindset tends to block 
consciousness from conceptualizing systems of meaning 
which differ substantially from conventional wisdom. 
Prehistoric and early historic organicism is of course a 
significant case in point. The modern, anthropocentric 
mind typically believes that atavistic peoples and 
societies wanted desperately to escape their primitive, 
wilderness wondering and simple, monotonous lifestyle 
while dreaming of the dawn of a more civilized existence. 
This view has been rigorously reinforced through 
conventional education and socialization. It represents 
a subtle perceptual prejudice which fails to conceive of 
a positive alternative framework to explain reality 
because one is so bound up with ones current vantage 
point. The modern mind "cannot imagine any desirable 
form of existence or definition of human beingness save 
their own. So viewed, prehistory is little more than a 
story of degraded savages living lives that were nasty, 
brutish, and short" (Oelschlaeger, 1991, p.6). 
Antithetical to this modernocentric 
contextualization of early people as ignorant brutes 
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longing for a more civilized existence are the 
conceptualizations of a relative new counterrevolution 
arising is natural history, archaeology and paleo-
anthropology. These new views have begun to understand 
our early and recent ancestors as living well within 
their organic framework. Anthropologist Herbert 
Schneidau (1976) commenting on the impact of this 
revolution of ideas, particularly in paleolithic studies, 
observes "perhaps someday it will be maintained that the 
most important development of consciousness in the 
twentieth century had to do not with moon walks or atomic 
bombs, but rather with the new availability of an 
adequate sense of prehistory" (p. 130). 
It appears an inescapable conclusion from this new 
sense of antiquity that for ninety-nine percent of the 
two million years on earth our ancestors lived as 
organicists having an understanding of nature's ways 
which reflects an intelligence at least equal to our own. 
Their beliefs concerning nature, land, place, plant and 
animal life, divinity, time, myth and ritual expressed in 
their art and cultural artifacts reveals a rich and 
imaginative life which is perhaps the most successful and 
enduring that humankind has ever achieved. 
And yet the modern conviction that prehistoric, and 
archaic people were primitive because of their organicist 
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beliefs in myth, magic and animism still goes largely 
unchallenged in most sectors of modern life. It is 
presumed that modern people and civilization have 
triumphed. Most moderns still think of themselves as 
''rational and therefore superior since they have achieved 
a factual and lawful scientific understanding of the 
world, dominated nature through technology, and abandoned 
mythological belief and magical practice" (Oelschlaeger, 
1991, p. 9). But, as Drew (1995) soberly observes, we 
have not triumphed: 
Ecologically our civilization is as mindless as a 
cancer, and we know that it will destroy itself by 
destroying its host. Ironically, any remnants of 
humanity to survive the apotheosis of civilization 
will be returned, genetically mutilated, to that 
state which we have thought contemptible. If man 
does not survive, interplanetary archaeologist of 
the future will classify our planet as one in which 
a very long and stable period of small-scale hunting 
and gathering was followed by an apparently 
instantaneous efflorescence of technology and 
society leading rapidly to extinction. 
Stratigraphically, the origin of agriculture and 
thermonuclear destruction will appears as 
essentially simultaneous. (p. 118) 
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Social work also has had difficulty developing a 
cohesive perspective of person and environment in its 
discourse and practices (Weick, 1981; Rosen, 1993; 
Mullaly, 1993; Kemp, 1994; Tester, 1994). For the most 
part, social work's current theories of person and 
environment were developed in the midst of modernism and 
are perhaps apt representations of modernist views. As 
the connection between catastrophic environmental 
degradation and human functioning becomes more clear 
(Johnson, 1993; Bullard, 1993; Hoff & McNutt, 1994) and 
if there is a major rethinking of western culture's view 
of reality then social work is challenged to reexamine 
its current theories of person and environment. 
This chapter contends that social work's 
conceptualization of person and environment must be 
viewed within the larger culture of modernism. In 
addition to the core anthropocentric ontology previously 
discussed, other modernist assumptions have profoundly 
influenced how person and environment came to be 
articulated, and the character of the relationship 
between both constructs. 
This chapter will present the views of a number of 
authors regarding the origin, development and current 
assumptions of the modern, western worldview and the 
implications of these factors on person and environment 
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relationships. It will delve into the question of how 
earlier, more wholistic constructs were supplanted by 
what critics view as more exploitive, hierarchial and 
dominating views. 
This critique is necessarily limited in scope to 
writers who have written in or who have had their works 
translated into English and which are readily available 
in the United States. Additionally, it will focus 
specifically on those issues related to the impact of the 
modern worldview and scientific paradigm on social work's 
views of person and environment. Though it is recognized 
that the implications of modernism to various systems of 
oppression such a racism, sexism and classism (issues of 
historical importance to social work) are of critical 
importance, they are outside the scope of this 
dissertation and will only be touched upon where 
appropriate. 
Worldviews and Paradigms 
Though worldview and paradigm are of ten used 
interchangeably by many writers, they are not necessarily 
equivalent concepts. A brief examination of their 
differences and similarities will assist in providing 
some clarity and interpretive boundary around these ideas 
for the subsequent discussion. A worldview is, broadly 
speaking, a map of the surrounding cultural landscape. 
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It is extremely encompassing in content and pervasive in 
adherence. The dominant worldview of any given culture 
or society: 
. . . normally pertains to the totality of human 
existence and most aspects of social life. 
Virtually everything that we experience is shaped by 
the perceptions provided by our view of the world. 
Since the dominant worldview is generally held by 
most members of that society, it normally 
establishes the culturally accepted definitions of 
social reality. We unconsciously and uncritically 
take our worldview for granted as 'the way things 
are'. It therefore pervades and influences most of 
our thinking and actions; it is not often questioned 
or doubted; and it is rarely altered in any 
significant way. (Olsen, Lodwick and Dunlap, 1992, 
pp. 13-14) 
A paradigm is more limited than a worldview. The 
concept of paradigms was popularized by Thomas Kuhn 
(1970) to explain the manner in which science operates 
and develops over time. He discusses the different 
meanings of paradigm and how, in particular, paradigms in 
science shift when the prevailing view appears to no 
longer be useful. Paradigms pertain only to certain 
aspects of life rather than the totality of existence. 
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In contrast to worldviews, paradigms are more limited in 
scope and acceptance and are constituted around beliefs 
and belief systems as well as the values associated with 
them. Embedded within a worldview, paradigms describe 
not only what is but proscribe what ought to be. 
Paradigms "provide the framework of meaning within which 
1 facts' and experiences acquire significance and can be 
interpreted" (Cotgrove, 1982, p. 26). 
Devall and Sessions (1985) summarize the elements of 
a worldview by addressing its general character and the 
paradigms (assumptions) nested in it: 
1. There are general assumptions about reality, 
including man's [sic] place in Nature. 
2. There are general "rules of the game" for 
approaching problems which are generally agreed 
upon. 
3. Those who subscribe to a given worldview share 
a definition of the assumptions and goals of 
their society. 
4. There is definite underlying confidence among 
believers in the worldview that solutions to 
problems exist within the assumptions of the 
worldview. 
5. Practitioners within the worldview present 
arguments based on the validity of data as 
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rationally explained by experts--be they 
scientific experts or experts in the philosophy 
and religious assumptions of the worldview. (p. 
42) 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a 
critical reflection on factors shaping and consequences 
of the modernist worldview and its associated scientific 
and technological paradigm. Important contributions from 
a number of theorists frame this discussion. First, the 
foundational works of Andrew Bard Schmookler (1984, 1988, 
1989) and Riane Eisler (1987) will be assessed to 
understand the prehistoric origins and development of the 
modernist mindset. Second, the works of Fritjof Capra 
(1975, 1982) and Lynn White Jr. (1973) will be summarized 
to clarify current configurations of the modernist 
worldview through identification of historic, causal 
factors associated with its particular tendency to 
alienate humans from themselves and their environments. 
Thirdly, the work of Albert Borgmann (1984) will be 
utilized to critique the implications of modern 
technology on our understanding of both person and 
nature. The final section of this chapter will be 
devoted to summarizing the important points of the above 
review and drawing some implications of these on 
conceptualizations of person and environment and the 
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relationship between the two. 
Prehistoric Origins and Development of the Modernist 
Worldview 
The tribes theory 
Andrew Bard Schmookler, researcher, writer and 
social critic, received his Ph.d from the University of 
California, Berkeley. He has been a researcher for the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies and Public 
Agenda Foundation and is currently the senior policy 
adviser for Common Ground. Schmookler has written a 
number of books critical of the way the current political 
and economic system creates an illusion of power and 
personal choice while leading the world precariously 
close to an inhumane civilization governed by war and 
domination. 
Schmookler (1984) suggests that early society was 
much different; mostly unstratified and basically 
egalitarian. It was made up of relatively tranquil 
communities which existed not to dominate and conquer but 
to cultivate the earth and to provide the material as 
well as the spiritual means for a satisfying life. 
Individuals were connected to their local tribal units 
and to the nurturing earth in non-hierarchial, non-
authoritative ways. Schmookler suggests that a struggle 
for domination between tribes arose because of increasing 
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population growth and resulting resource scarcity. Once 
the struggle for power began, it took on momentum of its 
own so that eventually power was sought for its own sake. 
Schmookler (1984) describes the parable as follows: 
Imagine a group of tribes living within reach of one 
another. If all choose the way of peace, then all 
may live in peace. But what if all but one choose 
peace, and that one is ambitious for expansion and 
conquest? What can happen to the others when 
confronted by an ambitious and potent neighbor? 
Perhaps one tribe is attacked and defeated, its 
people destroyed and its lands seized for the use of 
the victors. Another is defeated, but this one is 
not exterminated; rather, it is subjugated and 
transformed to serve the conqueror. A third seeking 
to avoid such disaster flees ... others decide to 
defend themselves... But the irony is that 
successful defense against a power-maximizing 
aggressor requires a society to become more like the 
society that threatens it. (p. 21) 
Human development was being driven in a direction 
that most did not intend nor would they have consciously 
chosen. Expansion created a situation of complete 
anarchy in which no one could choose to cease the 
struggle for domination. According to Schmookler (1984) 
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"no one is free to choose peace, but anyone can impose 
upon all the necessity of power. That is the lesson of 
the parable of the tribes" (p. 21). 
It is important to note that Schmookler's theory 
does not rest on any belief that sees aggression, 
domination and control as an innate, biologically driven 
human instinct. The parable of the tribes theory: 
... offers no indictment of human nature. The 
irresistible social evolutionary forces that have 
swept us along since the breakthrough to 
civilization have depended very little on human 
nature for their origin and their direction. All 
that was required was that we be creative enough to 
develop culture to a certain point of freedom from 
natural limits, and that we be capable of (not 
necessarily inclined toward) aggressive behavior. 
Almost any animal can be aggressive under the right 
condition. (Schmookler, 1984, p. 31) 
The unintended struggle for power in early society 
had many unforeseen, if not predictable, consequence for 
ongoing human development. First, exploitation of other 
peoples and of nature itself became a dominant social 
ethos. 
The selection for power can discard those who revere 
nature in favor of those willing and able to exploit 
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it. The warlike many eliminate the pacifistic; the 
ambitious, the content. Civilized societies will 
displace the remaining primitives, modern industrial 
powers will sweep away archaic cultures. The iron 
makers will be favored over those with copper or no 
metallurgy at all, and the horsemen will have sway 
over the unmounted. Societies that are coherently 
organized and have strong leadership will make 
inviable others with more casual power structures 
and more local autonomy ... Power therefore rules 
human destiny. (Schmookler, 1984, p. 23) 
A second consequence of the struggle for power was 
the emergence of domination hierarchies. Schmookler 
(1984) suggests that the ways of power create an: 
... intrasocietal selection for power, compounding 
the tendency for civilized societies to become 
polarized between a powerful elite and a 
subordinated majority. Thus with power uncontrolled 
in human affairs, the emergence of civilization cast 
human beings into the new roles of ruler and ruled. 
These new roles demanded new psychologically 
structures among the players in the human drama. (p. 
168) 
In a related point Schmookler suggests that "this new 
regime of power necessitates, among other things, 
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environmental destructiveness" (p. 255). Not only was 
there a willingness to exploit nature, but the ways of 
power created a drive to control it as well. Human 
control of nature is, from Schmookler's perspective, 
inseparably linked with technological growth and the 
willingness of humans to use this new technology for 
exploiting nature: 
As the parable of the tribes would predict, the 
struggles among human societies have inexorably 
spread power-conferring technologies .... these more 
exploitive technologies were accompanied by a new 
attitude that facilitated the more complete 
overthrow of the natural order for the enhancement 
of human power .... This ideological change is 
inseparable from the technological revolution that 
so explosively has escalated the growth of power. 
Those who can eye nature with an uninhibited urge to 
use her are far more likely to discover the 
techniques for manipulating her. And those who hold 
to an ideology than encourages the unlimited 
exercise of power are the more likely to put their 
technology to use. The selective process that has 
favored the technologically advanced has therefore 
also favored the spread of the less pious, more 
exploitative and rapacious attitude toward the 
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natural order. (Schmookler, 1984, pp. 257-59). 
A third consequence of Schmookler's theory is the 
way in which the spread of power reshaped human 
consciousness. He (1988) theorizes that the pre-
civilized sense of self was characterized by a "whole 
consciousness" in which there was no inherent separation 
between the conscious and unconscious mind. As the rule 
of power gradually became the global ethos, the belief 
that humans could control the natural environment 
according to their own desires gave rise to the belief 
that the conscious mind was in control of the unconscious 
mind. Jeremy Rifkin (1991) characterizes this as an 
attempt to control our animal nature: 
The rapid urbanization of Western culture after the 
seventeenth century went hand in hand with the 
severing of the remaining bonds between people and 
animals and the detachment of human beings from 
their own animal nature. Enlightenment thinkers 
joined with church authorities in condemning human 
behavior that they considered bestial, brutelike, 
and unworthy of the new civilized man and woman of 
the Age of Reason. Man's animal nature become 
something to overcome, a dark force to suppress and 
defeat. Bacon and other modern thinkers were as 
concerned with subduing the wild forces of human 
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nature as they were the wild forces of the rest of 
nature. Exercising rational, detached, objective 
power over animals in nature and the animal inside 
human nature become equally important. (pp. 189-90) 
Schmookler (1988) refers to 20th century views of 
self as a kind of "sick consciousness". From this 
perspective person is separated from his or her own 
deeper, instinctive, animal nature. The solution to this 
separation is the creation of a new consciousness "that 
is the expression of the harmony and integration that 
characterized the system of life before civilization" (p. 
311). According to Schmookler (1989) the striving for 
wholeness is inborn. The capacity for human fulfillment, 
the drive to achieve our potential are not a push for 
greater individuation, greater separation from our 
unconscious, our bodies and nature. New consciousness, 
whole consciousness is discerning that a deep river of 
"energy that seeks harmony" (p. 85) flourishes within 
humanity. It is only through creating the conditions to 
nourish this can humanity achieve wholeness. 
Models of social organization 
Riane Eisler's book, The Chalice and the Blade 
(1987), draws on archaeological data and theories to 
describe the character and limits of the modernist 
worldview. She is among a growing number of writers who 
41 
suggest that the current sociocultural worldview 
originated from patriarchal dominator societies of past 
epochs (Griffin, 1978; Merchant, 1980; Capra, 1992). 
Eisler, writer, researcher, lecturer in women's and 
cultural issues and attorney, was educated at UCLA and is 
currently the codirector of the Center for Partnership 
Studies in Pacific Grove, California. She has been 
involved in activist issues and feminist scholarship for 
many years, particularly those involving changing social 
paradigms and the emerging new vision of reality. 
According to Eisler recorded history has not been a 
simple linear progression from simple to more complex 
levels of technological and social development, but has 
been characterized by regressive periods such as the 
Middle Ages when the dominant culture returned to 
previous models of social organization. Eisler suggests 
that this return to previous models of social 
organization represents an intuitive, cultural 
recognition that in earlier times there had existed a 
sociocultural worldview that was far more complex and 
differently organized than previously thought. 
Eisler's Cultural Transformation Theory proposes 
that two basic models of society underlie all human 
cultures: the dominator model and the partnership model. 
The theory holds that there existed in prehistorical 
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times a society structured very differently from our 
present one. Through the use of archaeological data, 
such as that unearthed of ancient European and Cretan 
culture by archaeologists Marija Gimbutas (1982), James 
Mellart (1967, 1975) and Nicolas Platon (1966), Eisler 
hypothesizes that society was partnership dominated, 
equalitarian in its social structure and emphasized a joy 
and celebration of the harmonious relationship between 
human beings and the natural realm. This societal 
structure collapsed with the persistent attacks of 
aggressive bands of nomads who were originally fringe 
groups to the larger more peaceful society. Though 
providing no reason for the aggressiveness of these 
nomandic tribes, Eisler does suggest that their 
persistent attacks eventually lead to gradual 
disintegration of the peaceful, nature-centered 
civilizations and to the emergence of dominator 
societies. Eisler notes that although the course of 
cultural evolution since prehistorical times has included 
various social movements that have variously challenged 
the dominator model, the underlying assumption of that 
system has remained in place. The remainder of this 
section will summarize the assumptions of Eisler's view 
of the dominator model. 
The first assumption of the dominator model is that 
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systems evolve linearly from simple to complex forms. 
This belief has been used to support the notion that 
present social structure is defined as best because it is 
the most highly complex. Because the direction of change 
is from simple to complex and because this is perceived 
to be a natural process, there is no possible room to 
question the current structure of society. This belief 
also excludes the possibility of the existence of a 
complex and differently organized society in archaic 
times. To ensure the maintenance of this belief, 
dominator societies systematically distort, undermine, 
and destroy the symbols and structures of societal 
structures different from their own. This has been 
particularly true in the way dominator societies have 
emphasized control of women and nature. 
Another primary assumption of the dominator society 
is a social order organized around a hierarchical, 
ranking process. Hierarchical structure is assumed to be 
the norm while person-to-person interaction and 
relationships, if they exist at all, revolve around a 
one-up/one-down dichotomy. Thus, diversity is equated 
with either inferiority or superiority with, for example, 
men ranked over women, light skin color over darker skin 
color, adults over children, humans over nature and 
animals, rationality over intuition, consciousness over 
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sub-consciousness, and logic over myth. Eisler suggests 
that dominant societies retain hierarchies with force or 
threat of force. The power of the blade is idealized, in 
that strength and power are equated with the capacity to 
destroy. Warfare against persons or nature is 
redemptive, and power is equated with privilege, 
oppression and fear. 
Following understandably from the above assumption 
is the dominator society's emphasis on technologies, 
particularly those which tend to destroy, dominate and 
maintain distinctions. Eisler suggests an important 
distinction between development of technologies applied 
to peaceful, and sustaining purposes, and technologies 
developed for destruction, control and violence. 
Another assumption of the dominator society deals 
with the normative form of leadership. According to 
Eisler, there is an assumption that leadership is in the 
form of a small elite making decisions for the larger 
group. Collaborative and participatory leadership is 
ignored or devalued. Eisler especially focuses on the 
fact that these elite leadership positions have 
historically been held by males. Those perceived as 
strong by virtue of position or influence are most likely 
to attain leadership positions. Females, members of 
other groups and those with little status or influence 
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are not likely to lead. 
A final assumption of Eisler's dominator society is 
that multivoiced forms of myth, ritual, spirituality and 
sacredness are excluded from and separate from everyday 
life. From this perspective, spirituality and sacredness 
are singularly skewed toward experiences of redemptive 
violence (Wink, 1991) and coerciveness rather than 
benevolence and nurturing. This isolated and refracted 
view of spirituality and sacredness carried with it a 
presumption that persons are separate from and above 
nature. Nature is objectified and placed below humans. 
Belief structures emphasizing feminine and natural 
spirituality and lifegiving nurturing are replaced with 
the reverence for death and war as divinely sanctioned. 
To this point this chapter has presented Eisler's 
and Schmookler's prehistorical perspectives on the 
origins and development of what has become known as the 
modernist worldview. Others have approached this issue 
with an examination of causal factors and current 
societal attitudes associated with the modernist view. 
The following section will present three such critiques 
central to understanding the modern worldview and its 
technoscientific paradigm. 
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Current Configurations of the Modern Worldview 
Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm 
Fritjof Capra (1982) examines the contemporary 
values, beliefs and consequences of the modern, 
scientific paradigm and suggests that its socio-
historical underpinnings lie in what he terms the 
Cartesian-Newtonian Paradigm (p. 15). Capra holds a Ph.d 
in physics from the University of Vienna and is a writer 
and lecturer on the philosophical implications of modern 
science, particularlly the parallels between physics and 
the basic ideas in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. For 
purposes of this dissertation, emphasis will be on the 
essential points of Capra's theory rather than on an 
attempt to fully summarize his complete work. 
Capra suggests that between the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries a radical shift took place in the 
way people perceived the world and in the way the world 
and universe came to be understood. A major part of this 
shift was a new view of the earth as a machine rather 
than a living organism. Concomitant with this view was a 
lofty valuing of mathematical description, analytical 
reasoning and quantification of objective data. The goal 
of modern science came to be the acquisition of knowledge 
that could be used to control and separate nature from 
human intuition. Sir Francis Bacon, one of the fathers 
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of the mechanistic viewpoint, writes in his Novum 
Organum, first published in 1620: "we must therefore 
completely resolve and separate Nature, not by fire, 
certainly, but by the mind, which is a kind of divine 
fire" (Bacon, 1994, p. 169). Capra states of Bacon: 
The terms in which Bacon advocated his new empirical 
method of investigation were not only passionate but 
often outright vicious. Nature, in his view, had to 
be "hounded in her wanderings", "bound into 
service", and made a "slave". She was to be "put in 
constraint," and the aim of the scientist was to 
"torture nature's secrets from her." ... his view of 
nature as a female whose secrets have to be tortured 
from her with the help of mechanical devices is 
strongly suggestive of the widespread torture of 
women in the witch trials of the early seventeenth 
century. Bacon's work thus represents an 
outstanding example of the influences of patriarchal 
attitudes on scientific thought. (p.56) 
Capra suggests that Cartesian philosophy is the 
basis for many of the assumptions of the current 
scientific paradigm. A major presupposition of the 
Cartesian-Newtonian model is revealed by its process of 
organizing differences among and between organisms within 
a hierarchical structure. This general organizing 
48 
principle is reflected in, and supported by the belief 
that mind and matter are separate and that there is no 
essential sacredness in nature. This point is 
particularly important, as it represents a shift away 
from the organic view of nature characterizing previous 
epochs. From this perspective human consciousness came 
to be viewed as immaterial; self was set above the rest 
of nature and above ones bodily processes. 
A second major presupposition of the modern, 
scientific paradigm that has its historical roots in the 
Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm is reductionism. 
Reductionism understands all complex phenomena as being 
reducible to their smallest parts. Change consists in 
the rearrangement of the parts, which themselves do not 
change. The reductionist view was applied to the larger 
society by philosopher John Locke. Just as Newton's 
laws of mechanics were seen to govern the physical 
universe, Locke attempted to reduce the patterns of 
social behavior to the behavior of individuals. In his 
classic The Second Treatise on Government (1983) Locke 
spells out his unqualified belief in the absolute 
individuality and unrestrained freedom of all persons. 
He writes: 
To understand political power right and derive it 
from its original, we must consider what state all 
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men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect 
freedom to order their actions and dispose of their 
possessions and persons as they think fit, within 
the bounds of the law of nature, without asking 
leave or depending upon the will of any other man. 
(p. 118) 
Capra suggests that Locke's theory was pervasive, 
having a profound sway over all modern political, 
economic and social life. He observes: 
Locke's ideas became the basis for the value system 
of the Enlightenment and had a strong influence on 
the development of modern economic and political 
thought. The ideals of individualism, property 
rights, free markets, and representative government, 
all of which can be traced back to Locke, 
contributed significantly to the thinking of Thomas 
Jefferson and are reflected in the Declaration of 
Independence and the American Constitution. (p.69). 
Capra also suggests that one of the major 
consequences of the mechanistic, reductionist universe of 
the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm is the development of 
technology which contributes to the control, domination 
and power over others by force. He writes that modernist 
ideas of science and technology: 
are based on the seventeenth-century belief that 
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an understanding of nature implies domination of 
nature by "man." Combined with the mechanistic 
model of the universe, which also originated in the 
seventeenth century, and with excessive emphasis on 
linear thinking, this attitude has produced a 
technology that is unhealthy and inhuman; a 
technology in which the natural, organic habitat of 
complex human beings is replaced by a simplified, 
synthetic, and prefabricated environment. (p. 44) 
Christianity and alienation 
Capra has identified the values, beliefs and 
consequences of the Cartesian-Newtonian framework as a 
significant historical contributor to the modern 
scientific paradigm. From Capra's perspective the 
assumptions of the Cartesian-Newtonian model have 
separated individuals and society from themselves and 
from the essential sacredness of nature. While Capra 
suggests the historical roots of humanity's current 
alienation lie in the mechanistic worldview, others have 
suggested that the historical roots of modern alienation, 
particularly human/nature alienation, lie in the 
powerfully exploitive and dominating character of the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition. 
This association between Judaeo-Christian beliefs 
and the modern separation from nature was raised 
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originally and forcefully by then U.C.L.A. professor and 
historian Lynn White Jr. in his 1967 article The 
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis (1973). White's 
critique of the Judaeo-Christian heritage has met with 
substantial criticism by those who suggest that the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition does not consistently or 
unanimously adopt a negative attitude toward nature and 
to suggest such represents a simplistic and 
mischaracterized understanding of the historical and 
canonical data (Dubas, 1973; Passmore, 1974; Santmire, 
1985; Cohen, 1989; Attfield, 1991; Kinsley, 1995). His 
ideas have, however, added important initial insight into 
understanding the philosophical and religious 
orientations and values giving raise to modernist 
conceptions of the relationship between person and 
environment. 
White indicts the Judaeo-Christian tradition as 
encouraging both social and ecological exploitation by 
rejecting a much earlier pagan worldview in which nature 
is inhabited by spirits which humankind relied upon to 
inform their view of human/nature interaction. According 
to White (1973): 
Especially in its Western form, Christianity is the 
most anthropocentric religion that the world has 
seen .... Christianity, in absolute contrast to 
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ancient paganism and Asia's religions ... not only 
established a dualism of man and nature but also 
insisted that it is God's will that man exploit 
nature for his proper ends. (p. 25) 
In the view of White popular religion of antiquity 
was animistic. "Every tree, every spring, every stream, 
every hill had its own genius loci, its guardian spirit" 
(p. 25). Before one could cut a tree or alter nature in 
any way the spirit in charge of that particular entity or 
place had to be assuaged. Christianity, White argues, 
desacralized nature thus encouraging its exploitation by 
humans who were seen as separate from nature and superior 
to it. In opposing and destroying pagan animism 
"Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a 
mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects" 
(p. 25). It replaced all the old gods, many of whom were 
nature deities, and to a great extent demystified nature 
making it nonsacred and a passive resource to be 
controlled and manipulated by human beings. 
White claims that modernism and its techno-
scientific paradigm are in large measure a logical result 
of Christianity's insolent view of nature. 
Christianity's predisposition to desacralize nature laid 
the foundation for the rise of the Cartesian-Newtonian 
paradigm and the resulting scientific and technological 
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manipulation of nature. White notes that the modern and 
distinctively Western version of science and technology 
are permeated with a religious, particularly Judaeo-
Christian, justification of human dominance over and 
arrogance toward nature. He writes: 
From the 13th century onward, up to and including 
Leibnitz and Newton, every major scientist, in 
effect, explained his motivations in religious 
terms. Indeed, if Galileo had not been so expert an 
amateur theologian he would have got into far less 
trouble: the professionals resented his intrusion. 
And Newton seems to have regarded himself more as a 
theologian than as a scientist. It was not until 
the late 18th century that the hypothesis of God 
became unnecessary to many scientists. (White, 1973, 
p. 27) . 
There are several key passages (The Holy Bible, 
1952) in the Old Testament that White alludes to as 
supporting a view of the world created primarily, if not 
exclusively, for human purposes. They are (1) Genesis 
1:26-29, in which God says to men to "fill the earth and 
subdue it; and have dominion over ... every living thing 
that moves upon the earth", (2) Genesis 9:1-3, in which 
God says to Noah and his descendants "the fear of you and 
the dread of you shall be upon every beast ... every moving 
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thing that lives shall be food for you: and as I gave you 
the green plants, I give you everything", and (3) Psalms 
8:5-8, in which the Psalmist praises God's creation of 
mankind by saying "thou hast made him little less than 
God, and dost crown him with glory and honor. Thou hast 
given him dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast 
put all things under his feet". 
For White, these passages suggest a view of reality 
in which God is primarily interested in human beings and 
delegates to them mastery over his natural creation. 
Nature becomes a mere backdrop for the more fundamentally 
important human-to-human or human-to-divine interplay. 
White suggests that the human-centered essence of these 
passages are almost universally, though perhaps 
unacknowledged or unconsciously, accepted by the 
Christian as well as the so called "post-Christian" era 
(p. 24). He further argues that this religiously 
justified domination of nature permeates all western 
socio-political ideologies. For White Capitalism as well 
as Marxism are essentially Judaeo-Christian heresies 
because, despite apparent differences, both are rooted in 
a antinaturalist, anthropocentric Judaeo-Christian 
teleology. Referring to this pervasiveness White notes: 
Certainly the forms of our thinking and language 
have largely ceased to be Christian, but to my eye 
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the substance often remains amazingly akin to that 
of the past .... We continue today to live, as we have 
lived for about 1700 years, very largely in a 
context of Christian axioms. (p. 24) 
White (1973) concludes that the modernist project's 
science and technology, irrespective of what socio-
political idealogy embraces them, offers no singular 
solution to the current crisis of person and environment. 
"Since the roots of our trouble are so largely religious, 
the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we 
call it that or not" (p. 30). White's alternatives are 
to disavow any ongoing allegiance to orthodox 
Christianity and its "axiom that nature has no reason for 
existence save to serve man" (p. 29), or to attempt to 
reform Christianity ecologically by returning to or 
affirming a minority tradition existing within 
Christianity which valued the essential and positive 
interrelationship between the divine, humanity, and 
nature. For White this minority tradition is best 
represented in the life and works of St. Francis of 
Assisi. 
Technology and contemporary life 
In the following section the researcher will 
summarize Albert Borgmann's (1984) theory of the 
technological character of modern life and offer some 
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suggestions concerning its impact on the way humanity 
understands its relationship to nature . Borgmann is a 
writer and teacher of philosophy. He received his Ph.d 
in philosophy from the University of Munich in 1963. He 
has been a faculty member at the University of Illinois, 
De Paul University, the University of Hawaii and is 
currently professor of philosophy at the University of 
Montana. Borgmann has been most influenced in his 
thought by Martin Heidegger and John Rawls. He has been 
involved in refining his theory of technology which 
builds on Heidegger's insights and the commitment to 
justice exemplified by Rawls. 
Borgmann points out that critique of technology must 
not be centered on understanding the nature of research 
and development and machines in a narrow sense but rather 
on what, from a philosophical view, is the significance 
of technology. The significance of technology is best 
brought out through a consideration of "the antecedents 
and consequences of applied science and engineering" 
(p. 8) . 
Borgmann argues that an antecedent social agreement 
precedes technological development both historically and 
logically. Historically, the character of this agreement 
shows up in the writings of Bacon and Descartes as a 
promise of liberation, enrichment and conquest of all 
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scourges of humanity. This promise of technology is 
taken ''to mean that implied in the technological mode of 
taking up with the world there is a promise that this 
approach to reality will, by way of domination of nature, 
yield liberation and enrichment'' (p. 41). 
Borgmann does not question this aspiration for 
liberty and enrichment but rather the technological means 
by which the promise is realized. For Borgmann means are 
associated with the technological device to be 
distinguished from the more essential and somewhat pre-
technological thing. 
What are a device and a thing? The most fundamental 
and important feature of the device is that unlike a 
thing, a device divides sharply and exclusively into 
means and an end. Machinery is the means of a device 
while the commodity is its end. A device's only purpose 
is to secure a commodity in the simplest most efficient 
way possible. On the other hand " a thing is inseparable 
from its context, namely its world, and from our commerce 
with the things and its world, namely engagement" (p. 
41) . A thing has a context which makes certain claims 
and demands on us in a way which goes beyond the simple 
procurement of a commodity. It demands our engagement on 
many levels. 
Borgmann illustrates the association between 
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devices, things and commodities by drawing on the 
examples of the connection between a stove, central heat 
and warmth. A wood burning stove is a thing which 
produces warmth but it is more than a mere means of 
warmth. The uniqueness of a thing is described by 
Borgmann: 
The experience of a thing is always and also a 
bodily and social engagement with the thing's 
world ... Thus a stove is used to furnish more than 
mere warmth. It was a focus, a hearth, a place that 
gathered the work and leisure of a family and gave 
the house a center. Its coldness marked the 
morning, and the spreading of its warmth marked the 
beginning of the day. It assigned to various family 
members tasks that defined their place in the 
household ... It provided the entire family a regular 
and bodily engagement with the rhythm of the seasons 
that was woven together with the threat of cold and 
the solace of warmth, the smell of wood smoke, the 
exertion of sawing and carrying, the teaching of 
skills and the fidelity to daily tasks ... Physical 
engagement is not simply physical contact but the 
experience of the world through the manifold 
sensibility of the body. That sensibility is 
sharpened and strengthened in skill. Skill is 
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intensive and refined world engagement. (p. 42). 
A device transforms a thing by transforming our 
experience of engagement with it and thus drawing our 
attention solely toward the commodity. Central heating 
is a device which transforms the simple stove. It 
amplifies the warmth, the commodity because it is so 
easily expanded with little or no effort. Warmth stands 
out, is focused upon and draws our attention. It alone 
remains crucial to our well being. 
The transformation of a thing into a device not only 
amplifies the commodity, pushing all other experiences 
into the background. Central heat reduces the features 
associated with the stove. They withdraw into the 
background, unnoticed. Borgmann suggests that not only 
are they overlooked and misplaced into the recesses of 
unconsciousness, they tend to be repressively withdrawn 
into a ontological unfamiliarity, perhaps irretrievably. 
If warmth is.taken to be what the device is for, 
then progress, as the standard of technological 
advancement, is simply the replacement of one means for 
the procurement of the same end. Means are "better 
means" of accomplishing the same end but in a less 
burdensome way. The commodity is less burdensome if it 
meets the standard of being easier, safer, more 
ubiquitous and more instantaneous. It can be a burden to 
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chop and haul wood, build a fire, wait for the room to 
warm, attend to the dangers of a wood-burning stove, or 
not to have the room or whole house uniformly warm. The 
goal of technology becomes the procurement of commodities 
with no strings or burdens attached. Paradoxically, the 
ongoing adjustment of devices tends to make them 
"inconspicuous", while, at the same time inculcating the 
attitude that commodities are readiily available and 
accessible. The amplified foreground of the commodity, 
mere warmth, has expanded and increased in prominence by 
becoming free of all limits of space, time, danger and 
availability, and free of all burdens of skill, exertion 
and attention. 
Borgmann argues that mere warmth, no matter how 
expanded this commodity has become, is not a substitute 
for the thing of the stove. In fact as warmth becomes 
ubiquitous throughout the house, it fails to provide a 
focus and becomes no substitute for the thing because it 
lacks a world with its demand for engagement. Mere 
warmth cannot become the essence of a house because it 
does not warrant our attention and care. Transformation 
of the thing into a device does not merely tend to 
obscure possibilities of experience, rather its very 
structure makes rich experience impossible. 
Borgmann's thing-device distinction and his critical 
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description of the ways devices call for consumption, and 
nothing more, becomes more than a matter of psychological 
interest. At their core, the structure and construction 
of devices create a compelling challenge to the very 
essence of our existence. Here the matter becomes 
ontological rather than psychological. 
In unburdening us, technological devices disengage 
us from a profound depth of interest in the natural world 
and establish the ground from which the normal operation 
of existence is viewed. This way of splitting means and 
ends -- devices and commodities -- and ontologically 
reshaping existence into the model of a device, patterns 
human relationships, organizations, institutions, 
structures of civilization, professional practices, and 
the ways nature and culture are arranged and accessed. 
To move within the realm of devices and commodities 
is then entirely normal, and to exchange the 
engagement with things for the consumption of 
commodities is to extend the range of 
normalcy ... Living in an advanced industrial country, 
one is always and already implicated in technology 
so profoundly and extensively that one's involvement 
normally remains implicit. The rule of technology 
is not the reign of a substantive force people would 
bear with resentment or resistance. Rather 
62 
technology is the rule today in constituting the 
conspicuous pattern by which we normally orient 
ourselves. (pp. 104-5). 
Borgmann's argument is not that we presently live in the 
midst of technological totalitarianism, but rather that 
the range of normalcy is changing as we make more 
decisions for consumption and against engagement. In 
doing this the pervasiveness of the devices pattern 
becomes so entrenched that few contrasts or visions exist 
to set off the current pattern or suggest alternatives. 
Our ontological ground becomes disengagement, separation, 
the essential annihilation of the thing. 
The implications of Borgmann's theory are stunning. 
Because our basic daily orientation is that of 
consumption through the patterned use of devices, the 
central concerns of the modernist mindset become those of 
a preoccupation with economic contrivances such as gross 
national product. Modern technology cultivates an 
outlook on government and social services as metadevices 
whose ends are to unburden us from personal engagement in 
our own, as well as other's, human fulfillment. Borgmann 
also suggests that the technological paradigm has 
contributed to an absence of genuine class struggle and 
the persistence of social and economic inequality. In 
the end, modern technology prescribes our discourse and 
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agenda, informs our theories of social order, and 
determines our values. 
Summary of Assumptions of the Modernist Worldview 
A summary of the assumptions of the modernist 
worldview and its related scientific and technological 
paradigms is drawn from integrating the perspectives of 
the various theorists presented above. The intent is to 
aid the reader in perceiving and examining the different 
facets of the modernist worldview. In chapter three 
these will be used to provide a socio-historical backdrop 
for understanding the development and current 
constellation of social work's person-in-environment 
perspective. It is important to note that modernism, 
like most systems, consists of a complex web of non-
linear interrelationships which do not easily lend 
themselves to concise presentation. Consequently, there 
is some overlap among the concepts since many of the 
beliefs and assumptions mutually influence one another. 
A worldview is defined as a set of beliefs, values 
and assumptions held by a group of persons, which 
organizes their perceptions of the world around them. In 
examining the previous theorists, two overarching maxims 
appear to characterize the modernist worldview: (1) a 
hierarchical, dualistic conceptual framework, and (2) an 
overvaluation of personal, environmental and 
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technological capacity. 
The modernist worldview rests upon a basic 
assumption that relationships exist within a 
hierarchical, dualistic framework (Capra, 1982; 
Schmookler, 1984, 1988, 1989; Eisler, 1987). This maxim 
holds that the natural progression of all systems is 
linear, from simple to complex (Capra, 1982, Eisler, 
1987; Berman, 1984). This view purports to make sense of 
reality by oversimplifying complex situations and seeking 
to understand differences between things through a 
sorting and ranking process. Consequently 
interrelationships are seen from a dualistic up/down, 
above/under, win/lose frame of reference which excludes 
the possibility of more communal processes. 
Hierarchy is intimately related to the process of 
emphasizing separateness over connectedness. It produces 
the ranking of the process of separateness over 
connectedness. These two concepts weave through a number 
of modernism's beliefs and assumptions. Capra (1982) 
points out than mind and matter are separated, that mind 
is valued over matter, that analytic thinking is valued 
over intuitive thought. Persons are viewed as separate 
from and above the natural environment (White, 1973; 
Capra, 1982; Eisler, 1987, Berman, 1984, Rifkin, 1991). 
Complex phenomena are seen through a reductionist lens 
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which contracts the separate parts and uses them to 
explain the behavior of the whole (Capra, 1982; Colwell, 
1987; McKibben, 1989). This process consequently 
emphasizes the development of human selves which are 
separate from others, their own animism, and from nature 
itself. Perception of self is, thus, split into 
categorized parts as being of greater or lesser value. 
Bodily functions are associated with nature and are 
perceived as dirty or of only secondary importance to the 
mind. Such individualized selves are characterized by 
self absorption, lack of concern for other humans and 
other species and preoccupation with the present 
generation and those closest to the individual 
(Ehrenfeld, 1981; Wilber, 1980, 1981, 1986; Milbrath, 
1984; Gergen, 1991). Kanner and Gomes (1995 p. 77) call 
this self-centered, modernist personality the "all-
consuming" self, while Lasch (1984, p.16) prefers the 
"minimal self" to describe the character of the modern 
individual. Devall (1995) traces the contours of the 
minimal self: 
The minimal self has contracted to a defensive core 
concerned primarily with psychic survival and making 
a good impression on certain significant people -
bosses, clients, potential sexual partners. Seeing 
the problems of living in modern times - crime, 
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increasing air and water pollution, terrorism, long-
term economic decline, nuclear arms race, cynicism 
in major institutions in society - the minimal self 
prepares for the siege, retreats to private pleasure 
domes and withdraws from community service or any 
form of commitment .... Rootless, alienated from human 
community and from wild nature, from the will-of-
the-land, besieged with propaganda from 
scientists ... that nature should be controlled by 
human technology, the goal of the minimal self is 
survival, not personal growth. (p.112) 
Hierarchial separation is also reflected in the splitting 
off of spirituality and sacredness from nature and the 
concerns of everyday existence (White, 1973; Capra, 1984; 
Eisler, 1987; Fox, 1995). 
The second overarching maxim which appears to 
characterize the modernist worldview is the process of 
overvaluation of personal, environmental and 
technological capacity. A number of assumptions and 
beliefs of modernism may be seen to be characterized by a 
process of overvaluation. 
First, there is a belief in unlimited resource 
capacity (Capra, 1984; Borgmann, 1984; Milbrath, 1984; 
Myers, 1993). From this perspective, humans are entitled 
to control and exhaust resources, including anything non-
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human and some categories of humans judged to be non-
human (McLaughlin, 1993; Singer, 1994). Related to this 
is the belief that because of humankind's superior status 
relative to other beings, there is infinite capacity for 
growth. This stance denies population problems (Ehrlich 
and Ehrlich, 1990) while emphasizing production, economic 
consumption and a steady pattern of progress. Because 
growth has become associated with progress, it implies an 
inevitability to changes and eliminates the possibility 
of considering alternatives to modern society's current 
direction. This perspective is clearly illustrated in 
Jeremy Rifkin's (1985) discussion of the decision to 
split the atom: 
Even if the harm has exceeded the benefits, ... to 
say no to splitting the atom seems unthinkable 
Our mind simply will not allow us to say no to the 
splitting of the atom, despite what we know about 
where that decision has led. It's as if we are 
compelled by some sacred pact, some higher form of 
allegiance we all share, to make the decisions to go 
ahead, even against our own best judgment. Our 
instincts might well stir us to saying no, but the 
rational side, our conscious mind says we must, we 
have no choice, it is fated, there is no 
alternative, it is our burden to bear. To say no is 
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to condemn everything we hold dear. To reject the 
experiment is to threaten our world view, to 
question our approach to knowledge and to undermine 
our traditional relationship to technology. We are 
convinced that in saying no, we would be giving up 
the dream that has sustained so many generations, 
the dream of unfettered progress, the dream of 
building our own earthly eden. (pp. 30-1) 
A second set of beliefs reflecting the process of 
overvaluation may be seen in the inflated view of human 
capacity. Nested in this notion is the belief that 
humans can choose whatever goals they want by rational, 
logical and objective processes and learn to acquire 
whatever is needed to accomplish them. Nothing is 
impossible for human progress, given enough time, study 
and favorable economic conditions (Berry, 1977; Spangler, 
1984; Schwartz, 1986). It has become increasingly clear 
that vaunted belief in human capacity and the denial of 
human limits has often been accompanied by tragic 
consequences for humans and for the natural domain. 
Technological development and science are also 
related to the process of overvaluing capacity. Milbrath 
(1989) cites the belief in science and technology as a 
kind of sanctifying balm to modern society because of its 
stated ability to predict and control and to turn this 
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into swift development of products that maximize 
usefulness and efficiency. Technological mentality and 
structure, which Ellul (1964) calls technique, has not 
only pervaded industrial processes, but also all social, 
political and economic life. It has its own inherent 
logic and inner necessity which coalesces into a kind of 
technological determinism since it is self-perpetuating, 
all-pervasive and inescapable. In modern society, a 
legitimate concern for material necessity quickly becomes 
a frantic pursuit of comfort, a total dedication to self-
gratification (Gilkey, 1970i Winner, 1977, 1986). Such 
an obsession with devices distorts our basic values as 
well as our relationships with nature and other persons. 
It leads to a abridgement of imaginative experience and 
authentic human existence requiring the engagement and 
depth that occur when simple things and practices focus 
our attention and center our lives (Borgmann, 1984) . 
Overvaluing science and technology generates a quest for 
unlimited power which in the final analysis becomes 
imperialistic and addictive. 
The optimists may think that, by fulfilling our 
material needs, technology liberates us from 
materialism and allows us to turn to intellectual, 
artistic, and spiritual pursuits. But it does not 
seem to be working out that way. Our material wants 
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have escalated and appear insatiable. Yesterday's 
luxuries are today's necessities ... Once we allow 
technology to define the good life, we have excluded 
many important human values from consideration 
(Barbour, 1993, p. 14). 
This chapter has described the major assumptions of 
the modernist worldview. A central theme which has 
emerged as a consequence of the assimilation of the 
assumptions of the modernist mindset is the sense of 
alienation, isolation and separation experienced by 
people and, as we shall see, by institutions as they 
accommodate themselves to the dominant paradigm. 
Current, western culture has adopted a belief system 
which alienates humanity from the remainder of nature. 
This belief system has become so ingrained that it has 
not only separated humanity into single individuals but 
has separated each individual's intellect (rationality) 
from the rest of him/her self. Almost nothing has 
escaped the pervasive influence of the modernist 
worldview. It has changed the very face of reality. It 
has altered nearly all facets of life in the western 
tradition. This can be seen in the development of the 
social sciences and in particular the development of 
social work. 
The following chapter will articulate the 
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development of social work's conventional idea of person 
and environment and trace the current status of these 
concepts within the socio-cultural backdrop of modernism. 
It will utilize the insights gained in the current 
chapter to understand the contextual development of these 
constructs. Chapters two and three, together, will form 




DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS OF SOCIAL WORK'S 
PERSON AND ENVIRONMENT CONSTRUCTS 
Social work's ideas about person and environment 
have been shaped by many factors. The current chapter 
consists of a contextual review of the development of the 
concepts of person and environment within social work. 
Structuring this review is the assumption that conceptual 
development is not simply the deliberate and collective 
contemplation of influential leaders but is, in fact, 
influenced by the socio-cultural contexts in which such 
concepts arise (Barthes, 1979; Weick, 1981; Megill, 1985; 
Poster, 1990; Fillingham, 1993; Kemp, 1994) including as 
well political differences and conflicts within the 
profession. This chapter situates social work discourse 
on person and environment within this broader context. 
The current chapter is organized around two general 
themes: (1) tracing the conventional idea of person and 
environment constructs as they developed during the 
beginnings of the profession, and (2) sketching the 
status of these constructs as they are currently 
conceptualized. It is important for the reader to keep 
in mind that though this chapter is loosely framed around 
historical periods, it would be inappropriate to assume 
that the selected ideas discussed as emanating from a 
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particular period represent the totality of pertinent 
meanings. 
Conventional Ideas of Person and Environment 
The early years 
The rapid industrialization, urbanization, 
territorial expansion and economic uncertainty which 
marked the post-Civil War period was a time of great 
change in American culture. But change does not come 
without great human and social cost. Though spurred by 
unblemished confidence in the notion of industrial 
progress, frontier minded individualism and the belief in 
self sufficiency, these heady ideas were gradually coming 
under increasing criticism (Bremmer, 1956; Axinn & Levin, 
1975; Boyer, 1978). 
"Prior to industrialization, most people lived in 
communities with an array of institutions that afforded a 
high degree of self-sufficiency. Survival necessitated a 
degree of solidarity, or interdependence, that was taken 
as a law of nature" (Karger & Stoesz, 1990, p.35). 
Social welfare in America during this period was largely 
viewed as the responsibility of private efforts to 
enhance the welfare of the community. Reliance on 
voluntary associations to solve problems characterized 
nineteenth century relief efforts. Poverty was viewed as 
a limited though inevitable result of the economic 
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structure, but with faith and effort individual 
opportunities existed within the economic system for many 
if not most to overcome its restrictive bounds (Kemp, 
1994) . It was "pauperism rather than poverty as such" 
(Spano, 1982, p.12) which captured the attention of many 
involved in relief efforts. Pauperism was thought to be 
more widespread than poverty and existed more or less 
independent of the economic system. It was thought to 
result from some defect in individual character such as 
drunkenness, idleness or moral laxity and was best 
enervated through personal rehabilitation (Bremmer, 1956; 
Chambers & Binding, 1968; Spano, 1982; Franklin, 1990; 
Kemp, 1994) . 
As population increased, the magnitude of an 
escalating number of social problems could no longer be 
easily attributed to lack of effort or individual defect. 
Spano (1982) summarizes the changing social organization: 
Due to this tremendous growth, cities faced nearly 
overwhelming problems in housing, health, 
sanitation, crime, unemployment, transportation and 
poor relief. The existing social institutions 
lacked both the technological capacities and the 
philosophical foundations to cope with these 
problems. The combination of sheer numbers, 
combined with the heterogeneity of the new arrivals 
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in American cities, increased the complexity of the 
problems and the frantic search for their solutions 
(p.14). 
The ideas that evolved from this national reappraisal 
coalesced into an identifiable entity commonly thought of 
as the Progressive Movement (Hofstadter, 1955; Wiebe, 
1967; Leiby, 1978; Spano, 1982). It was the Progressive 
Era which also shaped the identity and purposes of the 
emerging profession of social work and determined the 
contours of social work's early understanding of person 
and environment. 
The progressive era 
What evolved during the Progressive Era was a robust 
belief in the environment as a powerful and dynamic force 
shaping human development. Concomitant with this reform-
minded thinking on environment was a growing conviction 
that persons had the inherent capacities to achieve 
positive change through a deliberate modification of 
their environment (Goldman, 1977) . This emerging focus 
on change through personal capacity and environmental 
reform however was limited in scope. Though it shifted 
attention from individual deficiency and passive 
adaptation toward the impact of environmental factors and 
the individual's capacity to change them, Progressive 
reform tended to restrict its views of environment to 
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very limited social and economic factors (Kemp, 1994). 
This is not to say that this era's views of 
environment were exclusively defined in such narrow 
bands. The romantic view of primitive or preindustrial 
modes of living as attractive alternatives to the 
prevailing progress-oriented, mechanistic worldview found 
expression in the works of early twentieth-century 
writers. D.H. Lawrence, William D. Howells, and Jack 
London among others began to speak of nature as unity, as 
an organism which has value for its own sake, where 
persons are seen as one coequal partner in the process of 
emergence of the whole (Janik, 1981). In 1913, Lawrence 
proclaimed his dissatisfaction with Western culture's 
proclivity for splitting mind from body: 
My great religion is a belief in the blood, the 
flesh, as being wiser than the intellect. We can go 
wrong in our minds. But what our blood feels and 
believes and says, is always true. The intellect is 
only a bit and a bridle. (cited in Sola Pinto & 
Roberts, 1971, p. 268) 
In addition to the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century romantic novelists' perspective, 
naturalistic views of environment were also prevalent in 
the works of the two great preservation and conservation 
writers of the period; John Muir (1838-1914), and Gifford 
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Pinchot(l865-1946). It would be hard to imagine two men 
with like goals more different in specific ideology and 
philosophy. Much of Muir's nature consciousness was 
shaped by his appropriation of Transcendentalist ideas of 
the natural world ( Fox, 1981; Nash, 1989). Nourished by 
his reading of Emerson and Thoreau, as well as by his 
years of personal wilderness experience, Muir believed in 
trying to merge his consciousness with nature, to seek 
unity in its complexity (Cohen, 1984) . Nature, Muir 
wrote in My First Summer in the Sierra (1911) is a 
"window opening into heaven, a mirror reflecting the 
Creator" (Nash, 1982, p.125). For Muir, it was a 
dangerous heresy to measure the natural world by its 
utility for humanity. Instead, he affirmed that there 
was inherent value in all organic and inorganic forms. 
Muir 1 s actions focused on educating the eastern 
establishment to protecting and preserving western 
wilderness (Nash, 1982) . By the turn of the century Muir 
had become the primary spokesperson for this cause. As 
one historian has noted "Muir promoted his cause with the 
passion of a zealot, for to him nature was a sacred 
reservoir that must be preserved for future 
generations ... He believed that by shedding the 
artificialities of civilized society and penetrating the 
wild one could experience the rapture of Divine presence" 
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(Shi, 1985, p. 196). Muir's efforts were important in 
helping create national parks and in establishing a forum 
for urban nature enthusiasts. His challenge was not 
simply to the newly emerging scientific management of 
wilderness, but was indeed aimed at the entire belief 
system about the relationship of humans and nature that 
had prevailed in the Western world since the time of the 
ancient Greeks (Rodman, 1983). 
Muir's philosophy stands in sharp contrast to that 
of Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot was primarily concerned with 
the protection of natural resources for practical use by 
future generations. His ethic was driven by utilitarian 
ideas and infused with principles of scientific 
management and genetic improvement. It emerged in large 
part as an attempt to constrain the wholesale destructive 
impact of individuals and corporations who exploited 
nature for profit without sufficient regard for the 
larger social good or welfare of future generations 
(Rodman, 1983; Sessions, 1995). Pinchot had no illusions 
concerning the deeper meaning of nature, so unabashedly 
trumpeted by Muir. To his mind there were only two 
relevant, guiding interests to be considered: "humans and 
natural resources" (Fox, 1981, p. 22) . Pinchot 
vigorously opposed the allocation of land for parks and 
other noncommercial purposes. He played a major role in 
79 
establishing the dominant mood concerning the management 
of natural resources in the progressive era as efficient, 
scientific, professionalized, economic development (Hays, 
1959; 0 1 Neil, 1976). 
The clash of the romantic and modernistic ideologies 
represented by Muir 1 s and Pinchot 1 s positions was 
dramatized in their fight over the Hetch Hetchy Dam 
project near San Francisco from 1902 through 1913. 
Essentially the dispute entailed whether the Tuolumne 
River of Yosemite Park should be dammed in order to 
provide power and water for the burgeoning population of 
San Francisco (Jones, 1964; Nash, 1982). Allied with the 
persuasive force of President Theodore Roosevelt 1 s 
commitment to Manifest Destiny and his disdain for 
sentimental views of nature, Pinchot 1 s side won, and 
Congress passed the Baker Act granting the city its 
rights to the water and the dam (Worster, 1973, 1985). 
The victory of Pinchot over Muir established the 
contours of American views on the natural environment 
during the later Progressive era and for many decades to 
come. It legislated and legitimized the modern, 
industrial era's faith in science and technology in the 
service of human needs (Kasson, 1976) . Hetch Hetchy 
became the proxy fight for a battle of competing moral 
visions. The lines were drawn between nature as a moral 
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or an economic resource. The latter had ultimately won 
because Americans of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century had become increasingly ambivalent 
about nature and increasingly enamored with the prospects 
of the modernist project. Quite willing to control 
nature, they at the same time sought to reform its 
unscientific and wholesale exploitation and to preserve a 
certain portion of it (Kasson, 1976) . Wise use, it was 
believed, would assure its availability for both agendas 
(Murphy, 1967). 
This overevaluation of environmental and 
technological capacity, core maxims of modernist 
ideology, increasingly moved the natural environment into 
the background of the American psyche. It was believed to 
be in the good hands of scientific, technocratic 
managers. To the foreground emerged the humanistic, 
existential principles of environment which passed over 
nature in favor of the mitwelt-the social world-and the 
eigenwelt-the personal world. The natural world was 
oversimplified by simple linear thinking and explained in 
reductionist terms. Individuals and the social world 
became separate from and above the natural environment. 
It was "understood to be little more than the sum total 
of thwarting physical necessities" (Roszak, 1992, p.65). 
It was into this world that the newly emerging 
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profession of social work was born. The Progressive Era 
was a conflicting mix of fear, dissatisfaction, reform 
and rising confidence. While reformers condemned the 
social and economic consequences of industrialism: 
... the spokesmen for this new revolt against the 
system accepted its central premise--the need for 
technology to flourish unchecked and to dominate the 
economy and the life of the nation. This 
ambivalence was the essence of the movement that 
come to be known as progressivism. The adherents of 
progressivism differed on many issues, but all were 
united in the belief that it was too late for 
society to reject industrialism. (Ferkiss, 1993, 
p.99) 
The social work profession emerges 
Conventional ideas of person, environment and their 
relationship within social work can best be understood by 
viewing these concepts within the framework of social 
work's early history. This early history is the story of 
the evolution of two organizational movements which 
assumed the major share of responsibility for social 
welfare during the rapidly expanding industrial era-
Charity Organization Societies and Settlement Houses. 
Charity Organization Societies (COS) began as an 
effort to coordinate relief giving by operating 
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community-wide registration bureaus in order to provide 
direct relief and education for both the poor and the 
upper class (Lieby, 1978). The work of COS was carried 
out by volunteer committees which examined needy 
applicants and decided upon a course of action. Friendly 
visitors had the task of investigating the circumstances 
surrounding the applicants' needs and to instruct the 
poor in ways to better manage their lives (Lubove, 1971) . 
The belief that the poor were morally responsible for 
their own circumstances is unmistakable. Chambers and 
Binding (1968) point out that friendly visiting was 
driven by a fear of the early leaders of the COS that 
providing relief solely on the basis of expressed need 
separated from the question of worthiness would undermine 
the structural foundations of economic capitalism and 
would be practically very difficult to control. Relief 
was to be dispensed "only when starvation was imminent" 
(Axinn & Levin, 1975), for as Alexander Johnson (1901) 
decried "the first taste of alms is often like a tiger's 
first taste of blood" (cited in Kemp, 1994, p. 68). 
Though friendly visiting was the heart and soul 
(Paine, 1901) of the COS, its intellectual grounding 
rested clearly in the scientific paradigm. Scientific 
charity stressed rationality, efficiency, and careful 
investigation by committed observers (Chambers & Binding, 
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1968). Science, particularly the emerging social 
sciences, was thought to offer the best chance of 
bringing order and control to the uncertain and 
dramatically changing social environment. It was thought 
that the scientific enterprise could be harnessed to the 
service of society (Bannister, 1987). 
Social workers and others of their day saw no 
inherent conflict between the reformist impulse and the 
scientific endeavor. They were not viewed as 
incompatible (Fitzpatrick, 1990; Kemp, 1994). Many 
social scientists, particularly sociologists, were 
committed to social reform and many volunteered for the 
COS and the settlement houses (Ross, 1991). The 
interesting relationship between social work and what was 
then still conceived to be an applied sociology has been 
often considered (Diner, 1980; Spano, 1982; Deegan, 1988; 
Ross, 1991). For a time prior to World War I the stark 
objectivism and the inherent hierarchial dualism so 
characteristic of modern natural sciences had not yet 
embedded themselves into the social sciences. 
By the early 1900s, COS workers became increasingly 
aware that the abysmal urban conditions so rampant during 
this time could not simply be attributed to faulty 
character. As one charity leader said, "I have done some 
psychological reading and I have still to find a single 
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author who is willing to agree that hunger is 
psychical ... " (Frankel, 1901, p.382). Gradually, COS 
leaders began to acknowledge weaknesses in the friendly 
visiting model. In its place arose the belief that 
poverty was a function of environmental circumstances 
(Stadum, 1990; Wenocur & Reisch, 1989). 
Although not making explicit mention of Pinchot, the 
general influence of reform environmentalism on much of 
early, modern society is suggested in many of the early 
writings of COS leadership. Edward Devine (1906) chided 
the charity movement "· .. with not having at all 
appreciated the importance of the environmental causes of 
distress, with having fixed their attention far too much 
upon personal weakness" (cited in Kemp, 1994, p. 79). 
Porter Lee (1911) argued that the foundation of social 
casework rested in environmental change. 
Central to this new environmental awareness was the 
contribution of Mary Richmond (1861-1928), one of social 
work's most ardent and influential spokespersons. 
Richmond's extensive writings give us keen insight into 
the forces beginning to shape the social work 
profession's views of person and environment. When 
Richmond wrote Social Diagnosis in 1917, she was 
concerned with responding to a growing desire among many 
social workers to" ... abandon claims of respect based on 
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good intentions alone ... " (p.25). 
Though initially defensive regarding Abraham 
Flexner's (1915) judgement that social work was based on 
something less than the independent, self-generated, and 
positivist derived knowledge typical of the major 
professions of law and medicine, Richmond tended to 
accepted Flexner's conclusions. She was instrumental in 
advocating professional training and in developing 
professional associations patterned on the positivist 
paradigm proposed by Flexner (Lieby, 1978, Austin, 1983). 
She defined the purposes of social casework as 
dualistically involving attention to the individual as 
well as his or her environmental context. Casework was 
"··.doing different things for and with different people 
by cooperating with them to achieve at one and the same 
time their own and society's betterment" (Richmond, 1917, 
p. 43) . 
Richmond framed her specification of casework by 
adopting the medical study-diagnosis-treatment model 
(Woodroofe, 1968; Germain, 1970). Study and diagnosis 
together constituted social diagnosis which she defined 
as: 
... the attempt to make as exact definition as 
possible of the situation and personality of a human 
being in some social need-of his situation and 
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personality, that is, in relation to the other human 
beings upon whom he in any way depends or who depend 
upon him, and in relation to the social institutions 
in his community (Richmond, 1917, p. 363). 
While Social Diagnosis (1917) concentrated on issues 
of adjustment within the larger rubric of social 
environment, Richmond also sought to identify what she 
meant by person. Richmond's notion of the wider self 
connected the person with a matrix of influences within 
the social environment (Germain, 1970). Self was viewed 
as the sum of ones social relationships. The focus of 
intervention for Richmond was therefore at the level of 
interaction between external circumstances and the 
socially emergent self (Deegan, 1988) . This idea of 
personality was more fully explicated in Richmond's 
second comprehensive work What is Social Case Work? 
(1922) . By this time Richmond was increasingly aware 
that forces both within and outside social work were 
moving the profession inexorably toward a very bounded, 
exclusively psychological definition of person. 
Reiterating her commitment to the wider self--as 
personality socially constructed--Richmond suggested that 
personality: 
signifies not only all that is native and individual 
to a man [sic] , but all that comes to him by way of 
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education, experience, and human intercourse ... it is 
our personality which relates us closely to our 
human kind; to all the communities and institutions 
he has developed (Richmond, 1922, p.92). 
Expanding further on her social view of personality, she 
writes: 
... we all need to get rid of whatever vestige of an 
idea still remains with us that a man's [sic] mind 
is somewhere in his head ... a man 1 s [sic] mental 
makeup is the sum of his natural endowment and his 
social experiences and contacts up to that time. 
(Richmond, 1922, p. 131) 
At the center of the COS movement was the belief 
that services should be fashioned around the specific 
needs of individuals. It is also true that by this time 
the COS movement was talking almost exclusively of the 
social environment when they spoke of environmental 
factors. Mary Richmond took this idea and built a 
contextualized definition of need which recongnized the 
social and internal environment as the most influencial 
forces. Neither Richmond nor the COS movement were able, 
however, to completly abandon the deep well of older 
tradition that located individual responsibility of the 
person for her or his own circumstances (Kemp, 1994) . 
Although deeply knowledgeable about the environmental 
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circumstances of clients, their interest began and ended 
with the study, diagnosis and treatment of the 
individual. 
The second organizational movement which assumed a 
major share of responsibility for social welfare in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century were 
settlement houses. The Settlement House movement like 
that of the COS was a response to the urban, industrial 
conditions of the times. Unlike the COS however, 
settlements were expressly different in structure and 
orientation (Chambers, 1962, 1963; Trattner, 1989). 
Settlement houses were established in immigrant 
neighborhoods by educated young men and women who 
themselves moved into the slums as residents. Their 
model was not that of friendly visiting but rather was 
infused with a genuine desire to bridge class differences 
and to develop a less patronizing form of charity 
(Trolander, 1987). A distinctive form of liberal 
Christianity and socialism were fused to form the basis 
of the settlements' unique outlook (May, 1977; Szasz, 
1982) . 
The environment, not the individual, was the locus 
of change for the settlers. In a address to the National 
Conference on Charities and Corrections, Jane Addams 
(1904) suggested that families experience great 
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difficulty not because of defective character but as a 
result of "influences from the outside" (p.457). Manthey 
(1989) writes of the settlement movement: 
The environment was both the cause and the healing 
agent of social problems. Social, economic and 
political factors had to be taken into account in 
understanding social problems. In contrast to the 
position of the charity organization societies, the 
settlement believed that the government had a 
responsibility to improve the environment. The 
neighborhood was viewed as a laboratory for social 
study. The settlements were concerned with creating 
a healing environment by educating the immigrant in 
literature, poetry, and the arts ... recreation and 
leisure time activities (pp. 106-107). 
Methodologically, the settlement movement was 
oriented toward group change rather than individual 
adjustment. The focus of change rested in the collective 
as the source of community development (Boyer, 1978). 
Mutuality and shared responsibility and the desire to 
harness the social initiative of the poor was a driving 
force behind the settlements (Leiby, 1978). While not 
rejecting individual services to the poor, the 
settlements were essentially reform oriented. Like the 
COS the settlement movement thought of the environment in 
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relatively restricted ways. While the COS tended to see 
environment as immediate social circumstances filtered 
through the lens of individual character, the settlers 
viewed environment as the larger economic, political, 
social situation refined through group organization. 
The ascendancy of Jane Addams to the presidency of 
the National Conference on Charities and Corrections in 
1910 marked a figurative turn to environmental factors as 
the center of change activity and suggested an 
"increasing commonality between the charities and the 
settlements" (Kemp, 1994, p. 80). Addams remarked, "It 
is as if the Charitable had been brought, through the 
care of the individual, to a contemplation of social 
causes, and as if the Radical had been forced to test his 
social doctrine by a sympathetic observation of actual 
people" (Addams, 1910, p.l). Although the philosophy and 
methodology of the COS and the Settlements were in many 
ways markedly different, the differences were more 
rhetorical than substantive relative to how each 
understood the constructs of person and environment. 
The early history of social work, especially during 
the Progressive era, was pivotal to its developing 
conceptualizations of person and environment. The COS 
and the Settlements, though often involved in rancorous 
discord relative to the delivery of services, clearly 
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established a philosophical link between the person and 
environment. The work and writings of their leaders, 
especially Richmond and Addams, established the 
parameters for social work's ongoing dual concern for 
both constructs. At the same time the seed was planted 
which bore fruit in a continuous, almost exclusive 
neglect of the natural element of environment and failure 
to develop a more expansive sense of person in 
relationship to it. 
It would be unwise and unjustified to assume that 
this tendency to ignore nature and limit person was 
somehow a deliberate attempt to subvert a more fully 
cultivated and extended view of professional development. 
Mary Richmond, Jane Addams and their fellow social 
workers were creatures of their times (Kemp, 1994) . They 
operated within the cultural framework of their day. 
Though marked by reformist fervor and environmental 
concern the view of nature in the Progressive era was 
largely framed in Pinchotian terms. Early social workers 
were clearly involved in limited ways with issues of 
natural environment (Brandt, 1910; Kellogg & Harrison, 
1910; Lovejoy, 1911) and the constructed physical 
environment (Kelly, 1895; Sanborn, 1898; Deforest & 
Veiller, 1903; Addams, 1909; McDowell, 1917), but this 
represented an application of the rational 
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instrumentalist, scientific conservationism so dominate 
during this time (Rodman, 1983). 
Early social workers defined persons in relationship 
to their immediate circumstances, resulting in a view of 
the environment focused on social relationships and on 
the internal subjective environment, as experienced 
within these relationships. The natural environment was 
merely background clutter providing the medium through 
which social circumstance and person interacted. The 
period of social work history between the end of World 
War I and the early 1960's marked a deeper entrenchment 
of restrictive notions of person and environment and saw 
the rise of the psychodynamic paradigm as a grounding 
force in social work practice. 
Separation of person and environment 
The mood of American culture after World War I, 
between 1917 and 1930, was much different from before the 
war started. The reform spirit of the pre-war days was 
gone, largely replaced by growing self-absorption and 
scientific managerialism in the arena of public interest. 
Business idealogues endeavored to create a new popular 
faith in American capitalism and in the "American Way" 
(Akin, 1977) . The total acceptance of the dominance of 
science, technology and professional expertise "is 
symbolized by the Chicago World's Fair of 1933 glorifying 
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a 'Century of Progress' with its slogan, 'Science 
Discovers-Technology Makes-Man Conforms'" (Ferkiss, 1993, 
p.102). The rise of communism in Russia created a 
suspicious atmosphere where reform of any sort was viewed 
as a threat to the traditional social order. 
During the period of the 1920's the American scene 
was characterized by a rising confidence in individual 
effort, private enterprise, technical rationality and 
intolerance for social reform (Akin, 1977) . Social work 
attempted to exert its influence in a society 
increasingly preoccupied with self-indulgence, 
disillusionment and with the power of individual and 
collective action to alter historical events (Ross, 
1991) . Although the reform spirit was not entirely dead 
(Chambers, 1963), its influence was largely overshadowed 
by social work's drive for professional status and a 
search for body of knowledge which would lead to a more 
refined technical expertise based on a foundation of 
science (Popple, 1985). The profession's shift from 
social action to more individual interests at this time 
was strongly influenced by the profession's alliance with 
psychiatry and its adoption of Freudian psychoanalytical 
theory as the scientific framework most informing to 
social work practice (Lieby, 1978; Ehrenreich, 1985; 
Specht & Courtney, 1994). 
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Psychoanalytical theory provided social workers with 
an accessible, effective, coherent body of knowledge that 
supported their professional ambitions. Even though 
social workers could not by training do psychoanalysis, 
the theory drew their attention away from environmental 
factors and towards the primacy of personal adjustment 
and contributed to the development of a hierarchy of 
professional skill and methods favoring individual 
treatment through therapy (Lubove, 1965; Popple, 1985; 
Trattner, 1989; Wenocur & Reisch, 1989). 
Psychoanalytical theory is marked by a distinct 
attempt to disconnect from the supposed subjectivity of 
the non-scientific disciplines of philosophy and 
religion. In order to understand the development of 
human psyche, psychoanalytical theory presumed that the 
environment to which an individual made accommodation was 
external to the person, stable, and knowable. Sigmund 
Freud (1962) makes this point by recognizing that "in an 
individual neurosis, we take as our starting point the 
contrast that distinguishes the patient from his 
environment, which is assumed to be 'normal'" (p. 91). 
For the analyst, complexity is located internally, within 
the mind of the patient. The environment, especially the 
natural environment, was more or less the repository of 
ambient commotion. Roszak (1992) says of Freud,"he seemed 
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to find nothing in the outer darkness of the universe 
that was of practical therapeutic use" (p. 68). 
The adoption of psychoanalytic theory as the 
dominant practice strategy suggests that the concern of 
social work during the period after World War I was the 
adjustment of people to their environment. This view 
placed change within the individual rather than in 
environmental conditions. In her speech to the National 
Conference on Charities and Corrections, Mary Jarrett 
(1919) portended the trajectory of social work when she 
said: 
The special function of social case work is the 
adjustment of individuals with social difficulties. 
It is the art of bringing an individual who is in a 
condition of social disorder into the best possible 
relation with all parts of his environment (cited in 
Kemp, 1994, p. 125) 
Porter Lee (1923) also defined the concern of social work 
as being change, focused on individual adjustment. 
Inherent in this approach was the shift to center stage 
of the helping relationship as the medium of change 
activity (Lee, 1923; Stapleford, 1926). Lee (1923) did 
recognize that social work's knowledge of environmental 
factors was underdeveloped: "we have still much to 
learn ... about the environment in which we live-both 
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natural environment which was created for us, and the 
social environment which we have largely created for 
ourselves" (p.191). He nonetheless appeared to ignore 
the significance of this concern by suggesting that the 
"psychological problem of treatment is at the heart of 
all good case work" (p.194). In a similar expression of 
social work's rhetorical acknowledgment of environment, 
Carpenter (1923) asserted that "the case worker views her 
problem and finds the center of the picture occupied by 
personality, with the material factors as background on 
the canvas, necessary, vital to the whole, but 
subordinate" (p. 245) . 
The years immediately following World War I were 
marked by great ideological and epistemological change 
within social work. Driven internally by the impetus to 
professionalize and externally by renewed interest in the 
power of science, social workers took the first 
determined steps towards a person-centered, therapeutic 
model of practice (Kemp, 1994). This shift away from the 
situated practice of Jane Addams and the person-
environment approach of Mary Richmond and others in the 
Progressive Era meant that social work was becoming 
increasingly abstract and disconnected from any 
environmental frame of reference. 
While the progressive reformers were able to 
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maintain a precarious symmetry between personal and 
environmental interests, the years following ushered in a 
dissolution of this early balance. The polarities 
between person and environment were magnified 
significantly during the 1920's. The boundaries between 
the two were widened while the conceptual borders within 
the constructs shrank (Kemp, 1994). Person became a 
matrix of internal psychological drives and impulses. 
Those environmental factors impacting on individual 
development were essentially restricted to proximal 
relationships: person to person, family to person, 
specialist to person. Larger environmental factors, 
economic, social and natural, were increasingly separated 
from issues of personal development. Nature, 
particularly, became a problem to be controlled by 
scientific manipulation or was so familiar as to be 
commonplace. Attention to it was minimized, abstracted, 
ignored or left in the hands of scientific managers. It 
was of little interest to a profession absorbed in a 
effort to establish its place and to develop its expert 
knowledge in professional, bureaucratic and objectivist 
terms. Alfred North Whitehead (1958) speaking at the 
Lowell Lectures in 1925 provides this description of the 
narrowed focus so characteristic of the emerging 
professional class of his day: 
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Each profession makes progress, but it is progress 
in its own groove. Now to be mentally in a groove 
is to live in contemplating a given set of 
abstractions. The groove prevents straying across 
country, and the abstraction abstracts from 
something to which no further attention is paid, but 
there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate 
for the comprehension of human life. Thus in the 
modern world, the celibacy of the medieval learned 
class has been replaced by a celibacy of the 
intellect which is divorced from the concrete 
contemplation of the complete facts (p. 4). 
A commitment to the individual 
The years between 1930 and 1960 are characterized as 
a period of constancy, continuation and conservativism in 
social work's understanding of person and environment. 
The idealism and reform spirit of the Progressive era and 
the rampant individualism and boundless confidence of the 
1920's gradually gave way to the turmoil and overwhelming 
social problems of the Great Depression (Lawson, 1971; 
Wenocur and Reisch, 1989) Confronted with problems of 
hunger, unemployment, and relocation on a scale hitherto 
unknown, most Americans increasing looked to the federal 
government for solutions. Private social agencies and 
philanthropy were stretched beyond their capacity to 
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provide relief (Fisher, 1980). 
In the face of increasingly overwhelming demands for 
assistance, social workers also began to realize that 
social casework was inadequate to the tasks of this 
tumultuous period. In 1931, the Social Worker's 
Conference on Federal Action petitioned the federal 
government for relief programs (Bruno, 1948; Franklin, 
1990). In 1934 the American Association of Social Work, 
in a letter to President Roosevelt, expressed support for 
unemployment relief and public works employment programs 
(Franklin, 1990; Kemp, 1994). 
The New Deal aims of the Roosevelt administration 
were not intended to break new ideological ground. The 
New Deal sought to serve the welfare needs of the poorest 
one-third of the nation within the confines of the 
existing socio-economic, technocratic culture (Bernstein, 
1969) . Ecological sensibility and consciousness of 
environmental issues were not matters of great public 
concern. American wild places were still seen largely as 
vast resource pools which could be tamed in service to 
the pressing economic and social needs of the time 
(Worster, 1985). Few voices of support for the natural 
environment were heard. The one notable exception, 
inaugurated by a group of literary intellectuals at 
Vanderbilt University, argued that only a return to the 
100 
agrarian values and natural reverence of the past could 
restore decency, order, and prosperity to the country 
(Nash, 1979). This Southern Agrarian movement argued 
that the technological, industrial centered New Deal 
endangered nature and future hopes of American 
development. The impact of the movement was negligible 
and most Americans remained resolute in their faith that 
America "was not only the greatest country on earth but 
owned most of that greatness to its willingness to use 
technology to exploit the natural resources a beneficent 
God had provided" (Ferkiss, 1993, p. 104). 
The history of environmental concern during World 
War II is one of continued dominance and an ever 
increasing willingness to strip nature of its bounty if 
it insured success in the world wide conflagration. The 
damage to the natural environment during the war, both on 
the battlefield and though industry, was profound; though 
most Americans agreed that any damaged would eventually 
be remedied through technological advance and was 
certainly a small price to pay for victory (Ferkiss, 
1993). 
During the Depression and immediately beyond World 
War II, the diagnostic and function schools were the two 
primary viewpoints associated with social work practice. 
The most influential of these was the diagnostic school 
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which emphasized a therapeutic understanding of the 
person's individualized problem and focused treatment 
towards assisting the client in functioning socially 
(Franklin, 1990). Its theorists included Florence Hollis 
(1936, 1939), Fern Lowery (1936, 1939) and Gordon 
Hamilton (1937; 1940), all of whom were strongly 
influenced by Freudian psychoanalytical theory. 
The diagnostic school emphasized the client/worker 
relationship but tempered this with a belief in the 
importance of environmental factors that framed 
individual functioning. Larger environmental factors 
such as economic, political and cultural structures were 
considered part of the fixed environment largely beyond 
the control of the client or worker. Florence Hollis 
(1939) suggested that the "immediate individual 
environment'' (p.265) was more open to change. 
Some within the diagnostic school worked to develop 
a more sophisticated understanding of environment which 
moved beyond the traditional equating of environment with 
social or economic conditions. Fern Lowery (1938) 
included in her understanding of setting a belief that 
the physical environment, including climate, the physical 
arrangements of the agency, and geographical space was an 
important factor affecting practice. Gordon Hamilton's 
(1940) efforts to develop an integrated conceptualization 
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of person-in-environment, marking a shift from the 
relationship between person and environment of previous 
years, also found a place for at least recognition of 
environment beyond social and economic. Her explication 
of the living event framed the focus of casework on the 
more expansive case rather than the client. She writes, 
"A social case is a 'living event' within which there are 
always economic, physical, mental, emotional, and social 
factors in varying proportions. A social case is always 
composed of internal and external, or environmental 
factors" [italics added] (p. 34). 
The functional school, led by Virginia Robinson, 
Jessie Taft and others, stressed the importance of the 
client/worker relationship but moved away from diagnosis 
as the cornerstone of intervention (Franklin, 1990; Kemp, 
1994). This approach was influenced by neo-Freudian 
theorists, particularly Otto Rank, and by the educator 
and social philosopher John Dewey (Dore, 1990) . The 
functional school interpreted environment as always 
shaped by individual perception and thus unable to be 
known or understood except in terms of the client's 
personalized narrative. Austin (1938) saw the 
environment as an ''idealistic conception of reality as 
not existing at all or existing largely in the terms 
through which it is perceived through the senses" (p. 
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105) . Active engagement with an external environment 
beyond individualized perception was of little concern to 
functional theorists (Yelaja. 1986). The focus tended to 
center on internal processes. Interaction between person 
and environment was, thus, limited and defined by the 
psychology of the client. Jessie Taft (1928) concluded 
that all environmental problems " ... are at bottom the 
inner problems of the human beings involved" (p. 105) . 
The functional-diagnostic debate was not simply a 
disagreement about methods and techniques, but a debate 
over the character of person, environment and the 
appropriate relationship between them and the social work 
enterprise (Franklin, 1990; Ehrenreich, 1985; Kemp, 
1994). Both approaches diminished the environmental 
construct. The diagnostic approach denied the subjective 
experience of environment, relegating it instead to the 
essential ground within which personal processes were 
operational. The functional approach denied any 
objective experience of environment apart from 
individualized perceptual mechanisms. Both schools 
adopted psychodynamic approaches which, though 
conceptually different in relation to the evolution of 
psychic development, had the same consequence of refining 
a technique of individual treatment which, as Saleebey 
(1991) has suggested, distorted "the nature of human 
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experiences of the world" (p. 56). 
Though a few isolated voices during the Depression 
persistently attempted to develop a consistently 
integrative approach to the question of person and 
environment as well as a more radical vision of casework 
theory (Reynolds, 1933, 1934, 1935; Lurie, 1930, 1939; 
van Kleeck, 1934), their work was bypassed by the 
mainstream because it denied the supremacy of 
psychological approaches and did not fit satisfactorily 
with the dominant psychodynamic paradigm (Kemp, 1994) . 
Although widely proclaimed as a consummate period of 
social activism and of expanding theoretical 
orientations, the Depression years were more a period of 
constancy and continuation of the primary interests of 
professional identity, scientific credibility and 
refinement of individualized, psychological treatment 
which had been given shape a decade earlier (Constable & 
Cocozzelli, 1989; Franklin, 1990; Courtney, 1992; Kemp, 
1994) . As the world turned upside down, and the apparent 
unmanageability of environmental factors became 
magnified, the ongoing expressed commitment of social 
work to the person-environment imperative remained, but 
it was increasingly barren. The upheavals of the period 
and the dominance of psychodynamic theory limited and 
narrowed both constructs. The legacy of social work's 
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preoccupations during this period is captured by Lasch 
(1984) who suggests that "those who turned to 
psychoanalysis welcomed it as another form of mind-cure, 
another system of self-improvement and personal growth. 
From the beginning, the American version of 
psychoanalysis minimized the power of instinctual drives 
and stressed the possibility of subjecting them to 
rational control" (p. 208). 
The period between the end World War II and 1960 was 
characterized as a time of mounting international crisis, 
domestic tension, and personal vulnerability. Americans 
had seen a great victory on the fields of war in Europe 
and Asia while, at the same time, Communist power and 
expansionism presaged a dire new threat to peace and 
stability (Link & Catton, 1974) . This was a time marked 
by growing affluence coupled with the terror of 
destruction. The American sense of how the world worked, 
in the aftermath of the war and the Depression, had 
coalesced into a mood of national vulnerability to the 
largely unmanageable temper of global geopolitics 
(Potter, 1954; Pells, 1985). Historian Todd Gitlin 
(1987) describes this era in terms of the prevailing 
middle class ambivalence: "The middle class furnished its 
islands of affluence, but around it the waters kept 
rising. Popular culture and politics ran rife with 
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foreboding" (p.22). 
One response to the widespread anxiety and 
uncertainty was a turn toward self-indulgence (Graebner, 
1991) . Consumption and affluence was assumed to be a 
national condition, an irresistible economic and 
psychological fact. Nature and her resources seemed 
plentiful, her supplies stable, and science mobilized 
industry and government to exploit her apparently 
limitless bounty. Expanding natural resource development 
was not only required to fuel the boom of economic 
development, it was an unconscious confirmation of what 
made America great (Gitlin, 1987) . Spurred on by grand 
developers, new technologies and generous appropriations 
from Congress, nature at last could be harnessed to serve 
the purposes for which it existed. As Worster (1985) 
laments regarding the ongoing developmentalism of the 
post-war period, scientific technology and the halls of 
government: 
... tirelessly asserted that 'achieving national 
goals for a stronger and more prosperous American' 
was what was at stake .... In all these minds, the 
dream of domination was powerfully compelling 
despite its loose and rigorless logic: the West is 
America, money is peace, control is freedom, 
survival is domination (p. 265). 
107 
In a similar vein, addressing the ideology and 
unprecedented power of the federal Bureau of Reclamation 
during the 1950 1 s, Worster adds that the bureau: 
... set itself the target of achieving nothing less 
than total control, total management, total power, 
or as the Bureau 1 s own slogan, emblazoned on the 
covers of reports and project summaries and public 
relations material, put it, 'total use for greater 
wealth. 1 The war against European fascism and Asian 
militarism was over, a war waged for 'unconditional 
surrender.' Another war, the Cold War, pitting two 
superpowers armed with nuclear weapons against each 
other, had begun. And still a third war was under 
way in earnest, this one to be waged against the 
western American landscape of scarcity; it too would 
not stop short of total victory (1985, p. 266). 
Against this backdrop of anxiety, headlong 
development, self indulgence and a growing tendency 
toward political conservatism, social work continued to 
struggle to find its place. In the main, social work 
attention continued to be drawn to previous concerns: 
the desire for professional status, refinement of 
scientific technique, fitting psychodynamic theory to 
practice, pressure for a stronger and more unified 
professional voice and increasing movement of social 
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workers into private practice (Barker, 1984; Trolander, 
1987; Roberts, 1990; Karger & Stoesz, 1990 Mullaly, 1993; 
Kemp, 1994) . The debate between the diagnostic and 
function schools became increasingly vindictive while 
tending to converge in directing psychotherapy toward 
effecting change through a modification of personality 
(Franklin, 1990). This ongoing internal squabble further 
removed casework from interest in the environmental 
domain of practice. 
One significant attempt to bridge the gap between 
the diagnostic and functional factions is found in the 
work of Helen Harris Perlman (1957). Perlman's approach 
incorporated both diagnostic and functional concepts. 
Perlman conceived of casework as a problem-solving 
process: 
... the case work process is a problem-solving 
process in that it employs the orderly, systematic 
methods which are basic to any effective thinking-
and-feeling-toward-action. Since the problems with 
which it deals are those of the individuals social 
living, their solution must take place by and 
through the persons involved in those problems. For 
this reason casework attempts to mobilize himself to 
act in consonance with his understanding. In 
cognizance of those potent emotional factors that 
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may variously block or promote the person's 
functioning, casework provides and emotional freeing 
and sustaining "climate" and bond which is known as 
the casework relationship (Perlman, 1957, p. 63). 
Coping and adaptation were key elements in Perlman's 
thoughts. Her emphasis was on how a person perceived or 
felt their problem and how they participated in coping 
through the adjusting experience of the helping 
relationship. Although Perlman attempted to ground 
casework in commitment to interaction between internal 
and external circumstance, her method structured practice 
in such a way that environmental factors were interpreted 
though a very constricted, individualized lens (Kemp, 
1994) . She describes her understanding of the 
relationship between person and environment: 
... the environment, it must be 
remembered, ... consists of the continuous 
interactions of people, of circumstances and 
condition, of ideas, of institutions. To human 
beings it is always personal in import. Even to the 
impersonality of weather we react in psychological, 
not only physical, waysi and in ancient days, when 
man's social environment was relatively simple, he 
cast his physical environment into social-personal 
terms and made gods of the physical forces which 
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shaped his life. (Perlman, 1957, p. 18). 
Columnist Max Lerner, in a 1957 paper delivered to 
the National Conference on Social Welfare, was highly 
critical of 1950's American culture and spoke very 
disparaging of social work's emphasis on what he called 
the "neutrality of the technician" (p. 43) and its 
obsession with the "notion of the primacy of the physical 
sciences and of research" (p. 47). This criticism fell 
mostly on deaf ears in the profession, however. In spite 
of attempts by some to revitalize the traditional focus 
on person and environment and to broaden the 
environmental definition (Pollak, 1956; Stein & Cloward, 
1958), there was no real challenge to the preeminence of 
psychodynamic theory while the environment continued to 
be defined primarily in social, relational terms. 
Current Ideas of Person and Environment 
The period between the 1960's and the 1980's has 
been described as a "multiple historic watershed" 
(Gitlin, 1987) . This period was marked by racial and 
social upheaval, gender and class polarization, wars in 
Vietnam and on poverty, shifts from liberal reform to 
quasi-conservatism to neo-conservatism, rising 
environmental consciousness and unprecedented 
developments in science and technology (Suttles, 1968; 
Wittner, 1974; Dickstein, 1977; Leuchtenberg, 1982; 
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Marable, 1984; Siegel, 1984). Americans and others 
around the world were beginning to question anew the cost 
of unrestricted economic and technological growth. A new 
environmental movement was gathering pace. Its message 
was that humans were endangering their own lives through 
an arrogant, manipulative attitude toward other forms of 
life. A singularly important factor contributing to this 
feeling of national doubt was the publication of Rachael 
Carson's (1962) powerful book Silent Spring. It captured 
the interest of broad audiences at a time when more and 
more citizens seemed to be sensing that nature itself was 
under attack and that defending it required a more 
radical way of thinking. The older far more restrained 
Pinchotian conservationism so characteristic of the 
environmental ideology and policy of the first half of 
the twentieth century was gradually thought to be 
incapable of meeting the challenges of global 
environmental degradation (Hays, 1987). This new 
environmentalism shifted the meaning of the term 
environment away from social contexts and toward nature. 
Worster (1994) describes this change: 
In the earlier part of this century the word 
"environment" referred mainly to the external social 
influences (as opposed to genetic endowment) working 
on the individual. Environmentalism referred to the 
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belief that the 11 physical 1 biologicalr psychological 
or cultural environment" was a crucial factor 
shaping "the structure or behavior of animals, 
including man". But increasingly as the battle of 
heredity versus environment lost saliency after 
World War Two 1 environment came to mean, 
particularly and especially, the natural influences 
surrounding people 1 including flora, £auna 1 climate, 
water 1 and soil; human beings, it was understood, 
were not passive victims of their surroundings-they 
were imbedded in them 1 they interacted with them, 
and they could have an effect. [italics in original] 
(p. 350) 
In social work, professional self-scrutiny of the 
effectiveness of traditional person-centered paradigms 
was growing (Woodward, 1960; Briar, 1968; Fischer, 1973, 
1975 Grinnell, 1973; Hashimi, 1981). In particular 
Herman Stein (1963) re-examined the conceptualization of 
environment in social work theory. He identified three 
major misconceptions associated with the concept. First, 
he noted the tendency to regard the environment as very 
narrowly related to immediate contexts such as housing, 
jobs, families, face-to-face relationships. Second 1 he 
identified the inclination to view environment as 
external to the individual who 11 stands alone, an isolated 
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complex of intra-psychic processes" (p. 68) . Third, 
Stein noted the tendency to view the environment as 
static, unchanging, background clutter. From these 
perspectives, Stein argued, that social work's view of 
environment was unnecessarily restrictive and merely a 
second-rate activity compared to the more distinguished 
method of psychological treatment. 
To bridge the gap between person and environment and 
to overcome what was increasingly perceived as a false 
dichotomy between individual services and environmental 
action, social work experienced a rush of activity aimed 
at developing a unifying conceptual framework that would 
revitalize its dual concern for person and environment 
(Gordon, 1969; Siporin, 1970, 1972; Meyer, 1970, 1973; 
Brieland, 1977) . 
Significant among the early contributions towards 
developing an integrative perspective was the work of 
William Gordon (1969) and Harriet Bartlett (1970). Their 
transaction or goodness-of-fit model relied on the notion 
that contact between person and the environment was 
reciprocal and circular rather than simply linear (Kemp, 
1994) . Gordon and Bartlett viewed coping with current 
social demands brought about by an "impinging 
environment" (Gordon, 1969, p. 10) as the central focus 
of social work practice. Though differing somewhat in 
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their understanding of person-environment interaction, 
they understood the ultimate goal of all social work 
activity as centering on, as Bartlett (1970) suggests, 
"the growth of the individual" (p. 103). Lack of clarity 
in explicating what constituted the environment and how 
it impacted persons kept their approach too narrow to 
encompass all of social work's interests (Burns, 1971; 
Roberts, 1990) . 
A search for new ways to conceptualize the 
relationship between personal and environmental 
dimensions of practice lead some theorists to explore 
emergent ideas in General Systems Theory (GST) 
(Leighninger, 1977, 1978). GST was seen as a way to 
explain the complexity of human phenomena from a process 
orientation, without giving exclusive attention to either 
the person or the larger environment (Petr, 1988; De 
Hoyos, 1989). Early social work writing on systems 
theory by Germain (1968), Hearn (1969) and Hartman (1971) 
attempted to shift attention from a limited person-
situation frame to one that was multi-dimensional, filled 
with complexity and potential. 
Notable among those social work theoreticians who 
worked at synthesizing the systemic perspective with 
traditional dual concerns with both person and 
environment was Carol Meyer (1970) . In Social Work 
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Practice: A Response to the Urban Crisis Meyer defined 
social work's purpose as being "to individualize people 
in the mass urban society" (p. 4). In this early work 
environment took on the meaning of the broader life space 
of the individual and community affecting the person. 
Meyer attempted to hold on to a central concern for the 
individual, so central to the diagnostic school from 
which she received her tutelage, while at the same time 
focusing on issues of the environment. Although Meyer 
placed her first work within the framework of developing 
a unitary theory while using systems as a practice 
metaphor, her emphasis on individualization tended to be 
interpreted as sanctioning an individualized treatment 
approach (Kemp, 1994) . 
In 1976, Meyer published a new edition of her 
earlier book in which she framed her strategy not in 
terms of individualizing practice but as social work from 
an ecological-systems approach. This broadening of her 
previous integrative effort used the language of both 
ecology and systems theory, which by this time had become 
common vernacular for many in the the scientific 
community and in the general population (Evans, 1976; 
Cowell, 1985; Haila & Levins, 1992). Meyer conceived of 
her ecosystems perspective as a conceptual framework, a 
metamodel rather than a particular model or theory: 
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... a metatheory that offers social work 
practitioners/clinicians a way of thinking about and 
assessing the relatedness of people and their 
impinging environments; it does not specify the what 
(problem-definition) or the how (methodology) of 
practice. For that it relies upon the increasingly 
large repertoire of available practice models, each 
one to make those specifications consistent with it 
particular theoretical orientations (1983, pp. 29-
30) 
Meyer's approach invites the practitioner to attend 
to the adaptive fit between people and environments. 
Rather than a prescriptive system, it is one potential 
focus of intervention that the social worker could draw 
upon. Its basic problem is that it had no workable 
methodology to verify the propositions of the theory 
(Roberts, 1990) . Wakefield (1996) notes that the 
ecosystems perspective is: 
... essentially just a collection of concepts and a 
general assertion that the concepts are applicable 
to all social work practice situations .... By placing 
no constraints on the application of the 
connectedness principle, the perspective's claims 
become overly universalistic and implausible, and 
its concepts become useless for making critical 
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distinctions (p. 11). 
Eventually the popularity of both general systems theory 
and ecosystems thought "waned because its basic 
assumptions never fit some of the assumptions of social 
work practice" (De Hoyos, 1989, p. 132). 
At about the same time the ecological approach of 
Carol Germain (1973, 1976, 1978, 1980) evolved as an 
attempt to bridge the gap between the abstraction of 
general systems theory and the growing trend of 
conceiving of the world in ecological terms. The 
ecological approach understood human behavior as 
inseparably linked with the environment. In order to 
fully enhance human functioning the physical and social 
environment of the person must be assessed concurrently. 
In the words of Germain (1978), "People and their 
environments are viewed as interdependent, complementary 
parts of a whole in which person and environment are 
constantly changing and shaping the other" (p. 539). 
The concept of adaptation is a cornerstone of the 
ecological perspective. It focuses on how an 
11 individuals's needs, capacities, and opportunities for 
growth and the individual's ability to adapt to changing 
external demands are met by, provided for, and challenged 
by the environment" (Saleebey, 1992, p. 113). Though 
appearing to be inherently compatible with many core 
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social work values, the ecological approach is not 
unproblematic. It assumes that individual human agency 
has the capacity to overcome external obstacles when, in 
reality, the individual may have little ability to 
exercise her or his will, especially in response to 
institutional oppression (Lichtenberg, 1990). It lacks a 
critical perspective and tends to support conventional 
norms and the status quo (Saleebey, 1992). It lacks 
significant explanatory power to illuminate the nature, 
strength and changeability of causal processes 
(Wakefield, 1996) . Finally, the ecological approach very 
narrowly understands environment (Weick, 1981) as 
relatively static and thus, focuses attention on the 
person and the person's ability to negotiate and 
accommodate environmental conditions. Though Germain's 
(1978) views were consistent with the unfolding trend in 
social work (Seabury, 1971, Walz, Willenberg, & Demoll, 
1974; Resnick & Jaffee, 1982) to explore the impact of 
the natural and human-made environment on human 
functioning, the ecological approach still heavily 
emphasized individual function in an environment that was 
likely to impinge upon optimal coping capacity. 
In an attempt to articulate the ecological 
perspective for practice, Germain and Alex Gitterman 
(1976, 1980) joined forces in order to apply the 
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ecological metaphor to direct social work practice. 
Their life model conceives of problems in living as a 
result of stress associated with inadequate fit between 
people and their environments. These problems revolve 
around stressful life transitions, maladaptive 
interpersonal processes, and unresponsive environments. 
For Germain and Gitterman: 
The environment is dynamic and complex. It 
comprises many kinds of systems, each with its 
characteristic structure, level of organization and 
spatial and temporal properties. The social 
environment comprises human beings organized in 
dyadic relations, social networks, bureaucratic 
institutions, and other social systems including the 
neighborhood, community, and society itself. The 
physical environment comprises the natural world of 
animals, plants, and land forms, and the built world 
of structures and objects constructed by human 
beings. The social and physical environments are 
related to each other in complex ways [italics in 
original] (1980, p. 137). 
From this definition of environment Germain and Gitterman 
draw attention to the coping capacities of the person who 
many either "alter, use, or support properties of the 
environment" (Gitterman and Germain, 1976, p. 602). This 
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strengthening of personal coping patterns and altering of 
environmental factors was in keeping with the general 
thrust of ecological theory which emphasized adaptive 
processes. 
In their development of environmental issues, 
Germain and Gitterman chose to focus on very limited 
domains of environment important in shaping individual 
coping. Organizations and a relatively narrow component 
of the social environment ref erred to as the social 
network were at the heart of their conceptualization. 
The life model made a significant contribution to 
social work by concentrating on environmental 
intervention as a core social work function (Kemp, 1994). 
The decisions, however, not to attend to broader 
dimensions of the environment limits the environmental 
focus to issues in the immediate vicinity of the client. 
In addition, the heavy reliance upon adaptive processes 
perpetuates a decades-old social work proclivity to 
discuss environment while at the same time to concentrate 
predominantly upon individual agency. The essential 
focus of ecological theory and all its variants is, 
according to Saleebey, " ... on how individuals adapt to 
environmental demands. While there is talk of changing 
environments, the message of the ecological approach in 
general is that, in many cases, it is the client(s) who 
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will have to adapt ... " (1990, pp.10-11). The "individual 
determinism" (Gould, 1987) so characteristic of the 
ecological model 1 s preoccupation with adaptation 
increases the likelihood that other important factors 
related to human development will be disregarded. Again, 
Saleebey (1990) notes that ''the realities of power, 
conflict, oppression, and violence, so central to the 
survival of many groups, are given a curious and unreal 
patina by the adaptation perspective" (p. 11). This 
epistemological blind spot also inhibits conceiving the 
natural environment as anything more significant than 
data to be studied and/or resource to be procured or 
regulated. Social work 1 s application of the system and 
ecological model 1 s adaptive component creates a state of 
consciousness which suggests that a person already exists 
on a plane of profound division between oneself and one 1 s 
place in the larger environment. Person-in-environment 
becomes a kind of euphemism for what is in reality person 
on environment. Deeper understanding of identity with 
nature is then excluded and becomes an abstraction which 
leads to concepts and actions that cannot be reconciled 
with either the health of the person or of nature. 
Living in nature, on the other hand, suggests a complex 
relationship pieced together over time through patterns 
of value and restraint, through memory, familiarity, love 
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and respect. The result of being in nature is both 
knowledge of object and particular experience of the 
world, but also (and this is what is missing) deep 
reverence for the mystery of the world and for its 
patterns which lie beyond expressive understanding. 
Person-In-Environment: Concepts in the Modern Era 
Because social work grew out of the late 19th and 
early twentieth centuries modernist traditions, its 
theoretical frames and methodology are built on the 
ideological foundations of a mechanistic, hierarchial, 
rationalistic and scientific/technological model. Its 
attempts to develop a comprehensive conceptualization of 
person and environment and to maintain a balance between 
dual concerns for both realms has been largely 
unsuccessful precisely because it relied so heavily on 
the modernist project for its conceptual base. 
The environmental consciousness of early social 
workers in the Progressive era reflected the emerging 
belief of early twentieth century American that the goal 
of environmental intervention was to study the problem of 
person-environment relationships and to develop useful, 
technological, solutions to reform perceived imbalances. 
Environment became divided and compartmentalized because 
of the reductionism inherent in the scientific paradigm. 
A domination hierarchy of expert knowledge directed at 
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discreet specialization became the standard for 
environmental study. Thus the economic environment 
became the province of economists, the personal 
environment of psychiatrists, the city environment of 
urban planners, the social environment of sociologists, 
and the natural environment of scientific ecologists. 
Social work's real world experience and knowledge 
appeared simplistic and imprecise in comparison (Kemp, 
1994). 
Particularly important from the perspective of this 
dissertation was social work's ever increasing abdication 
of responsibility and concern for broader environmental 
contexts. No where is this more apparent than in social 
work's treatment of nature within its conceptualization 
of environment. Social work unconsciously withdrew into 
the language of scientific abstraction. Promising to 
bring control and certainty, social work's adoption of 
normative scientific theory in its early history narrowed 
its interest to assessing and intervening in ever 
narrowing bands of environmental context. Nature came to 
be viewed as separate, out there; it was difficult to 
manage, not easily reducible to guidelines for practice 
and its seemingly inexhaustible resource base was more 
appropriately managed by technical solutions formulated 
by other scientific professionals. 
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As social work moved indoors into institutional 
settings what remained of an appreciation for the 
client's direct experience with physical and natural 
environmental factors was exchanged for technical, 
bureaucratic knowledge. Though maintaining the 
environmental vernacular, social work's widespread 
acceptance of psychiatric and psychological theory moved 
the profession inexorably toward a central concern with 
changing the person through the process of relationship 
with the specialist and corresponding manipulation of the 
environment. 
Social work in the period between the end of World 
War I and the beginning of World War II, with but few 
exceptions, fully emersed itself in the theory and 
technique of psychoanalysis and other psychodynamic 
theories. Reflecting modernism's economic, industrial 
conception of self-contained individualism, 
psychoanalytic theory conceives of person as consisting 
of a bounded, isolated, and potentially masterful self. 
Locus of control resides internally and change is 
expressed in a wish to manipulate the external world for 
ones own personal ends. Modernism has shaped an empty 
self that experiences a significant absence of community, 
tradition, shared meaning and a deep organicism with 
nature. Psychoanalytic theory became the means to both 
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respond to and further develop the new configuration of 
self without being encouraged or prompted to address or 
perhaps even see the socio-political and transpersonal 
causes of the emptiness. 
No true commitment to understanding and applying 
broader environmental factors to practice existed in 
social work from this period onward. Technique distorted 
social works 1 understanding of the character of human 
experience in the natural world and replaced with a 
figurative environment; the environment of restricted 
context, defined by science, described by client and 
dependent on animation by human stratagem. 
One last attempt remained for social work to more 
fully develop its dual concern for person and environment 
and expand its environmental conceptualizations. 
Beginning in the late sixties and continuing. until the 
present social work has aspired to an epistemological 
clarity in its enunciated dedication to person and 
environment by the application of systems and ecological 
theory to its guiding principles (Kemp, 1994) . Person 
and environment was now thought to be encompassed more 
completely through a conceptualization of person-in-
environment. The ecological, ecosytems, and life models 
were seen to represent a holistic approach to person and 
environment in social work. But, once again social work 
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was blinded by uncritically appropriating a system of 
knowl~dge which on the face of it promised integration 
but whose underlying assumptions rested squarely on the 
modernist worldview and its scientific/technological 
paradigm. The results were predictable. 
The language and knowledge of systems and ecological 
theory is clearly scientific. They simply replace the 
Progressive and post World War I period's conservation 
rhetoric of efficiency and production with the 
ecological/systems language of equilibrium and adaption. 
The primary method of scientific, ecological theory is to 
study the adaptive interaction (seen as a competition for 
higher position and/or material goods) of humans and 
habitat and to help develop responsive technologies to 
reform existing imbalances. Person-in-environment from 
an ecosystems perspective considers persons as 
experiencing themselves as separate from the environment 
but existing "in" it. Order and coherence become the end 
toward which a closed ecological system maneuvers. In 
the words of Sampson (1985) ecosystem models maintain 
that: 
(a) order and coherence are achieved by means of (b) 
seeking control and mastery over the world through 
(c) a person system designed to achieve control, 
which is thereby characterized as (d) a centralized 
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equilibrium-preserving structure. (pp. 1204-1205) 
From this vista a dualistic classification develops 
between that which is adaptive and that which is 
maladaptive. The clear conforming message in this 
arrangement from a psychosocial perspective is that 
persons are the closed, centralized unit for maintaining 
equilibrium within the ecological system. The 
unfortunate result is that expansive, openly systemic 
views of persons which offer an alternative to this 
cherished equilibrium structure are considered to be 
foolish or mad. This closes off a view of person truly in 
environment; a view which allows for multiplicity and 
deep interconnectedness. 
It is evident from this brief historical summary 
that social work has had a rhetorical rather than a 
actual commitment to a comprehensive, deeply situated 
person-in-environment perspective. In addition, the 
evidence also suggests that social work has maintained 
the status quo view of shallow environmentalism and self-
contained, alienated personhood by (1) endorsing and 
reflecting the dominant values and methodology of the 
modernist project, by (2) disseminating those values and 
methods in the form of ostensibly value-free scientific, 
professional statements and practices and by (3) 
normalizing a denatured image of person and environment 
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which in turn portrays the individual as essentially 
independent from deeper identification with the 
organismic whole (Hoff & McNutt, 1994). The essential 
incongruity of this part/whole dictotomy is suggested by 
Wendell Berry (1983): 
Nothing is meaningful or valuable alone ... Nothing 
can be its own context. Meaning and value are not 
generated by parts, but are conferred by the whole. 
The only safe contexts are, first, the natural order 
and, second, a human culture formed in respect for 
nature (p. 167). 
The next chapter will address methodological 
considerations of the dissertation. Chapter five will 
explore major themes in deep ecology and ecofeminism. 
Chapter six will then consider how these themes challenge 




APPROACH TO INQUIRY 
Significance, Relevance and Feasibility 
A dissertation, much like the process of adopting a 
child, arises out of passion. The decision to study 
social work's person-in-environment perspective evolved 
from a personal passion to both appreciate and understand 
the importance of nature to our conceptualization of 
ourselves. This passion and interest was forged in my 
early experience with the familiar terrain of the wide 
open spaces and subtle beauty of the western Kansas 
plains (see Preface) and has developed in recent years as 
an experiential journey to more fully appreciate the 
meaning nature holds for human beings, and what are our 
human responsibilities are to the non-human world. 
The current project also arose out of a professional 
interest to contribute to both the current cultural 
debate which increasingly questions the pace and 
direction of modern modes of progress and development, 
and the professional controversy which has raged in the 
social work literature surrounding the viability of its 
conventional guiding principles of practice. This has 
become essentially a question of how the profession comes 
to know and therefore how it goes about doing. 
The current project will challenge existing theory 
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surrounding social work's person-in-environment paradigm 
by providing alternative ways of filling in theory and 
bridging gaps in the profession's knowledge base. 
This project involves an ideological commitment to 
the idea that practice cannot be devoid of theory. It 
attempts to avoid what Thompson (1995) calls the "fallacy 
of theoryless practice 11 which assumes, quite incorrectly, 
that complex actions can be divorced from complex 
thought. It further recognizes that frameworks of ideas 
and values influence how professionals act and interact. 
To insure that professional ideas are appropriate and 
constructive in addressing client needs and demands 
social workers must be about the business of questioning 
conventional notions in order to foster an ongoing 
intellectual flexibility which allows the profession to 
confirm, adapt, or abandon those ideas in the light of 
changing circumstances. This dissertation confirms that 
social work's person-in-environment construct is an 
appropriate and useful guiding principle, but it also 
suggests that it must be adapted. This dissertation 
offers a creative and innovative approach to think about 
conventional ideas in new ways. 
The logic of this study is both analytical and 
dialectical. The review of the literature is analytical 
in that it involves a breaking down of complex ideas in 
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deep ecology and ecofeminism, but it is not simple 
reductionism-analysis as an end in itself. The results, 
conclusions, and implications go beyond the analytic, 
towards a synthesis involving a dialectical linking, 
rather than a simple "lumping" (Thompson, 1992, p. 22) 
together of parts, so that a revised position or 
understanding is achieved. This is essentially a process 
of critical reflection. Critical reflection recognizes 
the central role of conflicting ideas as a pivotal factor 
in accounting for change and revision. Conflict between 
competing ideas is to be embraced as essential to more 
complete understanding. 
A revitalized person-in-environment framework aims 
at having both theoretical as well as practical relevance 
to the profession. In this regard the results of the 
current project are aimed toward furthering a link 
between person/environment connections and issues of 
social justice and empowerment. The way in which 
individuals and societies conceive of their connection to 
environment prescribes the way they act towards it and 
towards each other (Berry, 1988). Problems in the 
natural environment cannot be understood in isolation. 
Human relationship to the natural environment is 
interconnected with social'issues of population growth, 
income distribution, the persistence of poverty and 
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hunger, toxic waste and racism, and environmental hazard 
and health (Rogge, 1994). For instance, only when the 
mind and body, and person and nature are seen as two 
facets of the same phenomenon will we be able to 
understand many of the problems of health and growth in 
meaningful ways. Similarly, only if we see economics, 
politics and social policies imbedded in larger natural 
systems will we be able to resolve issues of inequality 
and perpetuation of disempowerment (Capra & Steindl-Rast, 
1992; Hoff & McNutt, 1994). 
This study is both supported and constrained by a 
number of factors related to feasibility. First, there 
is an established, though small, body of scholarship in 
social work on the deeper relationship of person to 
nature, which can be developed and broadened. This, 
coupled with a fairly substantial body of scholarship in 
the two ecophilosophies, support the decision to pursue 
the current task. Related to bodies of scholarship is 
the fact that the researcher has relatively easy access 
to the data through a wide variety of site locations. 
Being a large research institution, the University of 
Kansas has considerable textual sources available through 
its network of libraries and support services. In 
addition, my current residence allows access to library 
facilities located within reasonable driving distance 
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such as Kansas State University and the University of 
Missouri, Kansas City. The metropolitan area of Kansas 
City also provides rich opportunities to canvas used and 
rare book stores and collections for appropriate data as 
well as providing opportunities to develop conceptual 
breath through the involvement in seminars and 
presentations which focus on issues of earth spirituality 
and mind/body healing. 
The feasibility of this study was also supported by 
encouragement and guidance from doctoral faculty and 
committee members who sanctioned the pursuit of this 
study and provided technical and personal support in its 
framing and continued development. This provided the 
researcher with the needed support to create a 
fascinating research opportunity which fulfilled a 
personal passion and interest, and met the requirements 
for doctoral degree completion. 
The feasibility of the current project is also 
supported by several factors related to the researcher's 
competence and research opportunities. Much of the last 
six years of my doctoral work has been involved in the 
study of research processes or the actual carrying out of 
research. Though this is my first effort in fully 
developing a qualitative research project, it is not the 
first time to experience the intense preparation and 
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ongoing rigor which is required to complete a research 
project. There have been several opportunities to 
contribute to quantitative studies and professional 
article development. From this my level of competence at 
actually doing research has been refined and enhanced. 
It has been a stimulus for the development of the current 
study. 
Lending further support to the feasibility of the 
current study has been the realization that social work 
and related fields (Morse,1991; Neuman, 1994; Tyson, 
1995) have a rich and varied tradition in research. 
Recent work on the employment of qualitative studies in 
social work (Pray, 1993; Sherman & Reid, 1994a; Riessman, 
1994; Carrizosa, 1995;) and the availability and 
refinement of research methods (Mitroff & Kilmann, 1978; 
Berg, 1989; Tyson, 1995) which help create an 
appropriate match between research questions and design 
choices contribute to the feasibility of the current 
project. 
Several factors constrain this project. The first 
is related to the researcher's time. Reasonable time 
constraints were placed on design implementation 
components of this study. Though the study proceeded in 
a series of phases, in a somewhat linear fashion, the 
phase approach is always interactive and requires 
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reassessment and revising. This is a time intensive 
process. The preparation, question development, data 
collection and preliminary data analyses components have 
to date occupied almost two years of the researcher's 
time. This represents a revision of a tentative time 
line which conceived of these tasks as being of 
considerably shorter duration. Delays resulted from 
personal lifestyle changes, and due to the researcher's 
naivete of the process. The researcher has, however, 
learned much about the intended topic, approach, and 
myself from the mistakes which have been made. It is 
anticipated that the completion of this project will take 
another nine months, inclusive of allowances for 
unforeseen delays. 
A second constraint upon this study concerns issues 
of funding. The current project does not involve any 
support from funding agencies or other interested 
parties. Fees for the purchase of books, tapes, copying 
and transcribing expenses, recording equipment and 
seminar registration were covered by the researcher. 
This represented a considerable outlay of ~onies at a 
time when the researchers income from professional 
teaching responsibilities were curtailed to allow time 
for this project. In addition the adoption of a child 
during the early stages of this work represented a 
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further financial drain and a loss of income due to our 
families decision to curtail my spouses employment so she 
would have full time to devote to child rearing. 
General Considerations 
The interpretive paradigm 
This theoretical dissertation consists of textual 
analysis of the concepts of person, environment and their 
relationships within the fields of deep ecology and 
ecofeminism. The current approach to inquiry is 
consistent with a over-arching social scientific 
tradition which Neuman (1994) calls "interpretive social 
science" (p. 61). This orientation shares similarities 
with approaches suggested by social work writers such as 
Leashore and Cates' (1985) and Goldstein's (1986) 
"humanistic approach", and Peile' s (1988) "normative 
approach". It is also consistent with Heineman-Pieper's 
(1981, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1994) and Tyson's (1994) 
heuristic paradigm which according to Heineman-Pieper 
(1994): 
conceptualizes science broadly as a systematic 
inquiry into some aspect of reality that is 
communicated in a way that will allow an interested 
person to make an informed evaluation of the process 
of inquiry and its conclusion ... The heuristic 
paradigm emphasizes both that there is no cookbook 
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approach to science and also that there is no 
intrinsically superior methodology for getting at 
truth. Rather any number of equally valid 
scientific methods are available, any one of which 
may be especially appropriate for researching a 
given problem in a specific setting. (pp. 71,75-76) 
The interpretive paradigm in general consists of a 
detailed reading or examination of text. Text could refer 
to conversations, written words or pictures. The reading 
of text is intended to discover meaning by absorbing or 
getting inside the viewpoints that are presented as whole 
text and then developing deep understanding of how the 
parts relate to the meaning of the whole. The 
interpretive approach also recognizes that there is 
reciprocity between the textual data, the interests of 
the researcher and contemporary concerns and that these 
will shape the conclusions of the study. 
Assumptions of the interpretive paradigm 
Neuman (1994) suggests there are several varieties 
or specific types of research which fit comfortably with 
the interpretive paradigm including: hermeneutics, 
phenomenology, and qualitative approaches. He contrasts 
interpretive approaches in a general way by comparing 
them with the assumptions and ideas of positivist social 
science along eight domains: (1) the reason for research, 
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(2) the nature of social reality, (3) the nature of human 
beings, (4) the role of common sense, (5) the nature of 
theory construction (6) the nature of truth claims, (7) 
the nature of evidence, and (8) the place of values. 
Though many proponents of the interpretive paradigm level 
substantial criticism at traditional positivist 
approaches to science, Neuman suggests this should not be 
taken to mean that interpretists find no value in more 
traditional approaches. It does suggest, however, a 
continuum of research strategies which are appropriate 
depending in large measure upon the purpose of the 
research and the questions being asked. 
(1994) observes: 
As Neuman 
... there is no single, absolutely correct approach 
to social science research. This does not mean that 
anything goes; rather, it means that the basis for 
doing social research is not entirely 
settled .... more than one approach is in the running. 
Perhaps this will always be the case (p.76). 
What becomes very important is that the researcher 
explicitly tell the reader which approach is being used 
and establishes the link between it and the questions 
under consideration. The interpretive paradigm is the 
over-arching approach to research which best fits the 
purpose and questions of the current project. 
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The following explication of the eight domains, as 
suggested by Neuman, provides a basis for referencing the 
interpretive paradigm as an appropriate approach to study 
the questions of this project. Support is drawn from the 
insights of Imre (1985), Leininger, (1985), Allender 
(1987), Barrell, Aanstoos, Richards and Arons (1987), 
Morse (1991), Riessman (1994), Neuman (1994), Tyson 
(1995), and (personal communication with E. Canda, 
associate professor of Social Welfare, University of 
Kansas, September 19 and 26, 1996). 
The reason for research: The interpretive paradigm 
suggests the reason for research is to discover embedded 
meaning. It attempts to clarify the textual accounts 
within the framework of the text. Deep ecology and 
ecof eminism are heavily dependent on both philosophical 
and visionary interpretations to establish the validity 
of their particular ideas. In fact they have been 
criticized somewhat because their ideas are not 
particularly accessible to the average reader (Watson, 
1984). One cannot approach the study of these belief 
systems in a cursory manner. The interpretive paradigm 
provides an appropriate referent for examining difficult 
concepts through engagement and dialogue with the text. 
The intent here is not, nor is it perhaps possible 
without damaging the integrity of complex, interrelated 
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phenomenon, to specify positivistic "a priori" hypotheses 
or to operationalize concepts in a way which make them 
suitable for quantifiable measurement. 
The nature of social reality: The positivist 
paradigm assumes that everyone shares relatively the same 
meaning system which can be explained by normative, 
logical theories. By contrast, an interpretive 
orientation assumes that multiple interpretations of 
human experience are possible. All conclusions are then 
tentative and provisional; open to questioning and new 
interpretations. The current project's reliance on the 
interpretive paradigm supports the examination of ideas 
which posit a different interpretation of human 
experience. Deep ecology and ecofeminism challenge the 
conventional penchant to deny alternative realities. The 
interpretive approach is consistent with this challenge 
by suggesting that the focus of research is on a process 
of listening and describing alternative views and using 
these as a tool for existing in diverse and complex 
relationships. 
The nature of human beings: The nature of human 
beings from the interpretive perspective is not dictated 
by causal laws that determine patterns of external 
behavior and development. Rather, human behavior and 
development is created out of evolving meaning systems 
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that are generated in context. Ideas of deep ecology and 
ecofeminism have followed an generative trajectory. In 
some ways they are not new in the sense that they have 
evolved from earlier transcendentalist traditions and 
previous versions of feminist thought. In other important 
ways the ideas of deep ecology and ecofeminism are very 
evolutionary in the sense that they have incorporated 
current cultural concerns and exigencies into the framing 
of their positions. Utilizing the interpretive paradigm, 
the current project provides a mechanism to account for 
the extremely unique and evolving patterns of meaning 
communicated in the textual sources on deep ecology and 
ecofeminism. The descriptive rather than numerical 
nature of interpretive studies permits the researcher to 
account for unique circumstances in the data analysis 
narrative. 
The role of common sense: The interpretive paradigm 
values the role common sense plays for the researcher and 
the research process. Common sense from this perspective 
means a strong reliance on intuition, imagination, 
experiential encounters and emotion as primary components 
in the research process (Ladd, 1987). The researcher's 
reliance on experiential strategies such as nature 
meditations, free writing, and reflective journaling 
ensure that the narrative results of the current project 
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are rigorous while at the same time artful and 
venturesome. From the interpretive perspective results 
are always tentative and subjectively shaped, rather than 
attempting to give the impression that the results are 
derived from some sort of objective detachment. The 
current data collection and analysis leads to continually 
emerging information and interpretation and relies on the 
use of descriptive language to frame the portrait of 
results. 
The nature of theory construction: Interpretive 
research rejects claims that the construction of social 
theory should be similar to natural science, which relies 
heavily on deductive axioms, theorems and interconnected 
causal laws. The current project is idiographic. 
"Idiographic means providing a symbolic representation or 
'thick' description of something else" (Neuman, 1994, p. 
64). Interpretive theory construction or for the current 
project reconstruction reads more like the interpretation 
of a "literary work" (p. 65). It is rich in detailed 
description, has internal coherence and is grounded in 
the text. 
The nature of truth claims: The interpretive 
paradigm evaluates the truth claims of the research 
results by whether they make sense, are accountable to 
interested professionals and readers and if they allow 
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others to understand deeply the reality of the text. The 
current project aims at establishing the truth value of 
the results by conveying a depth understanding of the 
text through fully documenting ways the texts reason, 
feel and view reality. Included in this is a careful 
translation of the textual experience into a form that is 
organized and intelligible and which is able to be 
assessed by other interested professionals and readers. 
The nature of evidence: What is the nature of good 
evidence or factual information from the interpretive 
perspective? Evidence or facts from the positivist 
paradigm are thought to be observable, precise, and 
generally independent of values. The current project 
sees the unique features of text as essential for 
describing evidence. Evidence cannot be isolated from 
context and researcher values and philosophy. This means 
that the current research process has had to accomodate a 
considerable measure of ambiguity. The discovery of 
straightforward, objective facts is virtually impossible. 
Facts from the standpoint of the current project are 
interpretive facts. It is accepted that they may have 
several meanings and thus their evidentiary value is 
dependent upon the meanings assigned them and the textual 
circumstances in which they exist. 
The place of values: The positivist paradigm 
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generally asserts that values have little place in the 
research enterprise. High quality research attempts to 
be value free. Consistent with the interpretive approach 
the current project adopts the stance that value free 
research is impossible and that researchers should 
reflect upon and reexamine personal values as a part of 
the process of study. This portion of the current 
chapter is directed at making the researcher's values and 
guiding orientations as explicit as possible. I do not 
assume that they are superior to others but rather are 
delineated as a means to allow the reader access to the 
governing views which guide the current research process. 
Design Details 
Statement of focus 
This conceptual-theoretical dissertation consists of 
an effort to deepen social work's traditional 
conceptualization of person-environment by demonstrating 
the ways in which newly-emerging ideas in ecophilosophy 
can be useful in redefining this construct. Because the 
idea of person-in-environment in social work has tended 
to be viewed within a very constricted modernist, 
technoscientific framework, this study is significant 
because it will contribute to a redefinition that is 
oriented toward recovery of the vital connection between 
these two seemingly disparate constructs. The primary 
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orientation of this study is to stimulate rich insights 
for purposes of developing a framework of ideas for 
viewing conventional social work principles. 
Specifically, this framework of ideas from deep ecology 
and ecof eminism is intended to contribute to a 
reconceptualized view of person-in-environment which then 
can be utilized as a perspective for viewing social work 
knowledge, theory and practice. 
Two central research questions will be addressed. 
They are: 
1. What are the key themes and key concepts in 
deep ecology and ecological feminism that may 
be useful in reconceptualizing social work's 
person-in-environment perspective? 
2. What are the specific conclusions and 
implications of a reconceptualized person-in-
environment perspective for social work 
knowledge, theory and practice? 
Three adjunctive research questions will also be 
considered in preparation for the primary research task 
described above. They are: 
1. What are the philosophical assumptions 
underlying the modernist worldview and its 
associated technoscientif ic paradigm and how 
have these constrained or supported the 
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development of social work's person-in-
environment perspective? 
2. How has the conventional ideas of person and 
environment historically developed in social 
work theory over the course of the last number 
of decades? 
3. What is 'the current status of person-
environment as it is configured in contemporary 
social work? 
Conceptual framework 
Strategies for this study represent a composite of 
research methods based upon the over-arching framework of 
the interpretive paradigm and are drawn primarily from 
hermeneutical (Barrell, Aanstoos, Richards & Arons, 
1987), phenomenological (Reiman, 1986; Anderson, 1991) 
and grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 
1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) methods. 
These three approaches are exemplars of what some 
have come to call, very broadly, qualitative research 
(Munhill & Oiler, 1986; Neuman, 1994; Riessman, 1994). 
Qualitative methods are consonant with the interpretive 
paradigm in that they share a concentration on the 
qualitative nature of human meaning and investigative 
techniques "that generate narrative as opposed to 
numerical data" (Knafl & Howard, 1986, p.267). 
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The focus is on identifying the "qualitative features and 
characteristics that make a phenomenon what it is" 
(Leininger, 1985, p.5). Qualitative research is defined 
by Sherman & Reid (1994) as: 
... research that produces descriptive data based 
upon spoken or written words and observable 
behavior. And qualitative methods can be defined as 
procedures for identifying the presence or absence 
of something, or describing the amount of something 
in words, in contrast to quantitative methods, which 
involves numerically measuring the degree to which 
some feature is present. The elements of judgment, 
choice, interpretation, and naturalistic situations 
are actually coterminous with the major elements of 
direct practice in social work. (p. 1) 
Qualitative, descriptive designs are particularly 
suitable for the discovery, formation and revision of 
concepts, and relationship among concepts (Taylor & 
Bogdan, 1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Gilgun, 1994). The 
qualitative researcher "can be thought of as an explorer 
entering an uncharted terrain" (Goldstein, 1993, p. 89) 
with the purpose of taking a fresh look at phenomena. 
Qualitative designs operate with a degree of structure 
which is appropriate for exploration, discovery and 
emergence of ideas. Though open-ended, they are 
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nonetheless rigorous in the way the researcher 
painstakingly devises an overall plan and set of 
procedures for analysis of the domain of inquiry. 
Goldstein (1993) notes: 
The open-minded character of qualitative inquiry 
should not be confused with anything resembling a 
seat-of-the-pants, slipshod disposition. It is 
because this investigation does not proceed 
according to a standard formula that the researcher 
is obligated to set certain limits and yet not 
compromise the unique nature of the inquiry. (p. 89) 
Methodology 
The character of qualitative methods require that 
the researcher view the research design as an emergent 
process and regularly evaluate and alter elements of the 
research plan as needed. Consistent with this tradition 
details of focus, methodological decisions and analytical 
procedures remained open to modification while this 
investigation was in process. Major methodological 
considerations will be identified and discussed in the 
following sections. 
Phases of inquiry 
Methodological considerations will be reported as a 
sequence of phases that guided the current research. 
Though these phases are reported in a linear fashion, the 
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process was interactive throughout the research study. 
The phases that guided this inquiry were: 
Phase 1) Building foundations: involved a number of 
steps including the preparatory work of focusing ideas, 
advancement of a research proposal, explicating rationale 
for the research, and preliminary definitions. Phase one 
included establishing the research problem, specifying 
research goals, and formulating major and adjunctive 
research questions. During his initial phase of 
development the researcher relied on a number of 
philosophical perspectives derived from hermeneutical and 
phenomenological research traditions. 
Hermeneutical and phenomenological research 
approaches are multifaced but share a number of common 
features which guided the development of the current 
research. Ray (1985) discusses constituents or 
guidelines of phenomenological and hermeneutical research 
which she calls "identification, intentionality, 
bracketing, intuiting and describing" (pp. 89-90). 
Although all of these features are relevant to the 
complete research process the latter three have been 
specifically associated with data analytic procedures 
(discussed later) while the first two are associated with 
the tasks involved in phase one of the current inquiry: 
problem, goal and question development. 
150 
Identification is an awareness of the totality of 
relationship between the focus of inquiry and the 
inquirer. For example, the current project understands 
the problem of person-in-environment not just as a matter 
of underdeveloped knowledge concerning these constructs, 
but also a matter of failing to develop the meaning of 
these phenomena for those who engage with them. For me, 
this meant I could not place myself outside the problem 
as I understood it. Posing the research problem and the 
research questions were not something I had to 
necessarily search out. They came from life-my life. 
The problem of person-in-environment within a social work 
frame and the question of themes from deep ecology and 
ecof eminism appropriate for reconceptualization are not 
very far from my own personal experience. The problem of 
person-in-environment is my problem. I identify in it 
the reality of myself. And in its reconceptualization I 
begin to understand myself and the world in new ways. 
Intentionality is related to identification in the 
sense that research involves intentional activity 
directed toward elucidating the experiential meaning of 
phenomena which are more conventionally viewed as mere 
symbolic abstractions. From this perspective person and 
environment are not things. They are not dependent 
variables as might be suggested in the parlance of 
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experimentation. There are experiential roots to which 
these concepts refer. The task of the current research 
was to begin preconceptually in order to elucidate the 
experiential meaning and contextual backdrop of these 
concepts. Several intentional actions assisted in this 
process. One was to explicitly reflect upon a kind of 
experiential protocol whereby my own sense of person and 
environment came into view. For example, I relied upon a 
kind of nature meditation where before and during intense 
periods of thought, analysis and writing I spent time at 
a secluded natural setting where I could experience and 
ponder the sights, sounds, and lessons of the organic 
world. The researcher also attended a series of 
reflective seminars conducted over the course of several 
months on such topics as mind/body healing, psychological 
health and the natural environment, and the spiritual and 
religious meaning of everyday life. Notes were taken at 
each of these seminars and personal reflections were 
recorded on audio cassette immediately following each 
seminar for future review. Each of these activities 
allowed me to sense my own spiritual and lived experience 
as person within nature and acted as a catalyst for the 
development of this topic as well as the procedures 
whereby it could be explored. 
A second activity of intentionality important to 
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this phase of inquiry was the development of a succinct, 
preliminary literature review which established the 
professional and contextual contours of social work's 
person-in-environment perspective. This is an important 
aspect of hermeneutic, phenomenological approaches, for 
in order to understand the fortunes of the concepts of 
person and environment one must also attempt to provide 
some interpretive understanding of the concentration of 
ideas that a particular construct represents at any point 
in time. The sociocultural and professional context in 
which concept development occurs influences the progress 
of any given conceptualization. Beneath the surface of 
an apparently orderly and rational progression of ideas 
are found discontinuity, uncertainty and the influence of 
the conscious and unconscious interests of both the 
culture and professional sphere that shape these ideas. 
Interpreting the values, ideology and power shaping 
person and environment are more important than simply 
observing their utility, rationality and efficacy as a 
guiding principles of practice. 
Results of phase one are contained in the preface, 
introduction and chapters two and three of this work. 
Phase 2) Determination of the approach to inquiry: 
began during phase one and proceeded iteratively 
throughout topic development, collection and analysis of 
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data. Here the intent is to develop a consistent process 
that would sustain a focused exploration. This phase of 
inquiry included the setting of a time line which would 
encourage an ordered pacing of all phases of design 
implementation but also allow for maximum flexibility. 
This included planning for delays and revising the time 
line periodically to reflect shifts in implementation 
strategy. The professional relevance, significance, 
feasibility, design components, guiding conceptual 
framework, and methodological considerations such as data 
collection, data analysis and issues of trustworthiness 
are described in detail in the current chapter. 
Phase 3) Analytical literature review: involved a 
detailed collection and analysis of literature in deep 
ecology and ecological feminism that aided in 
reconceptualizing social work's person-in-environment 
perspective. This phase involved a four step process: 
a) selecting the literature, b) accessing the 
literature sources, c) reading the sources and d) 
making analytical comparisons and contrasts of content 
patterns and themes. This phase will be discussed in 
greater detail in the subsequent sections of the current 
chapter. Results of the analytical literature review 
will be reported in chapter five. 
Phase 4) Developing reconceptualizations: pulled 
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all the literature together into a reformulation of 
person-in-environment. This will be reported in the 
first portion of chapter six. 
Phase 5) Suggesting implications: involved 
critical reflection upon conclusions and implications 
supported by the reconceptualization of person-in-
environment. These implications and conclusions will be 
reported in the latter portions of chapter six. 
Data collection 
The researcher developed data collection strategies 
based upon the research questions, insights from the 
literature and from suggestions provided by members of 
the dissertation committee. 
Specification of data sources. Data sources were 
specified based upon the research purpose and research 
questions to be addressed in the current study. The 
purpose and questions of the study suggested a detailed 
examination of literature as the most appropriate way to 
develop exploratory and descriptive insights on the topic 
under consideration. The data are consequently in the 
form of words or text. Words are a mode of expression 
with greater open-endedness, "more capacity for 
connecting various realms of argument and experience and 
more capacity for reaching wider audiences" (Collins, 
1984, p.353). And, in the study of text Neuman (1994) 
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suggests that researchers are required to 11 absorb or get 
inside the viewpoint it presents as a whole, and then 
develop a deep understanding of how its parts relate to 
the meaning of the whole" (p. 61). 
There has been a certain ambiguity related to the 
notion of what constitutes data (Strauss, 1987) . Many 
researchers generate their data, for example, through 
interviewing, field observation, or videotaping. But, 
there are also other sources of primary data which are 
textual in nature such as letters, diaries and published 
documents which are exceedingly important to many 
research interests. The study of textual sources 
requires a level of sophistication and rigor similar to 
other types of data generation. Strauss (1987) observes 
that the use of these textual sources involves 
considerable work, such as: 
... searching for the data, getting access to them, 
taking notes on them, and nowadays xeroxing those 
data. In some kinds of research, the researcher 
will even use the library much like an ethnographer, 
deciding upon which shelves to find the data sources 
(books, periodicals) and like the ethnographer 
happily coming upon fortuitously useful data. (p. 
26) 
Textual sources for the current study included 
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published literature from deep ecology and ecofeminism, 
ancillary reviews and summaries of these movements and 
related radical environmental ideologies sharing at least 
some philosophically similarity to deep ecology and 
ecofeminism. Text included mostly books, journal 
articles, book reviews, magazines, and promotional 
pamphlets. However, several audio cassette recordings of 
topics related to deep ecology and ecofeminism where also 
considered textual sources and were used for analytic 
purposes. Access to the literature took multiple routes. 
These included consulting cumulative and specialized 
bibliographies, indexing and abstracting resources and 
contemporary periodical reviews (Bart & Frankel, 1986). 
Additionally, textual sources were accessed by tracking 
frequently cited references, by locating specialized 
anthologies through the researcher's personal and 
professional contacts, and by perusing the shelves of new 
and used book stores and rare book collections. 
For the current study primary data collection sites 
were several large university research libraries 
(described previously) located in close proximity to the 
researcher. Research libraries, with their rich source of 
textual information, are considered key primary data 
collection sites (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Royse, 1991; 
Salkind, 1991) . 
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The rationale for relying on data acquired from 
libraries is suggested by several factors. First, using 
libraries as a primary data collection site is considered 
very useful when the purpose of the research is to 
discover and explore ideas based on purposely acquired 
and analyzed data. According to Marshall and Rossman 
(1989), libraries are "particularly useful in obtaining 
knowledge of previously unexamined areas and in re-
examining questions for which answers are not as definite 
as desired" (p. 95). 
The second factor is associated with both the 
breadth and depth of data availability. Barzun and Graff 
(1992) suggest the importance of libraries in providing 
breath of information: 
That "the library" is the repository of by far the 
largest part of our recorded knowledge ... Aside from 
the direct knowledge of an event by an eyewitness, 
or a firsthand investigation on the scene through 
interviews, laboratory or field work, or the study 
of relics, the shortest path to the facts is library 
research. (pp. 48-49). 
Libraries also contain multiple layers of imaginative 
voices which clamor to be heard and to be culled of their 
collective meaning. Glaser and Strauss (1967) understand 
the depth potential of the library by comparing it to 
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field work: 
There are some striking similarities-sometimes 
obvious although often overlooked-between field work 
and library research. When someone stands in the 
library stacks, he [sic] is, metaphorically, 
surrounded by voices begging to be heard. Every 
book, every magazine article, represents at least 
one person who is equivalent to the anthropologist's 
informant or the sociologists's interviewee. In 
those publications, people converse, announce 
positions, argue with a range of eloquence, and 
describe events or scenes in ways entirely 
comparable to what is seen and heard during field 
work. The researcher needs only to discover the 
voices in the library to release them for analytic 
use. (p. 163). 
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages 
to the use of libraries as data collection sites. One 
advantage is related to accessibility. Glasser and 
Strauss (1967) suggest there are at least five aspects of 
accessibility which makes its properties appealing to the 
library researcher. First, information gathering is not 
limited to current circumstances. Library sources allow 
the researcher to hear the voices of those long-deceased 
as if they were actually still living. Secondly, library 
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materials bring distant sources into the close proximity 
of the researcher. Difficulties often experienced around 
space, locale, time, travel and expense makes the 
accessibility of library sources very attractive to the 
researcher. 
Another aspect of accessibility pertains to the 
informants' willingness to be scrutinized or interviewed. 
Library materials make accessible the voices of those who 
for whatever reason may otherwise be relatively reluctant 
or guarded in sharing themselves with the researcher. A 
fourth aspect of accessibility is linked to the later 
stages of a research inquiry. Frequently, a researcher 
may discover well into the process that something is 
missing in the data. A researcher using library 
resources may return again and again to the data to fill 
in any gaps remaining after initial inquiry. A final 
aspect of accessibility is related to problems associated 
with scheduling. Frequently, data gathering has to be 
confined to extended periods of relative open scheduling 
when the researcher has the requisite time to pursue data 
collection. Library data requires no such 
considerations. The researcher can work intermittently, 
often at home, and with a greater degree of flexibility. 
A second advantage of using libraries is the diverse 
range of materials available for theory development. The 
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library offers the researcher an opportunity to have 
her/his "· .. theorizing impulses aroused by the happily 
bewildering, crazy-quilt pattern of social groups who 
speak to him [sic]" (Glasser & Strauss, 1967, p. 179). 
A final advantage of library data is that it lends 
itself to being assessed chronologically which enhances 
its usefulness in establishing a historical development 
of a phenomenon and any change that takes place over 
time. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest a number of 
limitations associated with library data. The first 
involves the fact that many views of the world and its 
operation evolve and disappear without leaving any or 
much documentary traces. It is certainly the case that 
most libraries are "richer in materials about certain 
given substantive areas and particular groups than about 
others" (p. 180) . 
A second potential disadvantage of library materials 
is the inherent difficulty in determining whether the 
data has been purposely misleading. Glasser & Strauss 
(1967) note this is the situation with all statements 
made whether in print or in conversation. The researcher 
must exercise careful scrutiny of the materials but 
"probably no more or less than interview of field 
materials" (p. 181) . 
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A third potential disadvantage of library material 
is related to accuracy. The possibility always exists 
that information and events reported by authors may 
simply be inaccurate. This is not to suggest that the 
library materials can never be trusted but does imply 
that the careful researcher must use these materials with 
their best judgement and in accordance with a meticulous 
methodology. 
A fourth potential disadvantage of library materials 
is related to adequacy. There may not always exists 
sufficient material in enough detail to satisfy the 
researcher needs. Glaser & Strauss (1967) note: 11 In some 
part, the adequacy of the library materials depends on 
the sheer bulk of material available concerning the topic 
under study, and also on who has produced it" (p. 182). 
An additional source of data was the researcher's 
personal notes generated from critical reflection on the 
topics and processes involved in this study. Data 
collected from informal conversations with committee 
members and interested colleagues, though not used for 
analytical purposes, were very helpful in generating 
insights and suggesting new areas of inquiry or in-depth 
contextual information. Notes were kept on these 
conversations. The researcher also relied on a supportive 
technology of audio recording of these conversations in 
162 
order to facilitate future review. 
The researcher also conducted semistructured, 
exploratory experience surveys of selected social work 
scholars who have published on the relationship of 
natural environmental factors to social work theory and 
practice. As the preliminary literature review has 
shown, little explicit writing exists on natural 
environment from a social work perspective. Several 
authors (Hoff & McNutt, 1994), however, have recently 
published an edited collection of essays and research 
studies which begin to address issues of the natural 
environment. It was from this edited work that the 
researcher chose to draw informed consultants. It was 
anticipated that these scholars would be able to 
contribute meaningful and concise insights about the 
research topic and about potential applications to social 
work research and practice. These interviews augmented 
data collected from textual sources and contributed to a 
modified form of data triangulation (Pray, 1993; Neuman, 
1994). 
An initial letter of inquiry was sent to two 
interviewees explaining the purpose of the interview, a 
request for participation, and information necessary for 
scheduling the interview (see Appendix I) . A one page 
orientation was mailed with the inquiry letter in order 
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to help familiarize the respondents with the research 
topic and to help them prepare for questions to be asked 
during the interview (see Appendix II). Because 
respondents were located in widely separated areas of the 
country, one-shot telephone interviewing was the method 
of choice. Each interview was scheduled to last for 
approximately one hour. With the permission of the 
respondent each interview was audio recorded in order to 
capture conversational detail which would have been 
impossible with only the use of interview notes. 
Reflective notes were also kept during the interview. 
Interview summaries were recorded immediately after the 
interview in order to help the researcher consider 
emerging insights and methodological refinements. 
Prior to beginning formal interviews, the interview 
procedures were pre-tested for feasibility with a social 
work doctoral student who has interest in the connection 
between natural environment and social work. This 
process also familiarized the researcher with the 
interview process to increase skill and level of comfort 
during the actual interview. 
Content of the interview guide was derived from 
insights which emerged from the preliminary literature 
review, early development of analytic coding categories, 
the researcher's very initiatory data analysis, and 
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conversations with committee members. All questions were 
open-ended by design, but were organized within 
conceptual categories based upon insights developed from 
the procedures mentioned above. They were intended as 
guidelines rather than as prescriptive of a rigid format. 
Order and pacing of question asking varied somewhat 
according to the reflexive process which emerged between 
the researcher and the interviewee, however, each content 
area was addressed with each respondent. The researcher 
asked probing questions, summarized responses, and 
clarified understanding of the interviewee's intent. 
Sampling. Rationale for selecting particular 
literature was determined from a purposive sampling 
strategy of textual sources. The initial elements of the 
strategy focused on a number of diverse, radical 
environmental philosophies and movements. These included 
such movements as Greenpeace, the ecotage coalition, the 
stewardship movement, bioregionalism, and earth first, as 
well as related ecophilosophies such as deep ecology, 
ecological feminism, social ecology, and mainstream 
environmental ethics (List, 1993). 
As the methodological process unfolded, the sampling 
became more focused and was adapted to include only deep 
ecology and ecological feminism. The current study 
focused on these two content areas because of the 
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feasibility constraints associated with using all of the 
textual sources mentioned earlier. These constraints 
centered on the need to establish reasonable limits to 
the time required for completion of this project and on 
issues of relevancy. Deep ecology and ecological 
feminism were considered to be more conceptually relevant 
to the goals of this research because they explicitly 
discuss the deeper connections between person and 
environment. 
The volume of literature in both deep ecology and 
ecological feminism is immense. This made extensive 
sampling unrealistic. Consequently, sampling was limited 
to the use of critical case examples of prominent 
theorists within each discipline, influential 
intellectual contributors, and theorists who share 
similar philosophical understandings (though not 
identifying themselves specifically with either 
movement), and critical reviewers of both deep ecology 
and ecofeminism. 
Decisions concerning to what extent data should be 
collected and issues of termination were based on a 
criteria of redundancy. That is, around the questions of 
whether any more new information is being generated, or, 
whether the same ideas are appearing over and over again 
(Glaser & Strauss,1967; Gilgun, 1994). Gilgun (1994) 
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describes this criterion: 
... successive cases are chosen on the basis of the 
likelihood that they will advance the development of 
findings. The type of case with which to begin the 
research depends on the research question. Once the 
first case study is completed, researchers continue 
to choose cases similar to the first until they are 
finding no new information. The point at which the 
researcher is not discovering new information is 
called theoretical saturation. (p. 117-118) 
Approximately 100 sources were sampled in the areas 
of deep ecology, ecological feminism and related venues. 
Sources were fairly equally distributed, primarily 
between books and journal articles. In terms of the 
published time frame of the textual sources attained, the 
majority were written in the 1980s. The next largest 
group were written in the 1990s, with fewer still in the 
1970s and previous decades. 
Data analysis 
In qualitative investigation, it is common for data 
analysis to begin almost simultaneously with data 
collection. The process is interactive and dynamic. That 
is, at times data analysis for this study was conducted 
synchronically with data collection, though time was also 
allocated for intensive periods of analysis with 
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cessation of data collection. 
Preliminary procedures. Data analysis is perhaps 
the most crucial phase of the current study. 
Consequently, the researcher relied upon several data 
analytic assumptions and methods associated with the 
interpretive paradigm discussed earlier in this chapter. 
From a hermeneutical, phenomenological perspective data 
analysis involves a number of preliminary procedures 
including: bracketing, intuiting and describing 
(Anderson, 1991; Berg, 1989; & Ray, 1985). Bracketing 
means that the researcher suspends judgment; refuses to 
take for granted, as correct, one's beliefs about a 
phenomenon as an objective reality, but rather attends to 
it precisely from the meaning which is supplied by the 
text. From the current study this implies that the 
researcher's gaze was intentionally redirected away from 
person and environment as objective things toward 
meanings. This is important because one of the intents 
of the current study is to achieve an empathic, 
experiential contact with these constructs as furnished 
from the textual perspective. 
A second procedure consistent with hermeneutical, 
phenomenological analysis is intuiting (Anderson, 1991) . 
Intuiting is a technical term related to the mode of 
awareness or reflective discernment of the essence of a 
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phenomenon. From the current perspective it became 
important to be very aware of the subtle shifts in 
meaning within the textual description of the constructs 
under study. For it is in the demarcation of shifts of 
meaning that the researcher is able to develop 
understanding of the constituent parts of the construct 
and then relate those to the experience as a whole. For 
example, intuiting involves noticing recurring themes in 
the text and then reflectively varying those in order to 
dialogically explore and engage with other emerging 
phenomenological themes. For instance preliminary 
analysis of the current study identified a recurrent 
theme of connectedness as important in understanding the 
textual essence of both deep ecology and ecological 
feminism. By varying connectedness, that is by imagining 
connectedness from the contextual perspective of the 
particular writer and also the researcher, discernment 
emerged concerning how the phenomenon might be 
experienced and described differently and thus led the 
researcher to intuit additional themes and subthemes 
which became essential to full understanding. 
A final preliminary procedure consistent with 
hermeneutical, phenomenological analysis is describing. 
Description is a process where essential, individual 
meanings are related to each other through a process of 
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formalized description in order to clarify how each 
meaning coheres to constitute the full experience. 
Reflection is directed toward each meaning in relation to 
each of the others. Though description depends on 
imaginative variation between meanings, the ultimate 
focus is on coherence in order to determine the essential 
generality of phenomena. A reflexive log file was kept 
where notes on ideas and themes emerging from the 
intuitive and descriptive procedures were recorded for 
concurrent and subsequent data analysis. 
Coding. The researcher analyzed textual data by 
organizing it into categories on the basis of themes, 
subthemes and similar features. This was an ongoing 
process that evolved into the development of new themes, 
formulations of conceptual definitions and examinations 
of relationships among themes. 
A coding instrument was developed in a series of 
iterations in order to organize information which emerged 
during analysis. Coding categories were developed 
deductively based upon researcher expectation, prior 
research, and prior experience. In order to increase a 
sense of confidence in code categories, and consistency 
in their application, the researcher relied on members of 
the dissertation committee for clarification of meaning 
and applications of the categories. The coding 
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instrument was in a continual state of development and 
revision throughout data collection and preliminary 
analysis. 
Inductively derived coding categories, also emerged 
during data collection and initial analysis. These were 
cross-checked with the deductively derived categories 
discussed above. This process led to formation of a 
final coding scheme which was used to consistently code 
all relevant textual data (see Appendix III) . Final 
coding was manually done on all text using the categories 
that reflected the patterns and themes identified. 
Because of the potential of generating a 
considerable volume of data, and feasibility constraints, 
coding was not made on every individual textual segment 
of the articles and/or books under review. A modified 
coding strategy was adopted which coded selected 
paragraphs or pages based upon a criteria of conceptual 
relevance. Deep ecology and ecological feminism address 
a wide-range of issues; not all of which are related to a 
philosophical understanding of the constructs of person 
and/or environment. There are political, social, 
historical and eschatalogical dimensions which, though 
important to each movement's development and credibility, 
are not relevant for the purpose of this study. The 
decision to code portions of each textual document was 
171 
based on whether the textual segments fit the relevance 
criteria established by several guiding questions 
prepared prior to intensive analysis. These guiding 
questions were: 
(1) Does this textual segment have things to say 
about the constructs of person and environment? 
(2) Are there descriptive terms used in this segment 
to describe these constructs? 
(3) Are there basic, related ideas or dimensions 
which have some correlation to the constructs under 
consideration? 
(4) Are there ideas which support, foster, 
facilitate, or constrain the constructs of person and 
environment? 
(5) Are there conditions or contexts which affect 
the constructs of person and environment? 
Constant comparative analysis. Classification of 
data and analytic procedures involved a series of 
comparisons; a process Glaser & Strauss (1967) called 
"constant comparison" (p. 102). This data analysis 
process involves data collection; identification of 
principal issues and concepts; construction of coding 
categories; revisions of data collection strategies; 
development of insights concerning evolving patterns; 
illumination and revision of categories; and explication 
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of the patterns, meanings, and relationships within and 
between sources of information. Though constant 
comparative analysis is generally associated with the 
development of grounded theory as described by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967), it is not limited only to this use. 
Canda (1996a) suggests: 
It is useful for any qualitative analysis of text 
(word) based data that involves the generation and 
refinement of understanding based on themes and 
patterns of similarity and difference. Basically, 
this method involves constantly comparing portions 
of text both within and ,between sources of 
information. (p. 1) 
As suggested earlier the data sources for the 
current study were word based text collected from 
published authors in deep ecology, ecological feminism, 
and ancillary sources. Selection of these data were 
based on the relevant question criteria described 
previously. This selective within and between case 
comparisons meets the requirement suggested by Glaser & 
Strauss (1967) that constant comparison necessitates 
intense "saturation of data-not consideration of all 
available data" (p. 104) . 
Instrumentation of analysis for the constant 
comparative method involved the use of a system of 
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orderly files in order to organize and synthesize, in 
detail, the information gathered from the data sources. 
The essential mechanics of this included the development 
of a series of files; one of which included the 
untouched, photocopied article or section/chapter of a 
book for each author; a second which included the article 
or section/chapter of the book which is fully coded for 
each author; and a third file for each code category. 
These last files contain every text or segment of text 
from every data source that pertained to the code 
category. Each textual segment was coded so that it 
could be identified according to (a) the author's 
identification number, (b) a number specifying the 
article or book from which the segment came, and (c) the 
relevant thematic code identifier. These files also 
contained selected notes developed by the researcher from 
several topical audio cassettes relevant to the code 
category. The structuring of the code file insures that 
everything a author wrote about the topic can be compared 
(within comparison) and that everything every author 
wrote on the topic can also be compared (between 
comparison) . The structure of the code file also ensures 
that each text segment can be traceable to the original 
article or book. 
As mentioned previously, in addition to the system 
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of files described above, a reflexive log file was 
developed and maintained throughout the research process. 
Contents of the reflexive log file included: records of 
methodological procedures and refinements; notes of 
insights and hunches around emerging patterns, themes and 
conclusions; tentative outlines of relationships in data; 
draft developments of the analytical chapter; notes and 
audio recordings of peer debriefing sessions with 
committee members; and diagrams or charts of 
methodological procedures or emerging relationships and 
patterns which had relevance to the implications and 
conclusions of this project. 
Planning for trustworthiness 
The time, thought and energy spent in the process of 
developing a trustworthy qualitative research study will 
according to Marshall and Rossman (1989) : 
. . . create a final product that convinces readers 
and ... will reap rewards throughout the research 
endeavor. (p. 153) 
Trustworthiness is the overarching criterion for 
testing the rigor of qualitative studies and specifically 
refers to "how well one can trust that the data collected 
and the conclusions reached accurately reflect the 
phenomenon studied" (Salkind, 1991, p. 297). Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) have suggested several criteria for 
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establishing the "truth value" (p. 209) or 
trustworthiness of qualitative research: credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 
These terms will be used to organize this section. 
Credibility. The first criterion for establishing 
trustworthiness, or what Marshall and Rossman (1989, p. 
144) call the "criteria of soundness" is credibility. 
Here the goal is to demonstrate that the inquiry was 
carried out in a manner so as to ensure that the object 
of the study is accurately identified and described. A 
variety of techniques were employed to improve the 
likelihood of credible findings and interpretations. For 
the current project these included: prolonged engagement, 
persistent observation, triangulation, peer debriefings, 
and refining heuristics by negative case analysis (Canda, 
1996b) . In this study prolonged engagement was addressed 
by extended periods of time utilized for data collection. 
Data were collected consistently over a period of 
approximately one year (June 1995-June 1996) beginning 
with phase one of the current project. This collection 
strategy began rather slowly in the early months, but 
increased at an accelerated pace as the researcher moved 
toward the latter phases of the inquiry. Intense periods 
of data collection lasted for approximately three months 
where the researcher set aside three to four day 
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intervals for intense review and retrieval of data 
sources. 
Persistent observation also contributed to the 
credibility of this study. In the current study 
observation is related to the amount of time the 
researcher spent with the data sources and analytical 
components of the study. The data are in the form of 
words, which can be relatively imprecise, diffuse and 
context based, requiring a great deal of reading, 
rereading, conceptualizing and summarizing of textual 
distinctions. The researcher developed a flexible 
schedule allowing on average from four to six hours per 
day, four to five days per week for living with the data; 
becoming emersed in the textual world under study. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 225) suggest something of 
this idea in describing the researcher's persistent 
involvement with the data: 
... he himself knows what he knows about what he has 
studied and lived through. They are his 
perceptions, his personal experiences, and his own 
hard-won analyses .... He has been living by his 
analyses, testing them not only by observation ... but 
also by daily living. 
Triangulation of multiple sources of literature and 
collection sites which involved the synthesis of insights 
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from professional journals, more widely read books, audio 
presentations as well as collection from several 
libraries, book stories, personal and professional 
contacts, ensures that the data reliably reflects an 
extensive spectrum of viewpoints on the topic (Canda, 
1986) . 
Informal peer debriefing involving frequent 
corrective feedback from the researcher's dissertation 
committee functioned to challenge consideration of 
researcher biases, and interpretations imposed on the 
data, as well as to improve adequacy of methodological 
procedures, and analytic techniques. In addition 
reliance upon expert interviews will ensure development 
of a broad range of insights and conceptual breadth of 
the project (personal communication with Consultant 1 & 
2, November 12, 1996 and February 3, 1997). 
Refining heuristics by negative case analysis 
involved a comparison of disparate viewpoints in the 
textual accounts, looking for rival and competing 
patterns of understanding, as well as consciously noting 
what the authors did not say or how the nonappearance of 
a phenomena or concept in the text reveal latent meaning. 
Negative case analysis will ensure consideration of the 
entire scope of textual perspectives. 
Transferability. The second criterion Lincoln and 
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Guba (1985) propose to ensure trustwor+thiness is 
transferability. The idea of transferability is to 
demonstrate the applicability of research findings to 
other contexts beyond the study. This was of critical 
importance to the current study since the goal was to 
provide a reconceptualization of person-in-environment 
that has likely application to a multiplicity of social 
work settings. Transferability of study outcomes (or 
portions of them) is supported by providing thickly 
descriptive, analytically derived accounts of diverse 
perspectives in the reconceptualization process allowing 
for multiple comparisons and applications within and 
across different social work settings and practice 
domains (Skrtic, 1985). In addition, the process of 
conclusion formation was aimed at establishing 
theoretical referencing by linking conclusions with prior 
social work research, theory and practice modalities. 
Engaging in theoretical referencing assists in the 
development of ·functional implications; allows the reader 
to asses the degree of fit between prior knowledge and 
current reconceptualizations and assists the reader in 
determining transferability to other settings. In this 
regard it is important to remember that this study 
presents a tentative, flexible and expanded conceptual 
framework of person-in-environment which attempts to 
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contribute to an ongoing process of professional 
reformulation and revision. 
Finally, transferability is also supported by the 
researcher's intent to present findings in publication 
and conference formats in order to solicit reflection and 
dialogue from interested professionals. 
Dependability. Dependability is a determination of 
the accuracy of data collection processes and products as 
well as concept generation strategies. Here the 
researcher systematically and explicitly accounted for 
modifications in the design, data collection strategies 
and concept reformulations processes by incorporating an 
inquiry audit into the methodological development of this 
project (Carrizosa, 1995). An inquiry audit involves an 
inspection of research procedures, protocols, decisions, 
and data by a qualified auditor who is familiar with the 
findings and analytical strategies of the study, has 
knowledge and expertise of the methodology and techniques 
of qualitative·inquiry, and who has had experience as a 
research auditor. The researcher's dissertation 
committee methodologist functioned as the inquiry auditor 
for the current project. 
Confirmability. Associated with dependability is 
the idea of confirmability. Confirmability appropriates 
the conventional concept of objectivity and emphasizes 
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whether the findings of the study could be confirmed by 
another researcher (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). In order 
to safeguard this the researcher was careful to leave an 
audit trail of data collection and concept generation 
processes and products (see Appendix IV) . An audit trail 
is essentially a meticulous preservation of records 
involving the research which are made available for 
review to other interested parties. An audit trail 
allows tracing back from conclusions through each step of 
the research; invertedly toward the original material 
(Canda, 1996b) . The components of the audit trail for 
the current study will include: 
(1) raw data consisting of original published 
material and notes on pertinent audio material as well as 
bibliographic citations. 
(2) data reduction products consisting of coded 
data files as well as notes and outlines on emerging 
conceptual insights. 
(3) data ·synthesis products including rough draft 
and final text of dissertation, proposal development 
documents and documents related to the defense of study 
methodology. 
(4) instrument development information including 
expert interview request forms, preliminary and final 
coding considerations and reflexive log file. 
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CHAPTER V 
MAJOR THEMES OF ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM AND DEEP ECOLOGY 
Introduction 
Theorists who associate themselves with deep ecology 
and ecof eminism and those who have contributed to their 
thought represent a variety of academic, literary, 
philosophical and professional traditions (Leopold, 1949; 
Heidegger, 1958, 1966, 1995; Janik, 1981; Zimmerman, 
1987, 1994; Griffin, 1989; Spretnak, 1990; Roszak, 1992; 
Sandilands, 1991; Wittbecker, 1994; Sandilands, 1994; 
Drengson, 1995) . Their written work encompasses many 
forms of expression, from poetry (Berry, 1977, 1985; 
Bass, 1989; Starhawk, 1989; Metzger, 1989; Everson, 1988; 
Kinnell, 1988; Dickey, 1988; Synder, 1990) to abstract 
and intellectual philosophical discourse (Naess, 1973, 
1984, 1988, 1989; Sessions 1992; Orr, 1992; Rothenberg, 
1993; Eckersley, 1992; Colwell, 1987; Mathews, 1988, 
1990; Toulmin, 1990) to work which reflects various 
cultural traditions and forms of religion and 
spirituality (Amidon & Roberts, 1991; Halifax, 1993; 
Cajete, 1994; Fox, 1988 1995; Harner, 1986; Gwaganad, 
1989; Lachapelle, 1988; Macy, 1989, 1991; Mander, 1991). 
The ideas of ecofeminism and deep ecology have been 
published in mainstream newspapers, magazines, books, 
professional journals and in a multitude of alternative 
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press publications (Gaunt, 1992). Such diversity of 
thought reflects the distinctive values, beliefs and 
practices of both perspectives and contributes to the 
strength of their ideas. 
The current chapter will exam the results of an 
analytical review of relevant textual sources in deep 
ecology and ecological feminism and related areas. This 
chapter represents phase three in the research 
methodology and focuses on the results of the analytical 
comparison within the substantive areas for content 
patterns and themes. 
Building upon the preliminary framework and 
definitions established in chapter one, this chapter will 
elaborate, clarify and summarize theoretical 
conceptualizations from the perspectives of deep ecology 
and ecological feminism as well as explicate 
similarities, differences, and key criticisms of each 
movement. 
As the first central research question of this study 
was to discover patterns and themes in the literature 
that may be useful in reconceptualizing social work's 
person-in-environment perspective, the current chapter 
will reveal key understandings toward this end that 
emerged in the literature. This will be accomplished by 
exploring the views of both deep ecology and ecological 
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feminism through provision of exemplars, descriptions, 
comparisons and contrasts from the literature for 
purposes of illustration. The final chapter will then 
organize the information so that the challenges each 
philosophy poses to social work's person and environment 
conceptualizations may be understood, and specific 
conclusions and implications may be discussed. With this 
in mind the current study will draw from critical case 
examples of prominent theorists within each content area, 
intellectual contributors, and theorists who share 
similar philosophical understandings (though not 
identifying themselves specifically with either 
movement), and critical reviewers of both ideologies. 
It is important to reiterate that the subsequent 
analysis of ecofeminism and deep ecology will be 
consistent with the methodological considerations 
discussed in chapter four. This implies that the 
approach will be methodologically rigorous in the sense 
that it involves clearly prescribed procedures for the 
researcher's concept generation process as well as for 
making comparison both within and between content areas. 
But, in addition, it also implies that for reasons 
discussed earlier, developing a definitive expression of 
each philosophy will at best be only tentative. As with 
Zimmerman (1994) my views are "inevitably colored by my 
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own interests and limitations" and as such my conclusions 
are "not singular and fixed, but rather multiple, open-
ended, and malleable" (p. 17). 
Andrew Dobson (1995) has noted the difficulty of 
trying to write about ecological ideologies, which he 
refers to as ecologisms: 
... just as there are many socialisms and many 
liberalisms, so there are many ecologisms. Writers 
on ideologies are consistently confronted with the 
challenge of defining the apparently undefinable, in 
the sense that the historical and therefore changing 
nature of their subject makes simple elucidation 
very difficult. (p. 11) 
Dobson suggests two ways of handling this dilemma. The 
first is simply to take on, in a very broad way, the 
multiplicity of definitions and make it the organizing 
principle of the study. The alternative is to make an 
explicit argument for a specific understanding of the 
ideology. 
Consistent with the researcher's methodological 
framework the current approach is more of an amalgam of 
both choices discussed by Dobson. First, the discussion 
of deep ecology and ecofeminism will not be comprehensive 
because this approach is neither practical nor desirable. 
The vast scope of the existing literature in the content 
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areas precludes taking a comprehensive approach that 
gives equal treatment to every manifestation of each 
ideology. The current analysis does not attempt to 
discuss every expression of deep ecology and ecofeminism. 
It is a selective summation. The concentration will be 
on aspects of each ideology that are relevant for 
understanding the distinctiveness of each, and how these 
may be important for helping social work understand its 
professional guiding principles. 
Secondly, while the treatment of ecofeminism and 
deep ecology is not comprehensive, it does present a 
point of view on the meaning of each worldview that 
emerged with increasing clarity during the course of 
analysis. Because of the amorphous, fluid nature of deep 
ecology and ecofeminism, it would be inappropriate to try 
to rigidly define each ideology. From the researcher's 
perspective there are a variety of ways of understanding 
deep ecology and ecofeminism and none should be excluded 
by defining the topics in a fixed manner. Consequently, 
there is no claim to offer a definitive understanding of 
deep ecology and ecofeminism, or that the current view is 
the one and only true perspective. I offer my point of 
view as a carefully developed way of thinking about each 
content area. 
The current study has yielded seven major theme 
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areas. They have become the basis for the organization of 
this and the final chapter of the current work. Each 
major theme area has subthemes which will be discussed in 




Contemporary environmental thought 
Historical and theoretical influences 
Theme three: Definitions and preliminary precepts 
Theme four: Major distinctiveness 
Theme five: Challenges to the modern worldview 
Theme six: Comparisons and criticisms 
Theme seven: Implications for social work 
Themes one through six will be addressed in the 
current chapter while theme seven will be fully developed 
in the final chapter of this current work. Themes two 
through five will each be addressed in conjunction with 
the discussions of ecofeminism and deep ecology. 
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TABLE 1 







Challenges to Modern 
Worldview 
DEEP ECOLOGY 
* Eastern Religious 
Traditions 
* Feminist Movement 
* Ghandi 
* Heidegger 
* New Physics 
* New Systems Models 
* Non-traditional Western 
Religions 




* Deep Ecology Platform 
* Deep Questioning 
* Ecological Consciousness 
* 11 Ecologism11 
* Experiential Philosophy 
* Ecocentric Grassroots 
Effort 
* Inherent Value in Nature 
* Interrelated Body of 
Ideas 
* Interdependence of all 
forms of being 




* No Ontological Division 
* New Vision of Nature 
* Radical Eco-philosophy 
* Reversal of Shallow 
Environmentalism 
* Transpersonal Ecology 
* Biocentric Equality 
-Intrinsic Worth 
- Vitalness and Nearness 
* Self-Realization 






* Phenomenological and 




* Environmental Movement/ 
Green Politics 
* Liberal Feminism 
* Marxist/Social Feminism 
* Nature/Spirituality 
* Radical Feminism: 
- Radical Cultural 
- Radical Rationalist 
* Biodiversity 
* Domination Critiques 
* Interconnectedness 
* Mutual Respect vs. 
Oppression of 
Women/Nature 
* New Vision of Self 
* Political/philosophical 
Project 
* Rejection of 
Patriarchal frameworks 
* Radical Reconstruction 
of values/beliefs 
* Theory/movement bridges 
feminism and ecology 
* Analysis of Social 
Domination 
* Challenging Power 
Relationships 
* Critique of Oppressive 
Power Structures 
* Transformation of Power 
* "Wild Justice" Grounded 
in Political Action 




Theme One: Contemporary Environmental Thought 
Devall and Sessions (1985) and Devall (1979) have 
presented a structure for understanding and critiquing 
conventional approaches to environmental issues. This 
structure contains four components: (1) reform 
environmentalism, (2) tactics of the new right, (3) new 
age/aquarian scenario and (4) revised libertarianism. 
Clearly, Devall and Sessions do not speak for all 
deep ecologists or ecofeminists. Their ideas are 
reflections of their profound dissatisfaction with 
mainstream attempts to remediate a range of environmental 
problems. Their commitment is to an alternative vision 
of reality which changes the character of environmental 
problem definition and solution. So, while Devall and 
Sessions' framework is useful for understanding deep 
ecology's and ecofeminism's evolution as critical 
responses to one or more forms of conventional 
environmental thought; their analyses should not be taken 
as final statements on the issue. It provides a useful 
structure for clarifying similarities and differences 
between conventional approaches to environmental issues 
and for making sense of deep ecology's and ecofeminism's 
discontentment with these. 
The current section will provide an overview of this 
structure. The components will be summarized with brief 
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discussion of the underlying assumptions and values of 
each. This will act as a point of departure for 
comparing and contrasting the ideas of ecof eminism and 
deep ecology. 
Reform environmentalism 
Reform environmentalism is, according to Devall and 
Sessions (1985), what most people think about when the 
issue of environment is under discussion. Various 
movements and ideologies are identified by the authors as 
consistent with reformist thinking. These include 
wilderness preservation, public health and safety, wise-
use land management, resource conservation, population 
control, limited growth movement and animal rights. 
Reform thinking tends to view individual problems with 
environment as technical and solvable within a modernist, 
technoscientific framework. Operating within the 
modernist worldview that assumes both problems and 
solutions are technical in nature, the reform movement 
has given rise to learned experts whose task it is to 
develop technical solutions to thorny environmental 
problems. Solutions have consequently been technically 
oriented and primarily aimed at reforming policies 
involving the use of natural resources. 
The problem solving attempts of the reformist 
movement have been characterized by battles between 
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competing specialists who develop reasonable, rational 
and professional technicalities of scientific expertise 
which are then applied to the management of a full range 
of environmental concerns. According to Devall and 
Sessions reformist environmentalism gives the illusion of 
a reasoned search for fundamental solutions to 
person/environment problems. 
Citing governmental reports of the U. S. Forest 
Service, the National Park Service and the Bureau of Land 
Reclamation; Devall and Sessions claim that reformist 
efforts serve to justify the policies and practices of a 
governmental/technoindustrial aristocracy whose primary 
concerns are with their own expansionary and pecuniary 
interests. For example, reformist forestry ideology 
operates out of a industrial model that views natural, 
old-growth forests as standing, economic reserve. With 
the exception of a few, relatively small protected areas, 
old-growth cutting is technically and expertly justified 
on the grounds that these forests can be replaced quite 
adequately with technologically designed and managed tree 
plantations (Drengson & Inoue, 1995). This perspective 
destroys the genetic diversity of forests, weakens the 
natural nutrient cycle of soil replenishment and dilutes 
ecosystem viability. 
The powerful influence of reformist environmental 
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thought is also supported by prevailing sociocultural 
attitudes which give more weight to the voice of experts 
and professionals with licenses and advanced degrees than 
to persons whose learning and expertise may have 
developed through personal experience or intuition. 
The language and practices of reformist ideology 
reveal a great deal about its underlying philosophical 
assumptions according to Devall and Sessions (1985) . For 
example, the rhetoric of stewardship, wise-use, 
conservation, and scientific management often means in 
practice the economic development of resources as quickly 
as technically possible. This means altering nature to 
produce more or better products for human consumption. 
Framing person/nature issues as technical abstractions 
reveals a strong adherence to a anthropocentric cosmology 
where humans are seen as separate from and above nature. 
Nature's value lies only in its usefulness to humankind, 
and change involves improvement or development of an 
imperfect natural realm. Devall and Sessions (1985) 
describe it this way: 
... the Earth is seen primarily, if not exclusively, 
as a collection of natural resources .... There is an 
overriding faith that human civilization will 
survive. Humans will continue to dominate Nature 
because humans are above, superior to or outside the 
192 
rest of Nature. All Nature is seen from a human-
centered perspective, or anthropocentrism. (p. 43) 
New right tactics 
A second scenario proposed by Devall and Session 
(1985) as important in understanding traditional 
environmental thinking is what the authors ref er to as 
the "new right" movement (p. 4). This movement is not so 
much characterized by an ideological framework different 
from the reformist approach, but rather by its 
organizational structure and its strategies for 
consciousness raising and information dissemination. 
The new right environmentalists such as The League 
of Conservation Voters, the Sierra Club, and Friends of 
the Earth adopt the political strategies which right wing 
extremist groups have used successfully for many years. 
These include the targeting of particular groups of 
people for mass mailings, media advertisements and 
promotions geared for psychological impact through 
playing on the fears and insecurities of the public. The 
danger of this approach, according to Devall and 
Sessions, resides in the movement of environmental 
initiatives towards a structure of professional 
leadership in large, centralized, bureaucratic 
organizations making it much harder for small grassroots 
organizations to play meaningful roles in advocating for 
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change in their local communities. 
A major philosophical assumption underlying this 
scenario is the explicit belief that problems of persons 
and nature are broad and moderately uncomplicated. 
Centralized strategies emanating from the new-right 
scenario tend to oversimplify environmental problems, 
which are inherently complex and localized, while at the 
same time lobbying for simple, short-term solutions which 
have the least chance of alienating the prevailing 
political/industrial power structure. 
The new age scenario 
A third scenario consistent with traditional 
environmental thought is the New Age/Aquarian movement 
which views the earth primarily as a resource for human 
use and regards humans as divinely chosen instruments of 
progress. This view, developed largely from the earlier 
writings of Jesuit scholar Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and 
technologist commentator R. Buckminster Fuller, has a 
devout following of thousands of "articulate, upscale, 
youngish professionals who are turned on by high 
technology, visions of human colonies on Mars, space 
travel and humans as co-pilots of spaceship earth" 
(Devall & Sessions, 1985, p.5). In this scenario humans 
are perceived as valiant planetary doctors whose 
technology has now given them "the skills to work with 
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natural systems to derive benefit from them, without 
destroying their integrity and ability to renew 
themselves" (Meyers, 1993, p. 259). 
The new age scenario makes a number of assumptions 
concerning the character of the human enterprise and 
environmental systems. Practically, its strategies do 
not differ significantly from the reformist position. It 
assumes that degraded ecological systems can be 
controlled and improved by application of human 
rationality in the form of advanced technologies. It 
differs in the sense that it views humans as heroic 
saviors of the earth rather than purely technical experts 
managing a plethora of environmental assaults. This 
techno-celestial position over-values human ingenuity by 
believing it is possible to regain control over an 
exploited nature. It also over-values natural capacity 
in believing that many, if not all, environmental 
problems can be dealt with by high technology or by 
transporting the most bothersome person/environment 
difficulties to colonized outposts in space. 
Revised libertarian movement 
A final scenario consistent with conventional 
environmental thought is what Devall and Sessions call 
the revised libertarian movement. Essentially this 
ideology focuses on a revitalized interest in ownership 
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of private property and an acceptance of laissez-faire 
economic policy as a rational foundation for developing 
environmental policy and resource conservation. 
Influential theorists from this tradition include 
biologist Garret Hardin and economist John Bade. This 
approach involves private ownership of wilderness areas 
by special interest environmental groups such as the 
Audubon Society and the Sierra Club. These groups manage 
the areas in such a way as to conserve biological 
diversity but also to allow for some restricted resource 
development to enhance the financial stability of the 
organization. 
A core value assumption of the libertarian view is 
the belief that private ownership of wilderness by 
concerned environmental entities will ensure the land's 
long-term survivability. Libertarians argue that when 
people are granted use of land that is held in common; 
the land is ultimately degraded because "each seeks to 
maximize short-term gain at the expense of the commons" 
(Devall & Sessions, 1985, p. 6). Contrastingly, private 
ownership by groups with environmental knowledge and 
expertise ensures a more utilitarian balance between 
potential damage and potential economic benefit of a 
parcel of land. 
Devall and Sessions suggest that the danger of the 
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libertarian approach is that it is deceptively appealing 
because it fits very well with current society's 
heightened devotion to free enterprise economics. 
However, economist Adam Smith's conceptualizations of 
maximization of self-interest does not, as supposed, 
operate to protect the interests of society in general or 
of nature in particular (Swartz, 1986). Unless the 
larger issues of domination and control (so subtlely 
embedded in current economic and supportive political 
systems) are addressed, the libertarian approach will tie 
environmental groups even more firmly to existing 
anthropocentric versions of environmental management and 
will ultimately lead to continued misguided views of 
person/environment relationships. 
To summarize, the reformist, new right, new age and 
libertarian approaches to person/environment problems are 
incomplete. They tend to oversimplify difficulties and 
overvalue technical solutions, while they at the same 
time maintain· a myopic disregard for the destructive 
purposes and values inherent in the prevailing worldview 
(Skolimowski, 1990, Merchant, 1992; Wittbecker, 1994). 
From the perspective of most deep ecologists and 
ecof eminists these conventional environmental approaches 
provide important short-term measures to slow 
environmental destruction and interim protection for the 
197 
biosphere (Zimmerman, 1994). But, these efforts will 
fail unless accompanied by changes in the basic 
structures of modernist worldview. There is a need for a 
change in the deeper structures upon which modern society 
rests. Deep ecology and ecofeminism call for a new 
ontology leading to a non-anthro/androcentric and non-
hierarchial view of human/nature relationships. 
The change toward a new ontology that ecof eminism 
and deep ecology are seeking to bring about is buttressed 
by a variety of evidentiary supports. Generally 
speaking, the contours of these evidentiary claims can be 
grouped into four broad categories. First, ecofeminism 
and deep ecology marshall empirical support by drawing 
upon new approaches to science now emerging in quantum 
physics, conservation biology and chaos theory. 
Secondly, both movements rely on spirituality and a 
variety of sacred impulses to support the development of 
a new ontology. Thirdly, they also regard philosophical 
explication, particularly like that found in the 
Postmodern, philosophical critique of modernism, as 
important in understanding fundamental change. Finally, 
ecofeminism and deep ecology value an individual's 
intuitive/experiential capacity to conceptualize and 
analyze significant issues. This unique mix of new 
science, philosophy, spirituality and one's intuitive 
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sense lie at the core of deep ecology's and ecofeminism's 
evidentiary claims. 
Ecof eminism 
According to Carolyn Merchant (1990) the term 
ecofeminism was coined by French writer Francoise 
d'Eaubonne (1994) in 1974 to illustrate the potential of 
women for bringing about an ecological revolution to 
guarantee human survival. Since that time there have 
been numerous writers who have formulated a variety of 
perspectives on ecofeminism. There is one element which 
some suggest unites ecofeminist perspectives: the belief 
that human/nature relationships and all forms of social 
domination are feminist concerns (Warren, 1987; 
Birkeland, 1991) . The sense of this is summarized by 
Ruether (1989) : 
There can be no ecological ethic simply as a new 
relation of "man" and "nature". Any ecological 
ethic must always take into account the structures 
of social domination and exploitation that mediate 
domination of nature and prevent concern for the 
welfare of the whole community in favor of the 
immediate advantage of the dominant class, race, and 
sex. (p 149) 
For while there may be some unanimity on a statement of 
fundamental concern over care of nature and quality of 
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social life (Merchant, 1992), ecofeminists have varying 
perspectives around specific ways to develop and apply 
this concern. This is not a surprising complication 
given the multiple sources from which ecofeminism arose. 
The following discussion of ecof eminism is organized 
around themes two through five (see p. 187) and shall 
include discussion of its historical and theoretical 
influences, definitions and preliminary precepts, its 
major distinctiveness, and its challenge to the modern 
worldview. 
Theme two: Historical and theoretical influences 
The current section will analyze the multi-layered 
character of ecofeminism's historical and theoretical 
development. It will briefly review three historical 
precursors to ecofeminist thought including the study of 
historical and political theory, nature-based religion 
and spirituality, and environmental activism of the 1960s 
and 1970s. It will then address the major theoretical 
influence on ecofeminism of traditional forms of feminist 
thought. 
Spretnak (1990) describes three historical 
precursors or paths which have influenced ecofeminism. 
The first path was the study of history and political 
theory. Feminists who were exposed to Marxist theory in 
the 1960's as well as critical theory and social ecology 
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in 1970's began to develop a theory of domination which 
was not based solely on classical Marxist belief; that 
domination is related to wealth, property and class. 
From their own life experiences, these feminists gave 
increasing attention to the twin oppressions of women and 
nature within the dominance structure of patriarchal 
social conventions. What evolved was a 
feminist/ecological dominance theory rooted in the 
destructive ethos of patriarchy. 
A second historical path into ecofeminism has been 
feminist exposure to nature-based religion and 
spirituality. Spretnak (1990) suggests that in the mid 
1970's feminists discovered, through historical and 
archaeological data, ancient religions which honored both 
nature and femininity. These religions were not 
matriarchal but rather were focused on experiencing and 
knowing the Divine as immanent in themselves and in 
surrounding nature. These discoveries became a vital 
force shaping· a ecofeminist spirituality which is 
concerned ultimately with: 
... the resacralization of Nature, of the "divine 
feminine'' inherent in all living beings. It is seen 
as part of a process of reconnection, a re-
establishment of ways of knowing and being in the 
world that have been lost in the history of 
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patriarchal domination. The Goddess, in myriad 
forms, represents an ultimate vision of 
connectedness ... (Sandilands, 1991, p. 93) 
A third historical influence on ecofeminism, 
according to Spretnak (1990) was women's involvement in 
the environmental movement and Green politics. As women 
began in the 1970's to move into careers in public-
interest environmental organizations, environmental 
studies and public policy a growing awareness developed 
around the inequities associated with being a woman in 
previously male dominated entities. As feminists began 
to encounter early ecof eminist analysis they began to 
view their careers and conventional notions of 
environment and environmental policy with an entirely new 
perspective. 
In addition to the historical influences 
contributing to a ecofeminist position, critiques of 
leading versions of traditional feminist thought have 
also contributed important theorethical insight to 
ecofeminism. Several ecofeminist writers and other 
theorists (Warren, 1987; King, 1990; Merchant, 1990, 
1992; Zimmerman, 1994) have examined both the 
contributions and deficiencies of liberal feminism, 
Marxist/socialist feminism and radical feminism to an 
emerging ecofeminist perspective. 
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Liberal feminism is rooted in the liberal political 
tradition which views society as composed of autonomous 
individuals who have optimal freedom to maximize their 
own discrete interests. From this perspective persons 
are viewed as rational agents who compete for scarce 
resources. The essence of human nature lies in the 
ability to reason and act in accordance with objective, 
rights-based principles which tend to give humans moral 
considerability over and above nature. Zimmerman (1987) 
suggests that this kind of theorizing tends "to restrict 
rights (and moral standing) to human beings, 
and ... portray nonhuman beings as being virtually devoid 
of intrinsic worth" (p. 2 9) . 
The liberal feminist approach to human/nature issues 
tends to focus on the lack of equal rights and unfair 
advantage. It tends to endorse reformist and libertarian 
environmental action such as legal protection of species, 
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resource conservation and wilderness preservation. It has 
been an important source of limited short-term change 
from within the framework of the liberal democratic 
tradition, and has drawn attention to the emancipatory 
aspects of modernism, but ultimately it fails because it 
does not challenge the philosophical underpinnings of the 
patriarchal opression of women and nature (Warren, 1987) . 
Warren (1987) argues that liberal feminist 
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viewpoints have given theoretical guidance to ecofeminism 
but any ongoing reliance on them by ecofeminists is 
severely problematic. First, because the highly 
individualistic rights orientation reflects the 
hierarchical, dualistic thinking of the modernist 
project; seeing humans over-and-against nature, and mind 
over-and-against body. Secondly, liberal feminism has 
uncritically adopted modernism's patently anthropocentric 
leanings in the extension of rights to nonhuman beings. 
Arrogant moral extensionism assumes that humans have the 
power and inherent right to grant moral consideration to 
nonhumans, and without this granting of standing, 
nonhuman nature is essentially valueless. Finally, 
liberal feminism tends to overlook a view of 
relationships existing within a interconnected web or 
community of beings. This disregard thus colludes with 
the modernist penchant to ignore, minimize or suppress 
different values which conflict with the dominant 
paradigm. 
Marxist/socialist feminism sees "nonhuman nature as 
the material basis of human life, supplying the 
necessities of food, clothing, shelter, and energy" 
(Merchant, 1990, p. 103), and the importance of 
''transformation of nature by science and technology for 
human use" (Merchant, 1992, p. 186). It views women's 
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oppression as only ancillary to an ongoing class 
struggle. Liberation occurs when men and women together 
overthrow the oppressive forces of capitalism and replace 
it with some form of egalitarian socialist state (Warren, 
1987} . 
Though Marxist/socialist feminist analysis has 
contributed much to ecofeminism in its criticism of the 
impact of environmental degradation on working-class 
persons, it has failed to provide an exacting analysis 
sufficient to develop a consistent ecofeminist ethic. 
King (1990} suggests that its greatest weakness is its 
reliance on the centrality of economics as a principal 
premise for its theory and practice. From this 
perspective it is not much different from capitalism with 
its emphasis on the production of economic goods and its 
domination and control of nature as a way of acquiring 
these. The underlying philosophical assumptions of the 
modernist project remain intact. Warren (1987) suggests 
that an even more serious flaw in Marxist/socialist 
feminism is its gender blindness in the analysis of 
women's oppression. Its focus on class, to the exclusion 
of gender issues, "serves to distort rather than clarify 
the nature of women's oppression" (p. 13). 
Of the three traditional feminist ideologies, 
radical feminism has been the one most closely associated 
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with ecofeminism (Spretnak, 1990). From this perspective 
the oppression of women is accomplished by men's control 
over women's bodies. Women are defined in the 
patriarchal system as child-bearing and child-rearing 
vehicles whose value lies in their instrumental ability 
to satisfy male sexual appetites (Merchant, 1990). 
Radical feminism holds that women and nature have been 
associated with each other and devalued together within 
modern Western culture. 
Radical feminists are split over the issue of 
connection between women and nature. While there is 
general agreement that ''the oppression of women and the 
domination of nature in patriarchal society are 
interconnected and mutually reinforcing" (Berman, 1994, 
p. 173); opposing positions have evolved around whether 
this connection is a source of freedom or a source of 
further domination. Radical rationalist feminists (King, 
1990) take the position that connecting women to nature 
is a backward· step that reinforces gender differences and 
sex-role stereotyping. For radical rationalist feminists 
"freedom is being liberated from the primordial realm of 
women and nature, which they regard as an imprisoning 
female ghetto" (King, 1990. p.110). Radical rationalist 
feminists maintain that associating women with nature is 
a sexist ploy to keep women in subordination to men. 
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Radical cultural feminists, on the other hand do not 
wish to undue the connection between women and nature but 
rather focus on challenging the male domination system 
instead of strategizing or joining with it. They 
celebrate women's commonalities and attempt to 
"articulate and even create a separate women's culture 
and have been major proponents of the identification of 
women with nature and feminism with ecology" (King, 1990, 
p .111) . 
The obvious similarity of these ideas to ecofeminism 
is clear, however, a number of objections have been noted 
concerning radical feminism. King (1990) points out that 
radical feminism has served a vital function of 
addressing the need for spiritual mystery and community 
connectedness which the modernist project has tended to 
ignore. But, by itself, the "femininity culture" (p. 
110) and politics of radical feminism does not provide an 
adequate basis for ecofeminist theory and practice. 
Ecof eminism understands the need to appreciate the 
mystery of current cultural connections, but also 
understands the need to address history as a succession 
of mysteries of human/nature relationships. King (1990) 
also suggests that radical feminists have tended to 
emphasize what women have in common, thus diluting the 
complexity of feminine identity. She points to the 
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important but often overlooked contribution of women of 
color as crucial in the continued development of the 
radical feminist perspective. 
Warren (1987) also notes a number of worries 
involving the radical feminist approach. First, radical 
feminism's exclusive focus on women as embodied spiritual 
beings lacks the broadness necessary to be a theoretical 
basis for ecofeminism because it tends to neglect other 
forms of body bound oppression such as racism and 
classism. Secondly, radical feminism unknowingly 
conspires with an oppressive patriarchal framework by 
attempting to locate women's experience as closer to 
nature than men's. This maintains the competitive, 
values hierarchical, dualistic thinking of patriarchal 
framework. Even asking the question, are women closer to 
nature than men, according to Warren, perpetuates the 
very system that radical feminism purports to reject. It 
can also be added that many radical feminist devotees 
unwitting collaborate with the new age/aquarian approach 
to environmental issues (King, 1990; Devall & Sessions, 
1985) by attempting to see women (rather than men) as 
uniquely qualified, spiritually ordained instruments of 
protection and progress. 
Theme three: Definitions and preliminary precepts 
Ecofeminism defies clear and precise definition 
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partly because its origins are very diverse. Some, 
however, have attempted to give ecofeminism a more 
precise character by attempting to give definition to it 
and by looking at some of its perceptual formulations. 
The current section of this analysis will explore several 
definitional statements of ecofeminism, and discuss 
preliminary precepts common to ecofeminist thought. 
Several authors have endeavored to define 
ecof eminism both as a social movement and a intellectual 
philosophy (Warren, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1994; Berman, 1994: 
Kheel, 1991; Birkeland, 1991; Sandilands, 1991, 1994; 
Mathews, 1994; Merchant, 1992). 
Mathews (1994), for example, suggests that the 
current status of ecofeminist thought is not developed 
enough to allow ecofeminists to be referred to as a 
theory. "Ecofeminism is by no means a position or a 
theory, but simply a fairly open field of inquiry" (p. 
162). Berman (1994), however, argues forcibly that 
ecofeminism 11·is a theory and movement for social change 
that combines ecological principles with feminist theory" 
(p. 173). Sandilands (1991) agrees with this assessment 
and defines ecofeminism as '' a theory and movement which 
bridges the gap between feminism and ecology, but which 
transforms both to create a unified praxis to end all 
forms of domination" (p. 90). Later, Sandilands (1994) 
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expands upon this understanding and calls ecof eminism a 
political and philosophical project which ''places a heavy 
analytic emphasis on the ways in which dualism works to 
bifurcate and lobotomize aspects of human experience" (p. 
169) . Perhaps the most developed definition of 
ecofeminism is provided by Warren (1988) . Ecofeminism 
is: 
... both a critique of male domination of both women 
and nature, and an attempt to frame an ethic free of 
male-gender bias about women and nature. It not 
only recognizes the multiple voices of women, 
located differently by race, class, age, and ethnic 
considerations, it centralizes those voices. 
Ecofeminism builds on the multiple perspectives of 
those whose perspectives are typically omitted or 
undervalued in dominant discourse. [It 
is] .... structurally pluralistic, inclusivist, and 
contextualist, emphasizing through concrete example 
the crucial role context plays in understanding 
sexist and naturist practice. (p. 151) 
Several authors have also identified a number of 
preliminary·precepts which characterize ecofeminist 
thought. There is in some cases considerable overlap 
among these, but they are illustrative of general 
features which many, if not most, ecofeminists might 
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ascribe to. 
Ynestra King (1983 pp. 119-120) citing the 
connection between social ecology and feminism suggests 
that ecofeminism is based on four overarching beliefs. 
One, modern western industrial civilization dominates 
nature, and because women are believed to be closer to 
nature, modern industrialism also subjugates women. 
Second, there is no natural value based hierarchial 
ordering of nature but rather a series of interconnected 
communal webs. Hierarchies are human inventions used to 
define and dominate both nature and women. Third, 
healthy ecosystems exhibit biodiversity rather than 
biosimplification. The tendency to simplify biological 
existence corresponds to a simplification of social life, 
thus reducing human diversity, devaluing difference, and 
homogenizing culture for the convenience of a mass 
consumer, market oriented society. Finally, there is a 
need for radical restructuring of society which removes 
the nature-culture dualism of modern society and renews 
understanding of our relationship to nature, to our 
bodies and to all non-human beings around us. 
In another early critical review ecofeminist Val 
Plumwood (1986, p. 120) identifies the single overarching 
construct of ecofeminism as its devotion to "the problem 
of women and nature 11 , by which she means the link between 
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the domination of women and the domination of nature. 
Plumwood suggests that there is substantial unanimity on 
this point. Differences among ecofeminists can be 
understood primarily as related to three different views 
of the origins of this domination mentality. The origins 
are seen variously as emerging from the dualistic 
(humanity versus nature) character of classical 
philosophy, the mechanistic model of the enlightenment or 
from the early belief in sexually-differentiated 
personality formation. 
Birkeland (1991 p. 74) understands ecofeminism as a 
conceptual framework that includes seven overarching 
precepts to which most ecofeminists would subscribe. 
These include a reconstructing of underlying values and 
structural relations of modern society; a belief in the 
intrinsic value of nature as an essential element in 
social transformation; an ecocentric ethical frame which 
comprehends the interconnectedness of all life processes; 
and the idea that human relationship with natural place 
should be guided by an ethic of reciprocity, diversity, 
and limited interference. Additional overarching 
precepts described by Birkeland are the belief that 
power-based, hierarchical relationships must be eschewed 
in favor of a relationship ethic based on mutual respect; 
the notion that all dualisms have a bases in the 
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male/female polarity and ultimately divide persons from 
others, themselves, and from nature; and the principle 
that processes are as important as outcomes--for how 
things are done is as important as what is done. 
Kheel (1991, p.63) suggests that ecofeminism is 
united in its sharing of three general premises. These 
are the belief that the devaluation of women and nature 
have historically gone hand in hand; the notion that the 
domination of outer nature is linked to the domination of 
inner nature; and the idea that domination of inner 
nature is rooted in psychic identity, particularly that 
of men who deny their vulnerability and dependency. 
Agreeing with Kheel's first point, Berman (1994, p. 
173) suggests there is general consensus on two general 
bases of ecof eminism; oppression of women and domination 
of nature in a patriarchal society is interconnected; and 
human beings are only one constituent part of a much 
larger community of all life and living systems. 
Sandilands (l991 p. 90) also sees two common elements 
which inform ecofeminism. These are mutual reliance on 
certain ideas on the origins of domination of women and 
nature, and a particular understanding of the essential 
relationship between humanity and nature. 
Warren (1987, 1988, 1990, 1994) has provided 
perhaps the most thorough analysis of the more specific, 
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philosophically grounded axioms of ecofeminism. In many 
ways her thought summarizes and elucidates the ideas 
discussed above. To begin with, Warren (1987 pp.4-5) has 
suggested a framework for establishing the minimal 
philosophic conditions upon which any ecological feminism 
must be based. From her perspective a thorough 
ecological feminism is based on the specific axioms that: 
(1) important connections exist between the oppression of 
women and oppression of nature; (2) understanding the 
character of these connections is necessary to appreciate 
both the oppression of women and nature; (3) if 
oppression of women and nature are connected and if there 
is some adequate understanding of these, then feminist 
theory and practice must include an ecological 
perspective; and (4) if oppression of women and nature 
are connected and if there is some adequate understanding 
of these, then solutions to ecological issues must 
include a feminist perspective. Thus, Warren suggests 
that on the basis of these claims an identifiable 
ecological feminism is a plausible alternative to 
traditional feminist frameworks which lack a 
transformative and integrative perspective. 
Warren (1987 p. 18-19; 1988, pp. 148-150; 1990, pp. 
138-143; 1994, pp. 187-194) suggests that a 
transformative feminism, an ecological feminist ethic, 
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has at least eleven specific action principles flowing 
from her philosophic axioms. For Warren a transformative 
feminism opposes all forms of oppression or all isms of 
domination. It is structurally pluralistic in the sense 
that it affirms the value of differences in an inclusive, 
nondominating manner. It involves a rejection of a 
patriarchal conceptual framework which functions to 
maintain and perpetuate domination hierarchies. In 
addition, a transformative, ecological feminism values 
and prefers the felt-experience claims of oppressed 
persons and believes to ignore these perpetuates a 
patriarchal, non-inclusive bias. It reconceptualizes 
theory as theory-in-process; theory should never be 
universalizing, and theory building is always situated 
within a set of historical, sociocultural, conceptual and 
environmental circumstances. An ecological feminism 
exposes and challenges the use of power domination 
tactics in socioeconomic and environmental contexts. It 
involves a rethinking of what it means to be person, such 
that self is viewed simultaneously as a co-member of an 
ecological community while at the same time being a 
unique individual in webs of communal relationship. It 
makes a central place for values of reciprocity, 
friendship, kinship and appropriate care for both other 
persons and the nonhuman natural environment. Ecological 
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feminism also provides a place for psychologies, and 
theologies or spiritualities of liberation as a part of 
its theoretical base. It provides practical guides for 
action within the dominant, patriarchal paradigm. And, 
finally, it involves challenging traditional scientific 
and technological approaches to person/environment 
relationships. From Warren's perspective it is these 
action principles which characterize ecofeminism and make 
it a truly transformative, ecological feminism. 
Theme four: Major distinctiveness 
Up to this point the current analysis has looked at 
major theme areas organized around historical and 
theoretical influences as well as definitional statements 
and preliminary precepts. Unlike deep ecology's platform 
principles and ultimate norms ecofeminism has no agreed 
upon standard or seminal theorist, like Arne Naess, who 
has established a framework for further development. 
Ecofeminism is a far more diversified movement than deep 
ecology in this regard. 
Ecof eminism is at an awkward stage of development 
and, as has been shown, it is a highly diverse field of 
discourse. This has lent to it not having the same 
precision and clarity in the development of normative 
standards, as has been more typically the case for deep 
ecology. While subsequent discussions will illustrate 
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marked similarities between the two movements; the 
ecofeminist literature shows that the major 
distinctiveness of ecofeminism lies in its focus on 
critiquing all oppressive power structures as the first 
step in forging a new standard of human/nature 
relationship. Ecofeminist writer Ynestra King (1989), 
for example, argues that any movement claiming an 
ecological interest is simply incomplete without a 
critique of power. She observes that "without a feminist 
analysis of social domination that reveals the roots of 
misogyny and hatred of nature, ecology remains an 
abstraction: it is incomplete" (pp. 23-24). 
Ecofeminism asserts that the split between humanity 
and nature in turn reflects a split between man and 
woman. This split between man and woman and between all 
comparative spheres is supported by a dualistic power 
hierarchy of existence which "creates a logic of 
interwoven oppression" (Plumwood, 1994, p. 211) In the 
words of ecofeminist Susan Griffin (1989) : 
We divide ourselves and all that we know along an 
invisible borderline between that we call Nature and 
what we believe is superior to Nature .... According 
to this worldview--a view whose assumptions are so 
widely accepted by this civilization that we do not 
even think of it as an ideology--there is a 
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hierarchy in existence. (p. 8) 
From the ecofeminist perspective hierarchy is 
inextricably linked with power. Thus in proposing that 
humanity give up hierarchical thinking, ecofeminism also 
exhorts us to give up power as we traditionally conceive 
of it and move toward what Sandilands (1994) calls a 
"wild justice" grounded in political action. Challenging 
all existing power relationships is, according to 
Starhawk (1989), the unique contribution of ecofeminism. 
It is ecofeminism's normative goal. Power critiques are 
essential for societal transformation because 
"powerlessness and the structures that perpetuate it is 
the root cause of famine, of over-population, of the 
callous destruction of the natural environment" (p. 180). 
This point of view is expressed very clearly by Petra 
Kelly: 
Our aim is radical, nonviolent change outside--and 
inside of us! The macrocosm and the microcosm! 
This has to do with transforming power! Not power 
over, or power to dominate, or power to terrorize--
but shared power; abolishing power as we know it, 
replacing it with the power of nonviolence or 
something common to all, to be used by all and for 
all! (Kelly, 1989, p. x). 
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Theme five: Challenges to the modern worldview 
Drawing from the previous discussion and relying on 
the works of several ecof eminist authors and other 
relevant theorists for illustration there are a number of 
important subthemes which emerged from the literature 
related to ecofeminism's challenge to the dominant, 
modernistic worldview. These have been organized around 
non-hierarchicalism, interconnectedness, spirituality, 
and the over-valuing of human and environmental capacity. 
Ecof eminists adopt a non-hierarchical conceptual 
framework as a guiding alternative to modernistic ways of 
understanding and organizing difference. Hierarchies are 
human derived systems of ranking which define and 
circumscribe relationships among complex phenomena. They 
have become the accepted way to understand differences 
that exist in the natural as well as the social realm. 
Hierarchies have two elemental characteristics which help 
clarify the features of this conceptual frame. The first 
is linear sorting and ranking of complex relationships 
among phenomena as a way to understand differences. The 
second feature, related to and perhaps flowing from the 
first, is the tendency to interpret these linear 
relationships as organized around a superior to inferior 
polarity which then legitimizes the belief that 
domination and control is the preferred method for 
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maintaining distinctiveness among phenomena (see Chapter 
2 for a detailed discussion) . 
Ecof eminists believe that hierarchies destroyed the 
original balance that once existed in the premodern world 
and that today hierarchial dominance permeates all 
aspects of life (Merchant, 1992). The non-hierarchial 
framework of ecof eminism challenges all forms of 
domination (Starhawk, 1990) and has a commitment not only 
to reversing the domination of nature, but also to 
removing social domination. 
As has been suggested earlier the distinctiveness of 
ecofeminism's challenge to hierarchial dominance is best 
understood in its emphasis on patriarchalism as a model 
for all other forms of domination. Ecofeminists tend to 
agree that hierarchies and the logic of domination stem 
from patriarchy and that patriarchy historically 
functions to sustain and justify the ongoing domination 
of women, nature and social structures (Warren, 1990). 
Warren (1988)· understands patriarchal conceptual 
frameworks as a domination system which: 
... explains, justifies, and maintains the 
subordination of women by men. Patriarchal 
conceptual frameworks place higher value, status, or 
prestige on what is traditionally associated with 
males than on what is traditionally associated with 
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females. A patriarchal conceptual framework puts 
men "up" and women "down", minds "up" and bodies 
"down", culture "up" and nature "down". Underlying 
patriarchal conceptual frameworks is what I call a 
"logic of domination" which incorrectly assumes that 
superiority justifies subordination .... Patriarchal 
conceptual frameworks ... sanction the subordination 
of both women and nature .... by feminizing nature and 
then assuming that both women and nature are 
inferior ("down") to men ... [and] by failing to see 
the ways in which the exploitation of nature is 
historically and conceptually tied to the 
subordination of women. (p.144) 
Thus, the nonhierarchical framework of ecofeminism 
reorganizes human relationships and relationships with 
all other beings so that diversity and difference are not 
equated with superiority or inferiority. Ecofeminists 
understand that hierarchies exist in nature and that 
hierarchical ·thinking is inescapable in some contexts. 
At issue for them is not hierarchies per se but the value 
humans ascribe to entities which are up as opposed to 
down on the hierarchical scale. Warren (1990) observes: 
Hierarchical thinking is important in daily living 
for classifying data, comparing information, and 
organizing material. Taxonomies (e.g., plant 
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taxonomies) and biological nomenclature seem to 
require some form of "hierarchical thinking". Even 
"value-hierarchical thinking" may be quite 
acceptable in certain contexts .... The problem is not 
simply that value-hierarchical thinking and value 
dualisms are used, but the way in which each has 
been used in oppressive conceptual frameworks to 
establish inferiority and to justify subordination. 
(pp. 12 8 -12 9) 
A second subtheme emerging from the literature in 
connection to challenges to the modern worldview is the 
idea of interconnectedness in complex webs of communal 
networks. Interconnectedness for ecofeminists is a view 
that the parts of all energy, matter and reality are 
related to the greater whole. This whole is not a 
abstract mentalism but has infinitely complicated 
characteristics somewhat analogous to the way communities 
of beings manage individual and collectivist realities. 
Ecofeminist writers suggest that humans have lost their 
integrated wholeness through a gradual deprogramming 
initiated and sustained by modern institutions, economies 
and educational systems. Swimme (1990), for instance, 
compares the fragmentation of the modern mind with a 
frontal lobotomy which essentially shuts down a person's 
fundamental cognitive and sentient powers. This virtual 
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lobotomizing began with the introduction of positivist 
scientific protocol and is sustained through all other 
educational and economic processes based on positivist 
premises. By the time formal education is complete: 
... we have only a sliver of our original minds still 
operative .... It is a sliver chiseled to perfection 
for controlling, for distancing, for calculating and 
for dominating .... Our insistence on analysis, on 
computation, on categorization has blinded us to the 
reality of the whole. We have been seated at a 
table heavy with food, and instead of realizing that 
this is a feast we are meant to join, we occupy our 
minds with counting the silverware over and over as 
we starve to death. (Swimme, 1990, p. 16) 
Ecofeminism seeks to heal this lobotomy by reweaving 
the inherent interconnectedness in all of the universe 
through a revitalization of each persons direct, lived, 
and sensual experience with the complex whole of nature. 
Griffin (1989·) suggests that modern civilization's root 
metaphor is division rather than connection. She 
concludes that: 
We no longer feel ourselves to be a part of this 
earth. We regard our fellow creatures as enemies. 
And, very young, we even learn to disown a part of 
our own being. We come to believe that we do not 
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know what we know .... dividedness is etched into our 
language. (Griffin, 1989, p. 7) 
From this complex ontology of interconnectedness 
ecof eminists understand human beings as not being 
separate from or above nature. They are one small part 
of a whole, rather than the pinnacle of nature. In 
separating nature from persons, humanity creates a nature 
which is made up of dead, unintelligent matter. 
Ecofeminists like Griffin (1990 p. 88) offer a 
alternative view of nature which suggests that 
"consciousness is an integral part of nature" and that 
nature is soulful. It is this great soulfulness of nature 
which connects, deeply, unalterability nature with 
humanity. 
Given this, ecofeminism rejects the reductionist 
tendencies of the modernist project by emphasizing that 
the organic wholeness of the universe is greater than the 
sum of its parts. Reductionism understands all complex 
phenomena as ·being reducible to their smallest parts. 
Change consists in rearrangement of the parts, which 
themselves do not change. By manipulating the parts of 
any system the whole is changed (i.e.the whole is the sum 
of the parts) . The corresponding change is always or 
perhaps presumably for the better. This point is 
strikingly illustrated in Swimme's (1990) comparison of 
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the violent, fragmented, reductionist big bang theory of 
the origin of the universe with the ecofeminist vision of 
a great birth. Instead of bombs, explosions, and 
shrapnel as the root metaphor for creation, ecofeminists 
envision a complex and mysterious birthing process, 
swelling and growing, connecting and reconnecting. 
Nature was and is birthed as we are. It is a mystery to 
be experienced rather than explained. And because it is 
a living entity, not simply a random reassembly of 
billions of pieces of cosmic dust and debris, there is an 
essential organic unity between nature and ourselves. 
This interconnected unity leads to action motivated by 
compassionate understanding and appreciation rather than 
competition; the experience of feeling with all beings 
now (Starhawk, 1990) and into future generations. 
Ecofeminism thus rejects the dominance, competition, 
materialism and technoscientific exploitation inherent in 
modernist, economic based social systems. Ecofeminism 
instead assumes that healthy interactions are based on 
caring and compassion and the creation and nurturing of 
life (Christ, 1990). Compassion and caring for nature 
are part of ecof eminist processes because all of nature 
is seen as intimately connected with humans and as having 
intrinsic value. Thus, in the decision making process of 
ecof eminism, nature also has a voice deserving to be 
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heard. 
Ecofeminists value nature's complex cycles of 
renewability, and the integrity and harmony of people 
with nature. Their analyses of human/nature issues do 
not follow problem specific, conventional environmental 
strategies but rather center around raising consciousness 
concerning the destruction of the cyclic integrity, the 
life giving and sustaining quality of nature, 
particularly under the modernist pretense of development. 
For example, Shiva (1990), discusses how current economic 
strategies continue the process of colonialism under the 
modern guise of development and points out how Third 
World peoples, particularly women, are struggling for 
liberation from the violence of development just as they 
struggled for freedom from colonialism in the past. 
Shiva observes that western economic interests view Third 
World peoples as living in poverty by defining all work 
that does not produce capital and profits as 
unproductive,· and peoples who do not have accumulations 
of material goods as impoverished. The evidence shows 
that while both men and women in Third World countries 
have been impoverished due to western development 
practices, it is women who bear the brunt of the losses 
and oppression: 
Development projects have destroyed women's 
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productivity both by removing land, water, and 
forests from their management and control, as well 
as by the ecological destruction of soil, water, and 
vegetation systems so that nature's productivity and 
renewability have been impaired .... The assumptions 
are obvious. Nature is unproductive. Organic 
agriculture based on nature's cycles of renewability 
is unproductive. Women and tribal and peasant 
societies embedded in nature are also 
unproductive ... because it is assumed that production 
only takes place when it is mediated by technologies 
for commodity production, even when such 
technologies destroy life. (p. 191). 
Shiva (1990) has called this debilitating phenomena 
11 maldevelopment 11 because of the violence and destruction 
that has followed in its wake. The modernist project, 
with its narrow vision of absolute truth, and confident 
that its vision of the world is the best view, has 
perceived Third World cultures as simple and impoverished 
because they did not have accumulations of material 
wealth, and as unproductive because their work did not 
produce capital and profits. Subsequent development 
projects to improve this perceived impoverishment has 
resulted in destroying the natural connectedness between 
people and their environment, removing life essentials 
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such as land, water and forests from the management of 
the people who live with them and disrupting and 
destroying nature's complex cycles of renewability. In 
contrast, the interconnected standard of ecofeminism 
redefines productivity by viewing nature's cycles and the 
peoples who live in harmony with them as naturally 
efficient and productive. 
A third subtheme emerging from the literature in 
ecof eminism is their view of the importance of 
spirituality to human functioning. Ecofeminism views 
spirituality and sacredness as primary foundations of 
social structure. Spirituality is related to everyday 
activities and is the bridge which connects nature and 
self. Sandilands (1991) understands ecofeminist 
spirituality as: 
... being concerned with the resacralization of 
Nature, of the "divine feminine" inherent in all 
living beings. It is seen as part of a process of 
reconnection, a re-establishment of ways of knowing 
and being in the world that have been lost in the 
history of patriarchal domination. The Goddess ... is 
the intricate (simultaneously fragile and powerful) 
web of life which is the Earth: She is ... immanent 
and alive in all people as parts of Nature, rather 
than as beings trying to transcend the material 
228 
world. (p. 93) 
Not all ecofeminists agree with the spiritual 
perspective. Some, like Janet Biehl (1991), base their 
transformative notions strictly on secular principles and 
ardently criticize the spiritual perspective. In a 
strongly worded condemnation of the implications of the 
spiritual grounding of many ecofeminists Biehl writes 
that this: 
.... sweeping but highly confused cosmology 
introduces magic, goddesses, witchcraft, privileged 
quasi-biological traits, irrationalities, Neolithic 
atavism, and mysticism into a movement that once 
tried to gain .... the most valuable features of 
civilization for women, on a par with thinking and 
humane men. (p. 6) 
Biehl's critique, though strongly worded, finds 
little resonance with the majority of ecofeminism 
theorists. Most appear quite comfortable in openly and 
frequently expressing their spirituality in a multitude 
of forms. For example, Gunn-Allen (1990), advocates 
healing ourselves spiritually and emotionally through 
respecting and loving our bodies and the fullness of our 
sensual experiences. She suggests that a society "based 
on body hate destroys itself and causes harm to all" (p. 
53). Razak (1990) and Spretnak (1989) address the 
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spiritual nature of women's bodily processes and their 
connection to the cycles of nature. Lachapelle (1989) 
speaks of the sacredness of sex and Macy (1989) suggests 
that our spiritual response to the pain we feel over 
threats to the earth determine our capacity to heal 
ourselves and the planet. Griffin (1995) reconnects 
spirituality to everyday life by suggesting that our 
meeting with God is not above or outside ourselves but 
rather" ... God exists in every meeting. In meetings of 
minds, or of bodies, between humankind and animals, 
plants, earth" (p. 151). 
Ecofeminists suggest that while the western and 
eastern traditions accept religion and spirituality as 
important components to human need, they often split 
spiritual consciousness away from everyday experiences 
(Eisler, 1990). In contrast, ecofeminist spirituality 
holds the view that all things are connected in a living 
global community and stresses responsibility to 
community. This spirituality is earth based. It is 
built on the belief that everything is connected, that 
everything affects everything else, and that humans are 
part of a living community. Rather than individual 
enlightenment, the goal of ecofeminist spirituality is to 
create a community where people can come together to 
connect with the earth and do what needs to be done to 
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heal person and planet. The challenge of ecofeminist 
spirituality is to distinguish "between a spirituality 
that is practiced versus an intellectual philosophy" 
(Starhawk, 1990, p. 74). 
A final subtheme emerging from the ecofeminist 
literature related to challenges to the modern worldview 
is the idea of over-valuing human and environmental 
capacity. Ecofeminism holds that the. modern mechanistic 
model of nature (Merchant, 1992) as well as patriarchal 
perceptual frameworks (Warren, 1990) replaced previous 
animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos, leading 
to a fragmentation of the human self and denial of human 
mortality, dependence, and finitude. This led to a 
simplistic overvaluing of personal, environmental and 
technological capacity and projection of denial onto the 
body, women and nature. In an essay on ecofeminism and 
deep ecology Michael Zimmerman (1990, p. 114) suggests 
the character of this denial: 
... as men became individuated by their 
identification with the Father God, the terror of 
individuation led them to construe him as an all-
powerful, separate, other-worldly self. This 
conception of God led men to dissociate themselves 
from women, from nature, and from their own bodies--
from everything that reminded them of dependence. 
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According to this view, men "have sought to deny their 
feelings of vulnerability and dependency in relation to 
women and nature" (Kheel, 1991), and in so doing have 
sought to control and dominate function of both women and 
nature in order to maintain denial of the split off parts 
of the self (Griffin, 1989) . Zimmerman (1987) adds that 
mankind's drive for immortality 11 may be said to motivate 
both the technological domination of nature as well as 
the nuclear arms race" (p. 26). 
In contrast ecofeminists emphasize the essential 
wholeness of the human self. They encourage healing by 
overcoming the fragmented self and its numbing of innate, 
organic sensibilities (Swimme, 1990). Humans are seen as 
humble members of a greater organic cosmos, rather than 
as superior to it. Human finitude is acknowledged and 
accepted as creating limits to human achievement as well 
as our understanding of environmental capacity, and 
technological capability. Unlimited capacity, pure 
rationality, ultimate control and unadulterated 
objectivism become illusions of humankind's fragmented 
selfhood and can only be healed by encouraging a sense of 
spiritual wonder through experiences of feeling with 
other beings (Griffin, 1989, 1990, 1995; Starhawk, 1990). 
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Deep Ecology 
According to Bill Devall and George Sessions (1985) 
the term deep ecology was coined by the Norwegian 
philosopher Arne Naess in his 1973 article The Shallow 
and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movements. In this 
article Naess attempted to describe a deeper and more 
experientially grounded approach to human/nature 
relationships. He describes a distinction between what 
he calls the shallow and deep ecology movements. From 
Naess's perspective there is a difference between an 
environmental movement which is concerned with ecological 
problems because of their impact on humans in the 
developed world and one which is more deeply concerned 
with issues of ecological equality in humanities 
fundamental relationship with nature. It is a difference 
"in the depth of our philosophical and practical 
attitudes" (cited in List, 1993 p! 17). 
Since the writing of this seminal article other 
theorists, including Naess himself, have amplified and 
expanded upon his original conceptualizations in an 
attempt to provide a thorough grounding for a new 
experiential philosophy of nature (Naess, 1984, 1989; 
Devall & Sessions, 1985; Rothenberg, 1995; Fox, 1990, 
1995a; Sessions, 1995b; Drengson & Inoue, 1995; Drengson, 
1995) . The central aim of deep ecology is to move beyond 
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a shallow, problem-specific approach to environmental 
problems characteristic of reformist environmentalists 
(see pp. 189-199) while attempting to articulate an 
ecological worldview that reflects a deeper connection 
and more sensitive openness between humans and between 
humans and the non-human world. 
According to Jung (1990) there are two governing 
principles of deep ecology. They are (1) "reverence for" 
and (2) "harmony with Nature" rather than "the utility 
and domination of Nature solely for humankind" (p. 95). 
These ideas are suggested in Naess's (1973) description 
of ecosophy which differentiates between ecology as a 
science and ecology as a philosophy: 
... in so far as ecology movements deserve our 
attention, they are ecophilosophical rather than 
ecological. Ecology is a limited science which 
makes use of scientific methods. Philosophy is the 
most general forum of debate on fundamentals, 
descriptive as well as prescriptive, and political 
philosophy is one of its subsections. By an 
ecosophy I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony 
or equilibrium. A philosophy is a kind of sofia 
wisdom, is openly normative, it contains both norms, 
rule postulates, value priority announcements and 
hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our 
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universe. Wisdom is policy wisdom, and 
prescription, not only scientific description and 
prediction. (cited in List, 1993, p~22-23) 
There is general agreement among deep ecology theorists 
with Naess's assessment of the need for reverence and to 
articulate the inherent harmony of persons with nature. 
But, as Zimmerman (1994) and Drengson and Inoue (1995) 
observe, deep ecology theorists and followers may not 
always agree with the precise application of these 
governing principles to political activism or to cultural 
specific issues. 
The current discussion of deep ecology is organized 
around major themes and ancillary subthemes which emerged 
in the course of the current analysis. As with the 
review of ecof eminism the following discussion of deep 
ecology is organized around themes two through five (see 
p. 187 ) and shall include discussion of its historical 
and theoretical influences, definitions and preliminary 
precepts, major distinctiveness, and its challenge to the 
modern worldview. 
Theme two: Historical and theoretical influences 
Deep ecology has had a variety of both historical 
and theoretical contributors. These historical and 
theoretical roots are difficult to trace given the 
diversity of their own intellectual development. 
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Merchant (1992) for example has noted a large number of 
religious, philosophical and scientific influences on 
deep ecology. These include: (1) alternative Western 
religious traditions, particularly that of Saint Francis 
of Assisi; (2) Eastern philosophy, such as that described 
by Daisetz Suzuki; (3) Eastern religious traditions, for 
instance Taoism, Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, and Hinduism; 
(4) Native American traditions from such leaders as Black 
Elk and Luther Standing Bear; (5) alternative western 
philosophy represented in the works of Giordano Bruno, 
Gottfried Leibniz, and George Santayana; (6) radical 
scientific critiques of modern ecology, particularly the 
work of Paul Shepard; (7) radical sociological critique 
of the dominant western worldview in the work of William 
Catton and Riley Dunlap; (8) the new physics represented 
in the work of Fritjof Capra, and (9) the new systemic 
challenge to the mechanistic model of nature predicated 
upon the wholistic, self-organizing character of systems 
and represent~d in the works of David Bohm, Ilya 
Prigogine, Edward Lorenz, Charles Birch and James 
Lovelock. 
The current section will analyze the multi-layered 
character of deep ecology's historical and theoretical 
development. It will briefly review two historical 
precursors to deep ecological thought including the 
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political activism of the 1960s and the mid-nineteenth 
century and contempory socio-political movements. It 
will then address the major theoretical influences of 
Gandhi and Spinoza and the postmodern philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger. 
Sessions (1995c) suggests that the flowering of deep 
ecology was influenced by the political activism of the 
1960s, particularly that of the so-called Environmental 
Revolution. The birth of deep ecology paralleled 
escalating environmental concern. Both grew out of the 
newly emerging science of ecology and a of ten unconscious 
sense experienced by many related not only to protecting 
the environment but developing a closer relationship with 
it. This need to reconnect with nature was popularized 
in Aldo Leopold's (1949) ethics of the land and Rachel 
Carson's (1962) pivotal book, Silent Spring (Sessions, 
1995c). Carson's book dealt specifically with the use of 
pesticides and their impact on small animal life, but her 
ultimate concerns went far deeper. She was in fact 
questioning: 
... the direction and goals of Western society, 
including the human competence and "right" to 
dominate and manage the Earth. More generally, she 
posed a philosophical challenge to the 
anthropocentrism of Western culture. She claimed 
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that "the 'control of nature' is a phrase conceived 
in arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age of biology 
and philosophy, when it was supposed that nature 
exists for the convenience of man". (Sessions, 
1995c, p. X) 
Two prominent sociopolitical movements, the first of 
recent vintage and the other of an earlier period, were 
significant contributors to emerging deep ecological 
thought. These include feminism and the tradition of 
naturalism and pastoralism in America, particularly in 
the legacy of the Transcendentalists (Devall and 
Sessions, 1985). The connection between deep ecology and 
feminism has been suggested by deep ecologists Bill 
Devall & George Sessions (1985, p. 93): 
There are important parallels between the themes of 
some feminist writers and social activists and the 
ultimate norms and principles of deep ecology. 
Indeed, some feminists claim that deep ecology is an 
intellectual articulation of insights that many 
females have known for centuries .... feminists deepen 
our sense of wonder in our lives and our commitment 
to creative, nonviolent, empowering social activism. 
They praise the work of early feminist writers such as 
Mary Austin (Fink, 1983), and more contemporary theorists 
as Rachel Carson (1962), Delores Lachapelle (1978) and 
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Elizabeth Dodson Gray (1982) . The contribution of 
feminism to deep ecology has been its clarity in 
providing critical examinations of the dominant western 
worldview, its call for all people to mend personal, 
social and ecological relationships and its questioning 
of modern forms of egoism, competition, abstraction and 
domination through which the voices of women and nature 
have been effectively silenced. 
In addition to the feminist contribution, Devall and 
Session (1985) give extensive attention to the mid-
nineteenth century Transcendentalist movement, especially 
the influence of Henry David Thoreau (1990), and the 
organicism inherent in their understanding of 
human/nature relationships. Deep ecology is not simply a 
recent reincarnation of the organismic 
Transcendentalists, but it is clear that deep ecology is 
heavily indebted to them for much of their own movement's 
early development. 
The Transcendentalists acquired their name through 
the particular relationships they developed with nature. 
They served as place-bound critics of the expansionary 
fervor prevailing in the United States during the mid-
19th century. The transcendental movement began with the 
coming together in September, 1836 of a small group of 
young men from Massachusetts, most of them Unitarian 
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ministers, who met with the express purpose of discussing 
transcendentalist values and beliefs (Marx, 1964). Two 
weeks before, Ralph Waldo Emerson's work, Nature, had 
been published and served as the their manifesto. The 
meeting marked the formal initiation of a movement. 
For the Transcendentalists nature was divinely 
inspired, yet humans, with effort, could understand its 
mysterious divinity. Access to the divine spirit of 
nature came through retreats into wilderness. These 
retreats endowed this group of men with spiritual 
fulfillment that uplifted them beyond the petty concerns 
of daily life, into a transcendental realm (Ekrich, 
1973). Through observing what they believed to be the 
true relationship between humans and nature, 
transcendentalists condemned technological advancement 
and the excessive, exploitative and greedy 
misappropriation of nature's bounty. 
The literature of the Transcendentalists deeply 
question a so~iety dominated by a mechanistic and 
materialistic system of values. They viewed the system 
as destructive and flawed in its "innermost essence 11 
(Marx, 1964, p. 248). In seeking an alternative to the 
established order, Transcendentalists cultivated a sense 
of relationship with nature that approached ecstatic 
fulfillment. Such ecstasy was regarded as a visionary, 
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prophetic experience. It was this spiritual or 
transcendental encounter that fueled the politically 
oriented literature embodying "values, attitudes and 
modes of thought and feeling alternatives to those which 
characterized the dynamic, expansionary life-style of 
modernizing America" (Marx, 1970, p.950). A 
psychological balance was also generated by the 
transcendentalist's retreats. The aim was to attain a 
mental equilibrium through a renewed emphasis on inner 
needs and was the psychic equivalent of the notion of 
harmony with nature (Marx, 1970). 
Several influences on deep ecological thought can be 
noted from the ideas and actions of the 
Transcendentalists. First, the divine inspiration that 
Transcendentalists felt in their retreats into nature 
were transformational and helped generate the belief that 
creation has a spiritual quality which is larger than the 
human capacity to intellectually comprehend it. 
Zimmerman (19~4) suggests that "many deep ecologists 
believe that the views of Henry David Thoreau" are the 
historical catalyst for their view that God is immanent 
in nature rather than "wholly other than Creation" (p. 
65). Secondly, Transcendentalism emphasized that 
retreats into nature must be repeated to reinforce the 
transformational feeling of inspiration. Retreats into 
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wilderness are regarded by many deep ecologists (Turner, 
1995; Sessions, 1995a) as essential to physical and 
spiritual health. Wilderness reinforces the ongoing 
i•need for nature-affirming rituals" in the daily lives of 
individuals (Zimmerman, 1994, p. 64). A third aspect of 
Transcendentalism appealing to deep ecology is the kind 
of behavior that humans derive from retreats into nature. 
Sessions (1995d, p. 165) observes that "Thoreau's 1851 
statement 'in wildness is the preservation of the world' 
provides the basis for modern ecocentric 
environmentalism". That is, one's connection to the wild 
found in wilderness is the basis for how one acts towards 
others. More importantly it is the basis for what humans 
do to protect, enhance and preserve the integrity of the 
natural realm. 
In addition to the previously described historical 
influences; Arne Naess, the acknowledged founder of deep 
ecology, often cites Gandhi and Spinoza as being two of 
the most significant theoretical progenitors of his 
ecological thought. Naess had been a student and admirer 
of Gandhi's non-violent direct actions against British 
colonialism since the early 1930s. Naess was influenced 
by Gandhi's metaphysical orientation which provided the 
leader with powerful personal motivation and strength to 
confront the onslaughts of colonialism. Naess (1995a) 
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says of Gandhi: 
His ultimate aim was not India's political 
liberation. He, of course, led a crusade against 
extreme poverty, caste suppression, and against 
terror in the name of religion. This crusade was 
necessary, but the liberation of the individual 
human being was his supreme aim. (p. 233) 
Naess believed that Gandhi's liberation of the individual 
implied a view of selfhood which moved beyond the narrow 
Western sense of self; an isolated ego concerned with its 
own self-interest. For Gandhi, it was the supreme self--
the universal self which was to be realized. This self-
realization is achieved not through catering to the needs 
of the narrow\egoistic self but rather through 
selflessness which diminishes the narrow self. Naess 
(1995a) cites Gandhi: 
What I want to achieve--what I have been striving 
and pining to achieve these thirty years--is self-
realization, to see God face to face, to attain 
Moksha (liberation) . I live and move and have my 
being in pursuit of that goal. All that I do by way 
of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the 
political field, are directed to this same end. (p. 
233) 
Gandhi also inspired Naess's conviction that 
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personal satisfaction can only occur in connection with 
the fulfillment of all beings-including all non-human 
beings found in nature (Zimmerman, 1994). Gandhi (1958) 
writes: 
Man [sic] should earnestly desire the well-being of 
all God's creation and pray that he might have the 
strength to do so. In desiring the well-being of 
all lies his own welfare; he who desires only his 
own or his community's welfare is selfish and it can 
never be well with him .... (p. 79) 
From this perspective flows Naess's view that in 
achieving the wider self one must recognize that every 
living being is intimately connected, and that from this 
intimate connection follows the capacity to realize self-
identification and the practice of non-violence. Fox 
(1995b) calls Gandhi's influence on Naess regarding this 
point a "monistic cosmology that emphasized the 
fundamental unity of all existence" (p. 146). Sessions 
(1995e) makes.this observation concerning Gandhi's 
influence on Naess's conceptualization of the 
interrelatedness of all things: 
From Gandhi ... Naess reinforced his intuitions about 
the equal "right" of all species to flourish on the 
planet (ecocentric egalitarianism) together with the 
Eastern doctrine of ahimsa--the avoidance of causing 
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unnecessary harm and suffering. Naess likes to tell 
the story about Gandhi refusing to let people in the 
ashram kill poisonous snakes or other creatures. In 
lectures, he shuffles his feet across the floor to 
show how the residents of the ashram avoided 
stepping on the snakes to avoid being bitten. (p. 
60) 
Naess (1995a) sums up the importance of Gandhi's thought 
and activities in suggesting that he "recognized a basic 
common right to live and blossom, to self-realization in 
a wide sense applicable to any being that can be said to 
have interests or needs" (p. 234) . 
Naess and several other prominent deep ecologists 
also appeal to the thought of Dutch philosopher Baruch 
Spinoza to support the non-anthropocentric and non-
dualistic character of deep ecology. Sessions (1995f, p. 
193) correctly observes that ''much of Naess's thinking 
about ecophilosophy ... has been inspired by Spinoza's 
ethics". Spe~king of himself and Naess, Sessions (1995e, 
p. 54), adds that "Arne and I also independently shared 
the conviction that Spinoza, more than any of the other 
major Western philosophers, provided a good model and 
inspiration for a contemporary ecological philosophy". 
Sessions (1995f) cites Naess as pointing out "no great 
philosopher has so much to off er in the way of 
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clarification and articulation of basic ecological 
attitudes as Baruch Spinoza" (p. 194). Naess (1995b) 
himself suggests that: 
The specific thing to be learned from Spinoza 
is ... to integrate value priorities themselves in the 
world. We tend to say "the world of facts," but the 
separation of value from facts is, itself, mainly 
due to an overestimation of certain scientific 
traditions stemming from Galileo which confuses the 
instrumental excellence of the mechanistic worldview 
with its properties as whole philosophy. (p. 253) 
For Spinoza, Nature and God are identical, they are 
a single energy. He suggests that 11 in Nature there is 
but one substance--God--and no other affections than 
those which are in God and that can neither be nor be 
conceived without God (Spinoza, 1992, p. 52). The highest 
end to which humans can aspire is to acknowledge the 
union existing between the mind and the whole of nature. 
Spinoza's essential metaphysics is: 
.... a conceptualization of the idea of unity; there 
can be only one Substance or non-dualism which in 
infinite, and the Substance is also God or Nature. 
What we experience as the mental and the physical 
have no separate metaphysical reality, but rather 
are aspects or attributes of this one Substance. 
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(Devall and Session, 1985, p. 238) 
Humans thus realize the truth of existence or attain 
self-realization "when they realize that they arise out 
of and so are united with 'the whole of nature,' the 
single substance (or energy) that constitutes all modes 
of existence" (Fox, 1995a, p. 260) . Spinoza suggests 
that human bondage develops from ignorance about the 
interrelated self-manifestation of God/Nature and human 
freedom arises from intellectual intuition about such 
interrelationship. This intuition inspires compassion 
for all things and reduces exploitation because 
exploitation "reduces the potential for self-realization 
I 
on the part of the exploited beings, and because it thus 
reduces my own capacity for self-realization" (Zimmerman, 
1994, p. 39). 
A final theoretical influence on deep ecological 
thought comes from the first generation postmodern 
theorist Martin Heidegger. Many deep ecology followers 
have been influenced by his critique of modernism even 
though as Zimmerman (1994) observed, several have 
disavowed this connection because of Heidegger's support 
for German National Socialism. 
For Heidegger, western philosophy had taken a wrong 
turn after Plato by rejecting the centrality of being in 
understanding human relationships to the world 
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(Heidegger, 1958). Heidegger argued that the world had 
become nihilistic or insensitive to the beingness of 
things. As a result the world became simply an 
accumulation of lifeless-beingless objects over which the 
subject or humankind exercised mastery. Heidegger sees 
this estrangement from being as the root of the failure 
of Western philosophy (Ferkiss, 1993) . 
For Heidegger the essence of existence was humans 
living in a total field or region of being. By looking 
at things simply as individual objects, subject to human 
interpretation and manipulation, humans have destroyed 
their ability to relate to them. "Living in light of the 
fundamental mystery of existence, Heidegger felt, was 
something that could not be explained, only experienced" 
(LeMay & Pitts, 1994, p. 98). This experiencing, for 
Heidegger (1995), is found in the essence of what he 
calls "self-transposition". He writes: 
In this connection self-transposition does not mean 
the f actical transference of one existing human 
being into the interior of another 
being .... Transposing oneself into this being means 
going along with what it is and with how it is. 
Such going-along-with means directly learning how it 
is with this being, discovering what it is like to 
be this being with which we are going along in this 
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way. Perhaps in doing so we may even see right into 
the nature of the other being .... (p. 202) 
The link between Heidegger's philosophy and deep 
ecology's philosophical base is well established 
(Zimmerman, 1994). Naess (1995c, p. 208) for instance 
refers to the "Heideggerian literature" as important to 
constructing the terminology of deep ecology's deep 
questioning. Heidegger's influence is also clearly 
present in Naess's discussion of his ideas on "being in 
the world" (Naess, 1995a, p. 225). Devall and Sessions 
(1985, p. 98) have identified three contributions 
Heidegger made to deep ecology. He criticized the 
anthropocentric development of western philosophy which 
paved the way for a technocratic mentality dedicated to 
the domination of nature. He also encouraged people to 
begin a kind of contemplative thinking which stood in 
sharp contrast to the traditional reliance on analytical 
thought. Finally, he called on people to dwell 
authentically on earth which paralleled deep ecology's 
call to dwell alertly in natural bioregions. For deep 
ecologists Heidegger's focus on letting things be is the 
clearest expression of what to them is his biocentric 
emphasis. Devall and Sessions (1985) cite Heidegger in 
this regard: 
Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as sky. 
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They leave to the sun and the moon their journey, to 
the stars their courses, to the seasons their 
blessing and their inclemency; they do not turn 
night into day nor day into a harassed unrest. (p. 
99) 
Zimmerman (1994, p. 109) also notes the similarity 
between Heidegger's ideas and deep ecology in at least 
two ways. Both argue that attempting to reform existing 
institutions in order to halt environmental degradation 
would only reinforce and increase the destructive urges 
of control-obsessed humans. Both argue that the ethics 
needed to improve human treatment of nature cannot arise 
from the anthropocentric framework of traditional 
humanism. Rather a new ethos of human/nonhuman 
relationships is necessary. However, Zimmerman (1994) 
also observes that one of the most seminal features of 
Heidegger's thought, and one which deep e9ology has yet 
to fully develop, is his contention that humanity's 
mistreatment of other humans and nature can be traced to 
humankind's denial of and anxiety over death. 
Elaborating on Heidegger's ideas Zimmerman (1994) 
suggests: 
... that modern Western humanity as a whole is in the 
grip of certain moods that disclose things in 
constricted ways. Descartes's quest for absolutely 
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clear and certain truth arose from early modern 
humanity's mood of insecurity and uncertainty. The 
modern subject seeks absolute truth as a way of 
controlling nature and thus of avoiding death. 
Making itself the measure of all truth, reality, and 
value, the subject compels things to show themselves 
solely according to dictates of rationality: to be 
means to be a clear and distinct idea .... Objects are 
"representations," in that for them to be, they must 
be re-presented, that is, re-positioned by the 
subject in accordance with its own standards. The 
death-denying subject portrayed itself as a 
substance striving to actualize its potential ... 
(pp. 111-112) 
Theme three: Definitions and preliminary precepts 
Much like the discussion of ecofeminism, deep 
ecology's historical and theoretical development is 
multi-layered, though certainly not at complex as that of 
ecofeminism. The current section of this analysis will 
explore several definitional statements of deep ecology, 
and discuss preliminary precepts common to deep 
ecological thought. 
Drengson and Inoue (1995, p. xxi) make the point 
that the terms deep ecology have been confusing to many 
who are unfamiliar with them. They suggest that there 
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are two meanings of the terms, one of which refers to "a 
broad ecocentric grassroots effort" to achieve an 
ecologically balanced future. The other meaning is 
reserved for the "specific ecological philosophy" of Arne 
Naess, and to a lesser extent, theorists who have 
expanded upon his original thought. While admitting the 
difficulty in separating the movement from its philosophy 
and that the environmental literature often fails to make 
such distinctions; Drengson and Inoue suggest that the 
term deep ecology be used to ref er to the philosophy 
while the phrase deep ecology movement be used when 
referring to the movement. Naess (1995d, p. 67) appears 
to make a similar point himself, though far less clearly, 
in attempting to distinguish between the "criteria, or 
set of proposed necessary conditions" of his deep 
ecological philosophy as the "bases to deep ecology 11 the 
larger ecological movement. 
In its simplest sense Glasser (1995) suggests that 
deep ecology is a movement that is primarily focused on 
"the reversal of the ecological crisis" (p. 138). From 
his perspective it is consistent with peace and social 
justice movements since ecological degradation is closely 
proximated with corresponding human oppression. Jung 
(1990, p. 97) emphasizes the cognitive shift necessary 
for one to become a deep ecologist in a somewhat generic 
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sense. He defines deep ecology simply as "a new way of 
thinking about our relationships with Nature. It 
replaces the old conceptual grids of utility and 
domination with the new wisdom of reverence and harmony". 
Fox (1990, p. 75, 90) prefers alluding to deep 
ecology as "transpersonal ecology" since at its most 
fundamental level deep ecology is a distinctive, 
experiential form of ecophilosophy which emphasizes a 
transcendent "wide, expansive, or field-like conception 
of self" in comparison to the modern "narrow, atomistic, 
or particle-like conception of self". List (1993, p. 17) 
also calls deep ecology an ecophilosophy but refers to it 
as a "radical ecophilosophy" in order to distinguish it 
from more traditional ecological philosophies which are 
concerned with "ecological problems because of their 
effects on people in the developed world", as opposed to 
deep ecology "which is more deeply concerned with such 
issues as biospherical equality and our basic 
relationships with nature". 
Dobson (1995, p. 48) uses the term "ecologism" to 
distinguish between radical green politics and mainstream 
environmentalism. He suggests deep ecology is an 
"ethical position" that informs ecologism by providing 
radical reasons for restraint in person/nature 
interactions and by providing a code of conduct for how 
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these interactions ought to proceed. Zimmerman (1993, p. 
196) is less abstract in his definition of deep ecology, 
preferring not only to mention its ideas but to emphasize 
the originators of its system of thought. For him deep 
ecology is "the interrelated body of ideas developed in 
various ways by Bill Devall, Alan Drengson, Warwick Fox, 
Arne Naess, and George Sessions, all of whom emphasize 
the promoting of self-realization for all beings as 
crucial for solving the ecological crisis". 
Perhaps the most concise definition of deep ecology 
comes from The Institute for Deep Ecology, located in 
Boulder Colorado. In a small announcement for a recent 
national conference on deep ecology entitled Restoring 
the Vision (1995), the institute provides this 
definition: 
Deep ecology is about transforming our way of life. 
This loosely-knit movement is a grassroots awakening 
to the root causes of our culture's degradation of 
nature and peoples. As it seeks to heal 
contemporary alienation from self, community, and 
the Earth, deep ecology encourages a fundamental 
shift in the way we experience nature and how we 
respond to the environmental crisis. Deep ecology 
arises from the basic intuition of the essential 
value and interdependence of all forms of being. It 
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is committed to minimizing humanity's destructive 
interference with the natural world and to restoring 
the richness and diversity of ecosystems and human 
communities. ("Restoring", 1995, p. 2) 
There are a number of overarching precepts to deep 
ecological thought which in some ways act to consolidate 
the beliefs of many who identify themselves as deep 
ecologists. Drengson (1995, p.143) suggests simply that 
what unites people from different religious and 
philosophical backgrounds in the deep ecology movement is 
"a long-range vision of what is necessary to protect the 
integrity of the Earth's ecological communities and 
ecocentric values". 
Fox (1984, p.196) argues the "central intuition" of 
deep ecology is that there is no ontological divide in 
the field of existence. That is, the world is not 
divided into subjects and objects nor is there any 
separation in reality between the human and nonhuman 
realm. Rather "all entities are constituted by their 
relationships". "To the extent that we perceive 
boundaries, we fall short of a deep ecological 
consciousness". Similarly, Zimmerman (1993) suggests 
that a unifying theme of deep ecology has been its 
emphasis on a cognitive shift in understanding 
human/nature relationships. This new understanding would 
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be ecocentric, non-anthropocentric and non-dualistic. He 
explains (p. 198) that "deep ecologists argue that a 
change in ontology must proceed a change in ethical 
attitudes" ... A non-dualistic, ecocentric understanding 
of what things are would lead us to treat nonhuman beings 
with compassion and care". 
Skolimowski (1990), at times an ardent critic of 
some aspects of deep ecology nonetheless admires its 
central distinctiveness. He notes that: 
... deep ecology constitutes a distinctive approach 
to ecophilosophy .... that distinguishes "deep 
ecologists" from other ecophilosophers .... deep 
ecologists are not primarily concerned with 
environmental axiology (i.e., environmental value 
theory). Rather, deep ecologists are primarily 
concerned with advocating the realization of a 
certain state of being, specifically, the worldly 
realization of as expansive a sense of self as 
possible. (p. 4 9) 
McLaughlin (1987, p. 2) agrees with this assessment, 
suggesting that the heart of deep ecology is the 
cultivation of "ecological consciousness" by which he 
means deep ecology's insistence upon bringing "to the 
fore the normative question of how should I be, rather 
than addressing the more abstract and impersonal 
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questions about the nature of value, the structure of 
moral argument, and so on". Later McLaughlin (1995a, p. 
263) adds that deep ecology's heart--expansion of self 
toward ecological consciousness--is the primary basis for 
"rejecting consumerism" which for him creates and 
sustains "the loss of traditional ways of forming ones's 
identity and their replacement by material possessions". 
In a new work, Capra (1996), a recent supporter of 
deep ecology and contributor to its epistemology, 
characterizes the unifying elements of deep ecology, as 
its emphasis on interconnection and intrinsic value, and 
its skill in contrasting these with contemporary, shallow 
environmental thought. 
Shallow ecology is anthropocentric, or human-
centered. It views humans as above or outside of 
nature, as the source of all value, and ascribes 
only instrumental, or "use", value to nature. Deep 
ecology does not separate humans--or anything else--
from the natural environment. It sees the world not 
as a collection of isolated objects, but as a 
network of phenomena that are fundamentally 
interconnected and interdependent. Deep ecology 
recognizes the intrinsic value of all living beings 
and views humans as just one particular strand in 
the web of life. (p. 7) 
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Zimmerman (1994, pp. 80-88) identifies the common 
features of deep ecology by noting the similarity between 
deep ecological thought and what he calls "new paradigm" 
thought represented by such writers as Harman (1979, 
1990), Roszak (1992), and Roszak, Gomes and Kanner 
(1995) . He suggests that deep ecologists and new 
paradigmers hold in common these eight propositions: (1) 
we are in the midst of a global crisis that heralds a 
paradigm shift to a socially harmonious and ecological 
age; (2) personal transformation is necessary for 
cultural change; (3) a reenchantment of the world/nature 
is necessary; (4) an ecological sensibility must be 
developed; (5) a relational self must emerge that is 
inextricably involved with the larger cosmic whole; (6) 
cosmic holism is consistent with and important to human 
holism (i.e., health and well being); (7) the new 
ecological wisdom is available in the beginning only to a 
few iconoclastic visionaries who then must reach out to 
teach the many; and (8) it is important to think globally 
but to act locally. 
As the previous discussion indicates, analysts and 
supporters agree on overarching precepts which tend to 
characterize deep ecology though they may disagree over 
particular emphases. What remains of this section is to 
explore the works of some of deep ecology's principal 
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thinkers on some of the more specific precepts that 
circumscribe the ideology. 
Sessions (1995f) has made the observation that there 
are at least three different characterizations of the 
deep ecology position. They are the intuitive attitudes 
held by deep ecologists and the manifestations of these 
in the public and political arena, the deep ecology 
platform and its eight points, and Naess's own personal 
philosophy grounded in the idea of self-realization. 
Selected features of the first two will be explored in 
the remainder of this section. 
In his 1973 article The Shallow and the Deep, Long 
Range Ecology Movements Naess (cited in list, 1993, p. 
19) suggests that cultivating ecological consciousness 
involves moving away from a view of 11 humans-in-
environment 11 to one of self as part of a "relational 
total-field". That is, rather than experiencing 
ourselves as separate from our environment and existing 
"in" it, we begin to cultivate the insight that we are 
"with" our environment. Being with environment means 
appreciating that we are part of a complex totality of 
interconnected relationships, and that these connections 
with human and non-human others is the very essence of 
ourselves. 
For Naess (1995c, 1995d) cultivating a total view of 
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human/human and particularly human/nonhuman relationships 
necessarily requires engagement in a process of deep 
questioning. In a 1982 interview, Naess argued: 
The essence of deep ecology is to ask deeper 
questions ... ecology as a science does not ask what 
kind of a society would be the best for maintaining 
a particular ecosystem--that is considered a 
question for value theory, for politics, for ethics. 
As long as ecologists keep narrowly to their 
science, they do not ask such questions .... in deep 
ecology ... we question our society's underlying 
assumptions ... We are not limited to a scientific 
approach; we have an obligation to verbalize a total 
view ... In general, however, people do not question 
deeply enough to explicate or make clear a total 
view. (Devall & Sessions, 1985, p. 74) 
Naess makes clear that deep ecology's approach to a broad 
range of environmental and social issues involves 
integrating one's intuitive take on person/other 
relationships and manifesting these by questioning 
"deeply and publicly, insistently and consistently" 
(Naess, 1995d, p.75) the societal paradigm within which 
burdensome social and environmental problems reside. In 
taking such an approach Naess insists upon fundamental 
change but rejects the problem resolution approaches of 
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shallow environmentalists and social reformers as 
solutions which ultimately fail at the task of long-term 
change. These approaches are seen as stop-gap measures. 
Naess, explicitly connects a rejection of the person-in-
environment image--toward a relational, total view--with 
a kind of epistic activism--a deep questioning of the 
knowledge and institutions which maintain a abstract, 
overly intellectualized, and scientifically derived 
social and environmental structure. 
Naess (1989; 1995d; 1995f; Naess & Sessions, 1995) 
also describes some specific precepts of deep ecology in 
his presentation of the Deep Ecology Platform. The 
platform has discrete categories but was never intended 
by Naess to be the final expression of deep ecology. The 
individual tenets are specific in that they address 
clearly identified categories of interest, but their 
wording has been framed "with a high degree of 
generality", so that others may (and should) modify them 
(see Rothenberg, 1995 as an excellent example) based on 
the unique attributes of various cultural contexts (Naess 
& Sessions, 1995, p. 49). On this point Naess (1995f) 
later writes: 
Maybe it should be repeated more often they only 
present an attempt to formulate what might be 
accepted by the great majority of the supporters of 
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the movement at a fairly general and abstract level. 
Different sets of formulations are needed to express 
something similar, but in the language of supporters 
in the non-industrialized parts of the Earth. (p. 
220) 
Naess (1995d, p. 68) offers the following eight points to 
the platform: 
1) The well-being and flourishing of human and non-
human life on Earth have value in themselves 
(synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These 
values are independent of the usefulness of the non-
human world for human purposes. 
2) Richness and diversity of life forms contribute 
to the realization of these values and are also 
values in themselves. 
3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and 
diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 
4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is 
compatible with a substantially smaller human 
population. The flourishing of non-human life 
requires a smaller human population. 
5) Present human interference with the non-human 
world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly 
worsening. 
6) Policies must therefore be changed. These 
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policies affect basic economic, technological, and 
ideological structures. The resulting state of 
affairs will be deeply different from the present. 
7) The ideological change will be mainly that of 
appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of 
inherent value) rather than adhering to an 
increasingly higher standard of living. There will 
be a profound awareness of the difference between 
bigness and greatness. 
8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have 
an obligation directly or indirectly to try to 
implement the necessary changes. 
The first point underscores one of the most 
significant assumptions of deep ecology, the intrinsic 
worth of all living things. From this assumption flows 
the ideas of non-anthropocentrism, biospheric 
egalitarianism, tolerance of different views, open 
relational communication with nature, the inclusion of 
animals and plants in the community and creating the need 
for heightened preservation and conservation efforts 
(Naess, 1995d) . 
The second tenet clarifies the meaning of intrinsic 
value by upholding the qualities of richness, complexity 
diversity, and symbiosis. "It involves a re-visioning of 
life and evolution, changing from understanding evolution 
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as 'progress' from 'lower' to 'higher' forms to 
understanding evolution as a magnificent expression of a 
multitude of forms of life" (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 87). 
It is here that Naess (1995f, p. 215) discusses Fritjof 
Capra's (1975) suggestion that the platform include the 
idea of ecological interdependence--"all things hang 
together". Capra pointed out to Naess that atoms are 
seen to have tendencies to exist in one place and 
another, that is, they hang together, but cannot be 
pinned down exactly. He suggests that the relativity of 
matter and the fact that at the atomic level, all things 
appear constant and paradoxically in a state of change 
can act to substantiate this point in Naess's platform. 
In essence, Capra says that quantum, theoretical physics 
can be used to demonstrate that boundaries are 
constructed experiences and perceptions rather than 
reflections of reality. The best one can say is that 
there is a kind of unquantifiable union which keeps 
things together. Thus, all essences have inherent value 
by virtue of this hanging together for there is no way to 
determine their extrinsic value. 
The third tenet, that humans have no right to reduce 
diversity except to satisfy vital needs has been 
controversial because of the ambiguity of vital needs. 
Naess (1995d) leaves the term deliberately vague to allow 
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for latitude in judgement in various contexts. 
McLaughlin (1995) stresses that vital needs must not be 
interpreted from the stance of industrial consumerism 
which repeats cycles of deprivation and temporary 
satiation. From this perspective all needs are 
quantitatively defined and so in fact can be interpreted 
as vital needs and if this happens to coincide with the 
marketing demands of a given producer, all the better. 
Rather, vital needs refers to a qualitative opening to 
the possibility of more enduring forms of happiness and 
joy unrelated to consumption. 
The fourth point makes the claim that a reduction in 
human population will contribute to flourishing of human 
life and culture. Naess (1989) points out that because 
this reduction must be gradual it could conceivably take 
up to one-thousand years to fully stabilize. This fourth 
platform principle has been criticized by some for 
implying a misanthropic view of humanities place in 
nature and ignoring the role that First World countries 
play in the population explosion (Zimmerman, 1994). 
Platform proponents have countered that population 
reduction must be gradual and humane-not ignoring the 
special needs of Third World countries, and that any 
reduction in population must include First World 
countries which consume a disproportionate amount of the 
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world's resources and energy (Naess, 1995d; McLaughlin, 
1995). 
The fifth tenet, that present human interference 
with the non-human world is excessive, and that the 
situation is rapidly worsening, supports the above view 
of population reduction. The principle "does not imply 
that humans should not modify some ecosystems". The 
"issue is the nature and extent of such interference" 
(Naess, 1995d, p. 69). McLaughlin (1995) offers two 
illustrations of how human interference, though intending 
to enhance the resource capacity of the environment, in 
fact ends up worsening it. He refers to the unrelenting 
destruction of old growth forests and to the practice of 
monocropping. Both practices deplete the soil's organic 
fertility and recuperative capacity while creating a 
continued need for chemical fertilizers and pesticides 
thus interfering with natural restorative cycles, further 
depleting its fertility and reducing its resource 
capacity. 
The sixth tenet, that policies must be changed, 
stems directly from the above five points. It implies 
basic changes in current economic, technological and 
ideological structures. For example, contrasting a new 
economic ideology with current practices, Naess and 
Sessions (1995, pp. 52-53) note that "present ideology 
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tends to value things because they are scarce and because 
they have commodity value. There is prestige in vast 
consumption and waste (to mention only several relevant 
factors)". 
Points six through eight of the platform again 
suggest the importance and interrelatedness of ecological 
and sociopolitical activism. However, unlike activism 
aimed at violent confrontation and based on secular 
rationality, it must be a activism exercised out of a 
spiritual context, "that is, acting from the basis of a 
fundamental philosophic/religious ecosophy (or total 
view) and acting nonviolently" (Sessions, 1995f, p. 191). 
The seventh tenet addresses in greater detail the 
issue of ideological and policy transformation. The 
predominate intuition of this point is "dwelling in 
situations of inherent value" (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 89). 
This would replace the current industrial society's 
ideology of progress measured by continual increases in 
gross national product, material wealth and standard of 
living. Dwelling in situations of inherent value places 
the focus on quality of life rather than quantity of 
things. "With a focus on quality, people can see that 
existing patterns of labor and consumption are not 
satisfying, but rather involve chronic dissatisfaction" 
(McLaughlin, 1995, p. 89). 
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The final principle stresses the importance of 
individual and cooperative participation in change. No 
particular priorities are spelled out because at this 
stage in history "no one now knows exactly what positive 
changes are necessary" (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 89). Many 
conceivable avenues of change are possible, through for 
example individual behavior with regard to consumption, 
through policies effecting production, through national 
transformation of industrial practices, or through 
applications of appropriate technology and sustainable 
development. For deep ecologists participation is the 
key. 
Theme four: Major distinctiveness 
Up to this point the current analysis has looked at 
historical and theoretical influences on deep ecology as 
well as definitions and preliminary precepts. The 
current section will explore the two major distinctive 
themes of deep ecology; self-realization and biocentric 
equality (Naess, 1995a; 1995b; 1995g; Devall & Sessions, 
1985). In developing these it is important to first look 
at Arne Naess's personal philosophy of human/nature 
relationships, what he has come to call Ecosophy T, for 
it provides the intuitive, experiential basis of both 
self-realization and biocentric equality (Zimmerman, 
1994). 
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For Naess, Ecosophy T is a very personal and highly 
experiential formulation which he hopes will help 
authenticate self-realization and biocentric equality and 
also may be of assistance to others in authenticating 
their own ecological sensibility. He refuses, however, 
to privilege his own ecosophy with the almost reverential 
acclaim ascribed to many philosophical treatises. Naess 
seeks to eliminate the absolutism and arrogance which 
characterize contemporary attempts to validate basic 
principles and norms. In fact his use of the terms 
Ecosophy T underscores the emphasize that other possible 
ecosophies ranging from A to Z can exist, his being only 
one which he has chosen to call T. T also supposedly 
refers to his mountain hut, Tvergastein, where much of 
his own personal reflection on human/nature relationships 
were formulated. Naess (1995g, p. 47), suggesting the 
tentativeness and limitations he felt concerning his 
ecosophy has said that "a philosophy centered on human-
nature relations, touches upon so many complex questions 
that the explicit formulations can only comprise a small 
part". 
Before discussing in more detail the norm of self-
realization some clarification of the idea of the 
individual self is necessary. Naess (1988) points out 
that there are difficulties in approaching questions 
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about what actually constitutes a person's self and in 
defining what the boundaries of this self might be. He 
quotes William James (1890) concerning the constitution 
and limits of self: 
The Empirical Self of each of us is all that he 
[sic] is tempted to call by the name of me. But it 
is clear that between what a man [sic] calls me and 
he [sic] simply calls mine the line is difficult to 
draw ... We see then that we are dealing with a 
fluctuating material. The same object being 
sometimes treated as a part of me, at other times is 
simply mine, and then again as if I had nothing to 
do with it all. (Naess, 1988, p. 259) 
Naess understands this fluctuating sense of self in 
terms of the processes of identification and alienation. 
That is, one's self is that with which one identifies, 
and not-self is that from which one is alienated. If one 
thinks of this fluctuating sense of self in terms of a 
continuum, self-realization at its maximum is 
identification in its widest sense, a oneness in 
diversity (diversity here meaning all beings in the 
universe) while a limited self-realization is a maximum 
of alienation and a narrow, constricted sense of what 
constitutes one's self (Naess, 1989). 
Naess (1988) distinguishes between his concept of 
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maximum self-realization and that commonly used in modern 
society to mean the "competitive development of a 
person's talents and the pursuit of an individual's 
specific interests" (p. 263). From this view an inherent 
conflict is seen between developing a sense of individual 
self and cultivating bonds with significant others, 
family, community and most importantly extending to 
nature. 
Naess points out this conflict reflects Western 
social theory's dualistic, egoism-altruism distinction. 
According to this view, altruism (care for others) is a 
moral quality developed by suppression of selfishness, by 
sacrificing one's own self-interests in favor of others. 
Naess challenges this thinking by proposing that one can 
cultivate connections with others, with family, with 
nature, without losing some part of self. In fact he 
suggests that maximum self-realization arises only in the 
context of maximum diversity 11 by an increase in the 
number of ways in which individuals, societies, and even 
species and life forms realize themselves" (Bodian, 1995, 
p. 30) . 
As one develops an ever-widening identification with 
the whole, there is no need for a self-sacrificing, moral 
altruism; a need, as some critiques would suggest, to 
sacrifice self in preference to nature, since the 
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interests of those with whom we identify, nature 
included, may be seen as one's own interests as well. 
Self becomes most fully realized not solely when self-
interest and wants are met, but rather when one begins to 
identify with more than one's own self. By reframing the 
developmental process in this way, Naess challenges the 
shallow theories of self differentiation and the inherent 
conflicts arising from competing needs. 
From Naess's perspective self-realization requires 
an extension of the process of identification beyond 
humanity to include the non-human world. From this 
viewpoint, maturing involves a process of widening one's 
sense of self and identifying with others-family, 
friends, communities, our own species, and then all 
species of non-human life. 
The second major distinctiveness supported by 
Naess's Ecosophy T and which helps define the deep 
ecology worldview is that of biocentric equality. 
Biocentric equality holds that all beings in the 
ecosphere have intrinsic value and have an equal right to 
flourish and grow and reach their individual self-
realization within the greater wholistic Self-realization 
(Naess, 1988) . Biocentric equality views natural 
entities to be independent of their perceived usefulness 
for human purposes. Naess (1995e) says that the 
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principle is a: 
... deep seated respect, or even veneration, for ways 
and forms of life ... a kind of understanding that 
others reserve for fellow men [sic] and for a narrow 
section of ways and forms of life ... an intuitively 
clear and obvious value axiom ... Its restriction to 
humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental 
effects upon the life quality of humans themselves. 
This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure 
and satisfaction we receive from close partnership 
with other forms of life. (p. 4) 
Biocentric equality suggests that humans should live in 
ways which have minimum impact on the rest of nature, and 
that humanity's role is that of "plain citizen" (Devall & 
Sessions, 1985, p. 68) rather than that of "master-slave" 
(Naess, 1995e, p. 4) which has contributed to alienation 
of humans from nature and themselves. 
Biocentric equality stems from the view of all 
beings as interrelated parts of a greater whole. Since 
all are part of the greater whole, all are equal in 
intrinsic worth. Naess (1988) has given this principle 
more substance by suggesting criteria for resolving the 
inevitable question; that if all life has intrinsic 
value, then how much value does one ascribe to other life 
forms when conflicts between each entity's equality 
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claims arise. He suggests the use of two factors, 
vitalness and nearness and offers an example of how these 
two factors can help resolve such conflicts: 
Under symbiotic conditions, there are rules which 
manifest two important factors operating when 
interests are conflicting: vitalness and nearness. 
The more vital interest has priority over the less 
vital. The nearer has priority over the more 
remote--in space, time, culture, species. Nearness 
derives its priority from our special 
responsibilities, obligations and insights ... It may 
be of vital interest to a family of poisonous snakes 
to remain in a small area where small children play, 
but it is also of vital interest to children and 
parents that there are no accidents. The priority 
rule of nearness makes it justifiable for the 
parents to remove the snakes. But the priority of 
vital interests of snakes is important when deciding 
where to establish the playgrounds. (Naess, 1988, p. 
266) 
Theme five: Challenges to the modern worldview 
Drawing from the works of several theorists the 
remaining pages of this section will explore a number of 
subthemes related to challenges to the modern worldview 
and organized around non-hierarchicalism, non-
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anthropocentrism, interconnectedness, and the 
phenomenological and experiential bases of deep ecology. 
Very similar to ecofeminists, deep ecologists adopt 
a non-hierarchical conceptual framework as a guiding 
alternative to modernistic ways of understanding and 
organizing difference. Echoing this sentiment Cheney 
(1987, p. 116) suggests that one of the appeals of deep 
ecology is the fact that it has "answered the call for a 
non-hierarchical, non-domineering attitude toward 
nature". Deep ecology holds that natural processes are 
interconnected and cyclical and are composed of complex 
webs of relationships. Modernism's view of natural 
systems conceives a progression up a hierarchical ladder, 
from simple to complex. 
Similarly, McLaughlin (1995) suggests that one of 
the implications of deep ecological thought is that it 
involves "a re-visioning of life and evolution, changing 
from understanding evolution as process from lower to 
higher for~s to understanding evolution as a magnificent 
expression of a multitude of forms of life" (p. 87). 
Naess (1995e), in more philosophic terms, contrasts the 
place of persons in a hierarchical framework with his 
wholistic, interconnected view that persons are: 
... knots in the biospherical net or field of 
intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between 
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two things A and B is such that the relations 
belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of 
A and B, so that without the relation, A and B are 
no longer the same things. The ... model dissolves 
not only the man[sic]-in-environment concept, but 
every compact thing-in-milieu concept ... (p. 3) 
Deep ecologists believe that uncritical reliance on 
hierarchical conceptualizations have supported a full 
range of domination theories and practices over the 
course of many centuries. This has been particularly 
true with respect to nature. The sorting posture of 
hierarchicalism in human/nature relations has lead to 
planetary degradation and a entire range of activities 
suggesting the supremacy of humans over the environment 
in which they live. By contrast Zimmerman (1990) 
suggests that it is humanity's commonality with nature 
and its willingness to reject hierarchical domination 
that will lead to its ultimate preservation. He supports 
deep ecology's non-hierarchical emphasis that: 
... only by recognizing that humanity is no more, but 
also no less, important than all other things on 
Earth can we learn to dwell on the planet within 
limits that would allow other species to flourish 
and to follow out their own evolutionary destiny ... 
hierarchies would be replaced by biocentric 
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egalitarianism. (p. 140) 
The significance of deep ecology's challenge to 
hierarchial dominance is best understood in its emphasis 
on anthropocentrism as a underlying cause for all forms 
of domination. Deep ecologists believe that the way to 
change destructive relationships among people, and 
between people and nature is to shift away from a human-
centered perspective. In the words of Warwick Fox 
(1989) : 
In making human-centeredness (rather than humans per 
se) the target of their critique, deep ecologists 
have contended that the assumptions of human self-
importance in the larger scheme of things has, to 
all intents and purposes been the single deepest and 
most persistent assumption of (at least) all the 
dominant Western philosophical, social, and 
political traditions since the time of the classical 
Greeks... (p. 21) 
Several theorists have contributed to the 
development of this non-anthropocentric position. Deep 
ecologist George Sessions (1995d) has sketched the rise 
of anthropocentrism and notes the fundamental difference 
between it and deep ecology's idea of ecocentrism. 
Environmental activist Dave Foreman (1995) has chronicled 
the anthropocentric core of the modernist perspective on 
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environmentalism and, in agreement with deep ecology, 
offers a appraisal of non-anthropocentric ways humans 
could relate to nature. Thomas Berry (1988), a deep 
ecology sympathizer, extends the critique of 
anthropocentrism in his criticism of the human-centered 
norm of reality: 
We cannot expect life, the earth, or the universe to 
fit into our rational human designs of how life, the 
earth, or the universe should function. We must fit 
our thinking and our actions within the larger 
process. We must move from democracy to biocracy. 
(p. 161) 
Deep ecologist 1 s critique of the modernist 
anthropocentric worldview goes further than chastening a 
simple lack of appreciation for non-human life-forms. 
Rather, for deep ecology, anthropocentrism is the human 
arrogance that assumes "with both religious and 
scientific rationalizations, that we as a species are 
superior to other species and life-forms, and therefore 
have the right to dominate, control and use them for our 
own purposes as we see fit" (Metzner, 1993, p. 4) For 
deep ecologists advocacy for a non-anthropocentric 
cosmology is not just a matter of academic debate over 
philosophical premises, having no real relevance. For 
them anthropocentrism has its "precise parallel" in every 
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form of sexism, racism, nationalism and classism 
(Metzner, 1993, p. 4) and is not just a simple failure to 
appreciate nature. 
Deep ecology's focus on critiquing anthropocentrism 
has been criticized, particularly by ecofeminists, who 
hold the view that androcentrism is the primary cause of 
human domination of nature. This point will be discussed 
in more detail in a subsequent section of this current 
work. 
A third subtheme emerging from the literature in 
deep ecology and offered as a challenge to modernism's 
oversimplified, atomistic, and particle like character of 
relational processes is the idea of interconnectedness. 
Interconnectedness between person/environment, 
perceptually focuses on the "complex web" (Naess, 1995g) 
of relations, and the processes surrounding them rather 
than focusing on the perception of partialness. 
Partialness attempts to divide and sort relationships 
into discrete categories. Mathews (1994) notes: 
All exponents of deep ecology seem to agree that 
individuals, to the extent they can be identified at 
all, are constituted out of their relations with 
other individuals; they are not discrete substances 
capable of existing independently of other 
individuals. The whole is understood to be more 
279 
than the sum of its parts, and-the parts are defined 
through their relations to one another and the 
whole. (p. 159) 
Interconnectedness from Naess's (1995h) perspective 
implies the central ontological idea of gestalt. A 
gestalt is a recognition of "one single experience" (p. 
242) not simply defined by it parts. Gestalts are whole 
experiences of which the parts thereof are mere 
abstractions that have no separate identity. That is, 
there is no spontaneous experience of a part merely as a 
part, separate from the experience of the whole. 
Naess (1995h) illustrates the application of gestalt 
conceptualizations to very real environmental issues. He 
offers the example of a proposal to build a road through 
a large forest. While preservationists reject the 
proposal, proponents argue that the area despoiled by the 
road will be less than a tiny fraction of the forest. 
"But they are neglecting the gestalt character of the 
forest" (p. 244). That is, the forest would no longer be 
spontaneously experienced as a whole whatever the 
fraction of the area that is destroyed. 
Fox (1990) correctly observes that the idea of 
interconnectedness is inexorably linked with the process 
of identification spoken of so often in Naess's (1988, 
1995a) work. The fact that persons are interconnected 
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with the natural whole should not be taken to mean, as 
some critics of deep ecology would suggest, that persons 
are in fact so fully identified that they are no 
different from the natural whole. 
For Fox, similarity and commonality are important 
components in understanding identification. A person may 
have a sense of similarity with another entity in the 
natural realm without necessarily experiencing a sense of 
commonality with that entity. Fox notes: 
What identification should not be taken to mean, 
however, is identity-that I Literally am that tree 
over there, for example. What is being emphasized 
is the tremendously common experience that through 
the process of identification ... my self ... can expand 
to include the tree even though I and the tree 
remain physically "separate" ... Expressing this point 
another way, the realization that we and all other 
entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality--
that "Life is fundamentally one"--does not mean that 
all multiplicity and diversity is reduced to 
homogeneous mush. (Fox, 1990, pp. 81-82) 
In addition to the link between interconnectedness 
and identification there is also a link between 
interconnectedness and self in understanding the 
convergence of person/environment. For deep ecologists 
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interconnectedness cannot be fully apprehended without 
paying very close attention to the ways self are 
developed and understood. Although deep ecology's idea 
of self was discussed earlier in connection with the 
ultimate norm of self-realization a few additional points 
are worth noting. 
Deep ecology's reconceptualization of self goes 
beyond the modern Western sense of how the human self is 
fashioned. Devall and Sessions (1984) describe the 
modern Western sense of both a individualized and a 
socialized self: 
.... growth begins when one starts the long process 
of separating out our individual uniqueness from our 
socially programmed sense of self. Growth and 
maturity also occur when we cease to see ourselves 
as isolated egos and begin to identify with other 
humans, from our family and friends to eventually 
the whole of humanity. (pp. 302-303) 
Conventional human development then, according to 
Devall and Sessions (1984), is limited to identifying 
self with other humans--a social self. Deep ecology 
extends the concept of self to encompass a deep 
interconnectedness with other people and with nature--an 
ecological self. "When a person stops defending an old 
ego identity--an image of oneself which does not 
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correspond to current experience--and disidentifies with 
his or her rigid social identity, growth can occur. 
Exploring our ecological self openly and with acceptance 
no judgement is made, nor is there a pursuit of anything. 
The self is not an entity or a thing, it is an opening to 
discovering what some call the Absolute or in Sanskrit, 
atman" (Devall, 1995, pp. 103, 104). 
A significant point to be made here, complementary 
to the previous discussion, is that interconnectedness 
presupposes more than the modernist sense of ego-self and 
more than the modern sense of social-self. A new 
category of ecological-self arises which has implications 
for a whole range of human endeavors. One of the most 
important of these, from this author's perspective, is 
related to ethics. 
Merchant (1992) places the deep ecology idea of 
ecological self in an ethical context. She suggests that 
in the 1800s, what she calls homocentric ethics displaced 
egocentric ethics as the dominant Western view of ethical 
behavior. While egocentric ethics is based on individual 
ought "what is good for the individual will benefit the 
society" (p. 63), homocentric ethics is grounded in 
society--what is good for society will benefit the 
individual. According to Merchant homocentric ethics are 
"consistent with the assumptions of mechanistic science, 
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especially as extended by nineteenth century scientists". 
(p. 72). 
Merchant notes that a new moral philosophy is now 
emerging. Broadening one's conceptualization of self--
recognizing the complex web of connections between self 
and nature--has expanded ethics and is gradually ushering 
in a new ecocentric ethics. Ecocentric ethics are 
"grounded in the cosmos" (p. 74). A major difference 
between ecocentric ethics and homocentric ethics is that 
ecocentric ethics is not simply an extension of rights to 
include nonhuman entities, what deep ecology supporter 
John Rodman (1983) calls moral extensionism. Ecocentric 
ethics is really concerned with a general sense or 
condition of being as the grounds for right action rather 
than elaborating on the rights, duties and oughts of 
behavior. 
From a deep ecological perspective right action 
toward other beings will naturally arise from a broadened 
understanding of self and its interconnectedness with all 
of existence. Contrasting an ethics arising from a 
narrow, atomistic, mechanistic sense of self with an 
ethics arising from an expanded ecological self Fox 
(1995a) notes that deep ecology's conception of self: 
... is a wide, expansive, or field-like conception 
from the outset. This has the highly interesting, 
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even startling, consequence that ethics (conceived 
as being concerned with moral "oughts") is rendered 
superfluous! The reason for this is that if one has 
a wide, expansive, or field-like· sense of self then 
(assuming that one is not self-destructive) one will 
naturally (i.e. spontaneously) protect the natural 
(spontaneous) unfolding of ... (the ecosphere, the 
cosmos) in all its aspects. (p. 217) 
A final subtheme emerging from the deep ecology 
literature related to the challenges it poses to the 
modernist worldview is its phenomenological and 
experiential bases. Direct experience with nature is 
highly valued in deep ecology in keeping with its 
emphasis on broader self realization and inherent value 
of all things. Devall and Sessions (1985) point out that 
deep ecological thought has an emphasis on direct 
experience with nature and on conducting research which 
actually takes place in the field. Rather than studying 
predominantly in laboratories and books, deep ecology 
believes that students should be required to go into the 
field to see, but more importantly to experience the 
interrelationships at work and "to go beyond the narrow 
definition of scientific data and look to their own 
consciousness to develop their own sense of place" (p. 
85) . 
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This emphasis on experiencing human/nonhuman 
connections is a rejection of modernism's belief that it 
is possible and even desirable for reasonable people and 
scientists to be totally logical, rational and objective. 
In an insightful essay, deep ecology supporter Delores 
Lachapelle (1995), contrasts industrial culture's limited 
experientiality with the deep experience of existence 
celebrated in ritual: 
Our Western European industrial cultures ... have 
idolized ideologies, "rationality", and a limited 
kind of practicality, and have regarded the 
conscious rituals of these other cultures as 
frivolous curiosities, at best. The results are all 
too evident. We've been here only a few hundred 
years and we have already done irreparable damage to 
vast ares of the country ... (p. 58) 
There is a spiritual component to deep ecology's 
experiential connection with nature. It is somewhat less 
explicitly stated, however, than the spiritual 
expressions discussed in connection with ecofeminism. 
For deep ecology, experientiality is less a matter of 
mystical identification with nature than it is a kind of 
practical involvement in its everyday realities. For 
example, deep ecologists are critical of national parks 
and wilderness areas for tending to make persons 
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spectators of nature rather than inviting them to 
experience it (Drew, 1995; Turner, 1995). From Naess's 
(1989) perspective: 
To "only look at" nature is extremely peculiar 
behavior. Experiencing an environment happens by 
doing something in it, by living in it, meditating 
and acting. The very concepts of "nature" and 
"environment/milieu" cannot be delimited in an 
ecophilosophical fashion without reference to the 
interaction of elements of which we partake. (p. 63) 
In contrast to modernism's limited view of reality 
which tends to ignore, minimize, or oversimplify complex 
phenomena by reducing them to unidimensional terms, deep 
ecology adopts a phenomenological viewpoint which holds 
that the observer and the observed are always fluctuating 
and changing (Naess, 1989). From this perspective human 
beings perceive things differently, and the same 
individual perceives differently at different times. For 
deep ecologists "everything flows. "We must abandon 
fixed, solid points, retaining the relatively 
straightforward, persistent relations of interdependence" 
(Naess, 1989, p. 50). 
Much of Naess's theorizing supports this view. His 
writings are characterized by comments that suggest his 
views are tentative, open to change, and infinitely 
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revisable. Rather than dealing with ultimate or 
definitive provability of moral injunctions, deep 
ecologists are "inclined far more to what might be 
referred to as experiential invitations" (Fox, 1990, p. 
91). Thus, for example in a lengthy chapter on self-
realization Naess (1989) suggests: 
In this chapter a basic positive attitude to nature 
is articulated in philosophical form. It is not 
done to win compliance, but to offer some of the 
many who are at home in such a philosophy new 
opportunities to express it in words. (p. 164) 
And, while discussing deep ecology's connection to 
Spinoza, Naess writes: 
In what follows I do not try to prove anything. I 
invite the reader to consider a set of connections 
between Spinoza's ethics and the trend in thinking 
and living inspired in part by ecology and sometimes 
called the deep ecological movement. (cited in Fox, 
1990, p.91) 
The phenomenological basis of deep ecology values 
the intuitive aspects of human reasoning (Naess, 1995g) . 
It increases the diversity and depth of questions 
generated and proposes substitute, depth understandings 
about complex, multi-layered situations. In so doing 
deep ecology challenges the purely abstract reasoning and 
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limited sensationism of the modernist mindset and reduces 
the likelihood that alternative perspectives will be 
suppressed or marginalized. 
Theme Six: Comparisons and Criticisms 
The preceding discussions have explored and 
illustrated significant features within the emerging 
worldviews of ecofeminism and deep ecology. These two 
ecophilosophies share much in common and the reader would 
have undoubtedly noted some overlapping aspects on 
several points, as well as observing that the two 
philosophies also consequentially differ on certain 
distinctives. The current section of this chapter shall 
explore several subthemes related to similarities and 
major difference between ecofeminism and deep ecology and 
specific and general criticisms of both. It shall be 
organized around: (1) a comparative overview of 
similarities between deep ecology and ecofeminism as 
noted by several authors; (2) a comparison of deep 
ecology and ecofeminism, highlighting significant 
differences in the context of the deep ecology-
ecofeminism· debate; (3) a description and exploration of 
specific criticisms made of both deep ecology and 
ecofeminism by transpersonal psychologist Ken Wilber; and 
(4) a description and exploration of more general 
criticisms of deep ecology and ecofeminism, as both 
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philosophies and political movements. 
Similarities 
Ecof eminism and deep ecology share broad 
similarities. Both arose out of a concern for the 
destruction humans have inflicted on the environment and 
how questioning the root causes of environmental problems 
is important in determining appropriate relationships 
between humans and nature. In addition to these and 
others noted earlier, several authors have identified 
other general similarities. Zimmerman (1994) suggests 
that the essential connection between both lie in the 
facts that like postmodern theory, both share a criticism 
of modernity's dualism, its subject/object distinction 
and domination of nature but reject postmodern theory's 
pessimism, indifference and deconstructionism. Likewise, 
both criticize the doctrine of natural rights for being 
hierarchial and abstract. Both recognize as well that 
altered consciousness and attitudes are important in the 
transformation of dominating and destructive 
institutions. Finally, both value intersocietal and 
intercultural dialogue as contributing to solving social 
and ecological problems. 
Similarly, Spretnak and Capra (1986) advance the 
view, in connection with their discussion of the 
political principles of green politics, that deep ecology 
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and ecof eminism believe that basic social change can 
occur only if people adopt a different narrative of who 
they are and of what the future might be. They each also 
stress the spiritual core of social/ecological 
transformation which is centered not on doctrinaire, 
intellectual religiosity but on interconnectedness 
flowing from flexible, intuitive experience. 
Several other authors have identified general 
similarities. Deep ecology and ecofeminism recognize 
that their belief systems do not express or capture the 
whole truth of environmental consciousness--that they 
share compatible values but express them differently; 
some politically and some not (Starhawk, 1989). Both 
views customarily agree that the split between humans and 
nature is in many ways a psychic split within ourselves 
(Griffin, 1989) . And, both share a complementary 
interpretation of the interconnectedness of humans and 
nature, though with contrasting emphases (Mathews, 1994). 
Deep .ecology/ecofeminist debate 
While the similarities between deep ecology and 
ecofeminism are substantial, and widespread division 
between them is not sharp, there are nonetheless some 
major differences on several key points. This has 
generated an ongoing dialogue between proponents of both 
movements in the context of what has become known as the 
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deep ecology/ecofeminism debate (Zimmerman, 1994) . 
A major issue in the dialogue has centered around 
contrasting perspectives on androcentrism and 
anthropocentrism. Zimmerman (1987) has noted that 
ecofeminist critics of deep ecology: 
... assert that it speaks of a gender-neutral 
"anthropocentrism" as the root of the domination of 
nature, when in fact androcentrism is the real root. 
Only the interpretive lens of androcentrism enables 
us to understand the origin and scope of dualistic, 
atomistic, hierarchical, and mechanistic categories. 
(pp. 3 7-38) 
Ecofeminism has been critical of deep ecology for 
being thoroughly androcentric in that the ecophilosophy 
has been "formulated almost entirely by men and is 
characterized by unintended patriarchal prejudices" 
(Zimmerman, 1990, p. 142). An early ecofeminist 
proponent of this view, Ariel Salleh (1984), has 
suggested that men dominate both women and nature because 
they have an "impulse to compete and dominate the Other" 
(p. 343). Salleh points to the use of androcentric 
language by deep ecologists, such as the use of the 
generic term "man" (p. 340) to refer to humankind, as 
illustrative of their latent patriarchal tendencies. 
Others, including Ynestra King (1990, p. 109) have 
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supported Salleh's premise that the "root cause of 
oppression" is "the subordination of women in society" 
and because "men identify nature with women," men seek to 
control nature as well. Since deep ecology fails to 
appreciate the character and implication of this 
patriarchal misrepresentation in the oppression of 
nature, deep ecologists are suspected of meaning 
something quite different than do ecofeminists when they 
talk of appropriate human/nature relationship. From the 
perspective of both King and Salleh, then, the oppression 
of women and nature cannot be alleviated "unless men can 
come to grips honestly with the impulse to compete and 
dominate the Other within themselves" (Salleh, 1984, p. 
343). Deep ecology has failed to come to terms with 
these challenging notions and so cannot speak 
convincingly on a new kind of ecological existence. 
Michael Zimmerman (1987, 1994) and Warwick Fox 
(1989, 1995a) have raised the question as to whether it 
is appropriate to locate the source of ecological 
problems in men. One must legitimately ask, they 
contend, that if men's attitudes and behavior reflect 
patriarchal culture, why can't the same be said about 
women? Are not women also part of the patriarchal 
culture? Referring to Salleh's arguments, Zimmerman 
(1987) inquires: 
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If deep ecologists cannot get to the heart of the 
matter because their experience is too deeply 
distorted by patriarchy, cannot we say something 
analogous about women? How can authentic female 
experience and self-expression be possible under 
patriarchy ... since human experience is always 
culturally mediated .... Does feminism pretend to 
provide a nondistorted, impartial way of 
interpreting experience? (p. 40-41) 
From Zimmerman's (1987) perspective ecofeminism makes 
patriarchy responsible for too much. It portrays "men as 
the villains of world history" while portraying women as 
"peaceful, charitable, concerned about others, 
compassionate, more in harmony with nature and more truly 
human" (p. 41). Countering, Zimmerman (1989) asks, can 
such good characteristics belong only to one sex? Women 
too have a dark side which is all too easily projected 
onto men. Ecofeminists must realize "that men, too, are 
the victi~s of patriarchy, they lack a real voice of 
their own, apart from the impersonal voice that they have 
assumed in the process of having to split off their own 
feelings" (p. 41). In a concluding statement Zimmerman 
suggests that ecofeminists: 
... can say that patriarchal categories are the 
problem, and that changing those categories 
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according to feminist principles will bring about an 
end to the domination of woman and nature. Yet 
there is no assurance that new forms of domination 
and power will not arise in the process ... We must be 
careful ... not to fall prey to the sex-based 
stereotyping that has been so crucial to maintaining 
patriarchy. Men and women are both capable of 
becoming more open to and at harmony with the 
natural world. Deep ecologists and ecofeminists 
need to unite in reconstructing Western humanity's 
current attitudes toward nature. (p. 42) 
Warwick Fox (1989), in a conciliatory appraisal, 
concludes that the anthropocentric/androcentric 
difference between deep ecology and ecofeminism is simply 
a contrast of theoretical flavor and emphasis rather than 
suggesting real substantive differences. For Fox 
anthropocentrism and androcentrism are essentially two 
sides of the same coin. Deep ecology's anthropocentric 
critique focuses on the underlying, bottom line ideology 
of human-centeredness which legitimizes social domination 
and ecological destruction by whatever class of social 
actors ( whites, capitalists, Westerners) may be 
involved. Ecofeminism's androcentric critique, on the 
other hand, focuses primarily on the role that the class 
of social actors known as men have played in this 
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domination and destruction. 
Fox (1989) contends that no matter which of a number 
of social classes may dominate in a particular historical 
period they all tend: 
... at the most fundamental level to find a common 
kind of legitimation for the alleged superiority of 
these classes over others and, hence, for the 
assumed rightfulness of their domination of these 
others. Specifically, these classes of social 
actors have not sought to legitimate their position 
on the grounds that they are, for example, men, 
capitalists, white, or Western per se, but rather on 
the grounds that they have most exemplified whatever 
it is that has been taken to constitute the essence 
of humanness .... These classes of social actors have, 
in other words, habitually assumed themselves to be 
somehow more fully human than others ... women, the 
lower classes, blacks, non-Westerners ... The cultural 
spell of anthropocentrism has been considered 
sufficient to justify not only moral 
superiority .... but also all kinds of domination 
within human society--let alone domination of the 
obviously nonhuman world. (p. 22) 
From Fox's perspective, anthropocentrism is common 
to men and women, and all dominating persons or groups in 
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the sense that it is the grounding force sanctioning all 
forms of domination and oppression. What ecofeminism's 
criticism of deep ecology overlooks on this point is that 
deep ecologists are not primarily concerned with exposing 
the actors who have historically been most responsible 
for domination, but rather with the task of ''sweeping the 
rug out from under the feet of these classes of social 
actors by exposing the most fundamental kind of 
legitimation that they have habitually employed in 
justifying their position" (Fox, 1989, p. 24). Fox 
suggests that deep ecologists and ecofeminists must learn 
from each other and appreciate the uniqueness of their 
respective positions not as fundamentally different but 
as two among a varied range of perspectives on the 
distribution of power in human society. 
The debate between deep ecology and ecofeminism on 
this point has often been acrimonious. It is an 
essential clash between two competing visions of the 
original cause of the current social and environmental 
crisis. From this author's perspective neither is 
necessarily more realistic, more true than the other. 
There is particular cogency in the view that androcentric 
and anthropocentric analyses represent complementary 
rather than contradictory positions. 
For example, both deep ecology and ecofeminism 
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identify major, though not ultimate, causes of the 
oppression of humans and nature. The significant point 
is that the aims of each are remarkably similar; a 
thorough transformation of human consciousness. The task 
of deep ecologists and ecofeminists, from this author's 
viewpoint, is not to concentrate on pursuing their own 
truth of original cause to the exclusion of all others, 
but rather to see their efforts as one manifestation of a 
general stimulus for change that may take many different 
forms. The most effective dialogue is one which shifts 
emphasis from which analysis of cause is really deeper 
toward how can each perspective enhance and empower a 
ongoing transformational impulse. 
A second important part of the deep 
ecology/ecofeminism debate is related to the differing 
ways each philosophy conceives of the manner in which 
persons expand themselves to become identified with the 
whole of nature. Cheney (1987) contends that despite 
initial con$ruences, deep ecology's holistic 
interconnectedness thesis--of self being broadly 
identified with a relational, total field image of 
nature--promotes a masculine image of self that contrasts 
with ecofeminism's self in a community of relationships. 
This has lead, according to some ecofeminists, to 
deep ecology's speaking of interconnectedness in terms of 
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abstract rights rather than in terms of concrete, 
personal relationships (Zimmerman, 1990). For Cheney 
(1987), the deep ecology notion of rights arises from a 
view of humans as isolated egos seeking broader expansion 
with nature. He contends for them the way to identify 
more deeply with nature and to limit competition between 
self and nature is to grant nature rights that the 
isolated ego is obliged to respect. Relying on the 
notion of rights in the conceptualization of 
interconnected relationships, say ecofeminists, reveals 
underlying atomistic, separatist assumptions of a 
patriarchal system (Zimmerman, 1994). 
From a slightly different vantage point ecof eminist 
Marti Kheel (1990) maintains that when deep ecologists 
speak of expanding the self toward deep connections, one 
must question what self it is that is being expanded. 
Ecofeminists hold that men's and women's development of 
self take very different paths, and support their view 
with the ~ork of such feminist theorists as Gilligan 
(1982) and Chodorow (1990). For ecofeminists, a central 
assumption of the patriarchal system is "the notion of an 
autonomous (masculine) self, established through the 
defeat of a female-imaged other" (Kheel, 1990, p. 130). 
From this viewpoint, the male experience of the world is 
influenced by his early self-differentiation experiences 
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and simultaneous induction into a social context which 
defines the meaning of his difference from his mother as 
a denial of any aspect of sameness with her. Deep 
ecologists do not challenge these basic assumptions and 
simply attempt to extend their self concerns toward 
nature. This extension is at its core only a recognition 
of Other in terms of a masculine self rather than a true 
identification with Other. Ecofeminists point to these 
unacknowledged assumptions in explaining how some deep 
ecologists, particularly Devall and Sessions (1985), can 
hold an identification with nature and yet also hold a 
desire to kill (hunt) that with which one deeply 
identifies (Kheel, 1990). For most women, in contrast, 
an identification with animals means a desire to avoid 
harming them. 
Ecof eminists point to two dangers which stem from 
deep ecology's conceptualization of interconnectedness. 
First, individuals could presumably be sacrificed for the 
good of the whole, that is the self "may widen beyond the 
reach of individual beings" (Kheel, 1990, p. 136). 
Secondly, ecofeminists point out that defining self in 
terms of wider merger with a somewhat abstract Other in 
nature leaves out the notion of relationship with Other. 
The danger then is the possibility of an even more 
inf lated sense of ego simply granting rights to Other 
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instead of attempting to create a genuine relatedness 
with Other. 
Deep ecology has responded to these criticisms in 
several ways. One, by simply pointing out the 
corresponding danger in ecofeminism's relational/ 
identification premise. Two, by pointing out that 
ecofeminism's critique misreads or misinterprets deep 
ecology's ideas. And thirdly, by attempting to find 
common ground between the two positions. Proposals from 
this third perspective have come from both deep 
ecologists and ecofeminists. 
Deep ecologists have been quick to point out the 
danger in ecofeminism's own view of interconnectedness. 
They suggest that ecofeminism's relational/identification 
premise implies that humans can care for non-human beings 
only after they have learned to care for each other. The 
danger, state deep ecologists, is that such a view may 
reinforce the lack of concern that some ecof eminists have 
historically displayed toward environmental issues 
(Zimmerman, 1990). 
Sessions (1995g) adds that ecofeminism's relational 
emphasis remains essentially anthropocentric in practice 
for it creates a situation where ecofeminists "continue 
to focus on their respective human, social and political 
agendas while practice strategies and the activism needed 
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to ameliorate the ecological crisis, itself, receive from 
them a low priority or are ignored entirely" (p. 266). 
A second response of deep ecology to ecofeminism's 
critique involves the contention that ecofeminism 
misreads and/or misinterprets what deep ecology means in 
its attempt to describe human/nature relationships. With 
respect to Cheney, Zimmerman (1994), suggests that he 
misinterprets deep ecology's use of the term rights with 
respect to human/nature relationships. Rather than imply 
a masculine biased, technical sense of rights as an 
extension of viability to nonhuman nature as Cheney 
contends, deep ecology uses rights in a nontechnical 
sense to describe the attitude of respect that 
spontaneously accompanies ecological sensibility. 
Ecological sensibility arises from wider self 
identification and fosters "attitudes and relationships 
that take into account, as much as possible, the striving 
of human and nonhuman alike" (Zimmerman, 1994, p. 287) 
In a· similar response Fox (1989) contends that 
ecofeminists' fears that deep ecology's 
interconnectedness thesis will lead to diminished care 
for individual entities, is in fact a crucial misreading 
of what is deep ecology's critical task; what he calls 
the "fallacy of misplaced misanthropy" (p. 20). For Fox 
misplaced misanthropy is a misreading of deep ecology, by 
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ecofeminists, which suggests that deep ecology shows a 
genuine preference for nature while disdaining--even 
hating--the interests of humans. It is the mistaken idea 
of ecofeminists that deep ecology's interconnectedness 
thesis will somehow lead to a disregard for humans and 
preference for nature. For Fox (1989) deep ecology's 
interconnectedness thesis, if properly understood, has a 
constructive task of encouraging "an egalitarian attitude 
on the part of humans toward all entities in the 
ecosphere--including humans" (p. 21). Deep ecologist's 
version of interconnectedness does not hold to a 
preferential view of nature against the interests of 
human beings. 11 Far from being misanthropic, deep 
ecologists celebrate the existence of these human beings" 
(Fox, 19 8 9 , p . 21 ) . 
A final response to ecofeminism's critique of deep 
ecology's interconnectedness thesis has been to propose 
alternatives which may bring the two positions into 
closer alliance. These proposals have come from both 
deep ecologists and ecofeminists. For instance feminist 
and deep ecology supporter Freya Mathews (1994) views the 
particular emphasis of deep ecology's holistic versus 
ecofeminism's individualistic perspectives on 
interconnectedness as complementary in most respects. 
She offers an evenhanded characterization of their 
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essential elements: 
Deep ecology tends to take a basically holistic view 
of Nature--its image of the natural world is that of 
a field--like whole of which we and other 
'individuals' are parts. It encourages us to seek 
our true identity by identifying with wider and 
wider circles of Nature, presenting the natural 
world as an extension of ourselves, the Self-writ-
large. In this view our interests are convergent 
with those of Nature, and it becomes incumbent on us 
to respect and serve these common interests .... 
Ecofeminists, in contrast, tend to portray the 
natural world as a community of beings, related, in 
the manner of a family, but nevertheless distinct. 
We are urged to respect the individuality of these 
beings, rather than seeking to merge with them, and 
our mode of relating to them should be via open-
minded and attentive encounter, rather than through 
abstract metaphysical preconceptualization. The 
understanding born of such encounters should result 
in an attitude of care or compassion which can 
provide the ground for an ecological ethic. (p. 159) 
For Mathews the difference between these views lies 
in the vantage point taken by the protagonists. She 
insists that deep ecology and ecofeminism "each captures 
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an important aspect of our metaphysical and ethical 
relationship with Nature" (p. 162). If reality is 
internally interconnected as both camps propose then it 
may be seen as both a whole and as a manifold of 
individuals without destroying the essence of either 
position. Mathews (1995) has, in another work, explained 
it this way: 
It should be pointed out that interconnectedness 
does not imply that organisms do not possess a 
genuine individuality: their functional unity 
confers on them an essential ontological 
distinctness and integrity, but this individuality 
is strictly relative--it is itself a function of the 
particular environment which is capable of 
sustaining such a self-realizing, self-maintaining 
system. A relative ontological individuality, on 
the one hand, an interconnectedness, on the other, 
are thus not in the framework mutually exclusive; on 
the·contrary, they entail each other. (Mathews, 
1995, p. 127) 
The key for both deep ecology and ecofeminism is to 
be "committed in the end to an irreducible moral 
ambivalence" that appreciates "intervention on behalf of 
nature on the one hand" and a recognition of "our 
humanity--our very finitude and limitation" on the other 
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(Mathews, 1994, p. 162). This is what Mathews calls 
"cosmic ecology" (p. 164) for it reduces the sharp 
dualism at the heart of the interconnectedness debate 
which tends to suggests that one should ally either with 
nature in preference to humanity or humanity in 
preference to nature. 
Deep ecology supporter Joanna Macy (1989) and 
environmental philosopher Michael Zimmerman (1994), each 
of whom have endorsed aspects of both ecof eminism and 
deep ecology, point to the adoption of a Buddhist 
· framework as a potential coupling alternative to the 
interconnectedness debate. As the previous discussions 
have suggested both deep ecology and ecofeminism call for 
wider identification. The first calls for a wider 
identification with the wholistic character of the 
natural realm while the latter speaks of identification 
in the widening context of relationship with a community 
of individual entities. Buddhism provides a potential 
synthesis to the polarity engendered by this debate. 
From this perspective identification is not an 
enlargement of self with the Other of nature, whether 
defined wholistically or communally, but is rather a 
recognition of the self's emptiness and the emptiness of 
all other beings. Such insight dismantles the model of 
an expanding, perfecting self toward a discovery "that 
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the world is constituted by a myriad of interrelated 
phenomena that manifest themselves moment by moment. No 
one and no thing is radically other" (Zimmerman, 1994, 
pp. 315-316). This discovery creates not a perfecting 
self but an inward sensitivity where: 
... we learn to listen to our world and to each 
other. We hear the pain of the alienated, the sick, 
the lonely, the angry, and we rejoice in the 
happiness, the fulfillment, the peace of others. We 
are touched deeply by the pain of our planet, 
equally touched by the perfection of a bud 
unfolding .... We learn to respect the heart for its 
power to connect us on a fundamental level with each 
other, with nature and with all of life. (Macy, 
1989, p. 208) 
From Macy's perspective this view requires action. 
To awaken to the experience of emptied, interconnected 
existence one must not concentrate on estatic mentalisms. 
Rather, the point is that the experience requires 
activities that are directed toward preserving or 
sustaining entities greater than one's own self. The 
decisions to act is that which ultimately extends self, 
whether it be through activities on behalf of homeless 
humans or endangerd whales. 
Finally, ecofeminist Judith Plant (1990) suggests 
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that deep ecology and ecofeminism must find a common 
ground of cooperation, not in attempting to reconcile 
their varying views of the self /nature 
interconnectedness, but rather in emphasizing the reality 
of a practical, place-based identification found in the 
bioregional vision. Bioregionalism means fitting oneself 
to a place, becoming native to it, and living within the 
limits of the gifts it gives. Bioregionalism is much 
more than developing appropriate technology, or home 
growing food. It offers "a praxis--that is, a way of 
living what we're thinking" (p. 159). It means 
developing a new attitude toward living with the earth, 
of redefining the meaning of home. Bioregionalism can 
bring deep ecology and ecof eminism together not by 
focusing on the intricacies of ontological essence but 
rather focusing on rebuilding both human and natural 
community. Together deep ecology and ecofeminism can give 
the world hope of a new vision of person/environment 
relationship based on "thinking feelingly" (p. 160). The 
real work Plant points out, is at home, where both men 
and women will learn to mend their relationships with 
each other and with the earth. 
Criticisms from transpersonal psychology 
Ecof eminists and deep ecologists have had many 
critics, none more strident in their criticism than 
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transpersonal theorist Ken Wilber. In his extensive 
recent work Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: The Spirit of 
Evolution (1995), Wilber takes on all comers in his wide 
ranging criticism of what he perceives to be the 
regressive evolutionary tendencies of Nature Religions, 
among which he includes deep ecology and ecofeminism. 
Wilber views deep ecology and ecofeminism as beckoning 
their adherents back to a pre-modern level of 
intellectual and spiritual development. This regressive 
trend is best illustrated in the Nature Religion's 
unfounded emphasis on a kind of psychic mysticism where 
spirit and nature are joined. Wilber argues "in their 
view [the Eco camp's view] man and nature are 
indissolubly joined". Things are ultimates, and they 
never look beyond their sphere" (p. 469). 
For Wilber, eco-romantics, another term he coined 
for the followers of Nature Religions, adhere to an 
interconnected wholism that in reality represents an 
attempt to recapture some sense of "the archaic Paradise 
Lost" (p. 670) which is concieved of as the "Promised 
Land" (p. 670) of human evolutionary development. This 
belief in a pre-modern, interconnected wholism, according 
to Wilber, is far more narrow-minded and dangerous than 
the secular rationalism that the eco-romantic groups 
soundly reject. 
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For Wilber, nature worship or nature immersion--
union with the greater whole of nature--of which deep 
ecology's and ecofeminism's interconnectedness premise is 
one manifestation, "prevent the realization of Nature, or 
the spirit within and beyond. Nature worshipers are the 
destroyers of Nature and destroyers of Spirit" (p. 288) 
because their nature worship blinds them to a deeper 
search for the Over-Soul. The over-soul is a kind of 
metaphysical essence which exists beyond the 
identifiable, sensory reality of nature and culture. 
But, it is the essence out of which loving embrace of 
both culture and nature emerge. One must connect with 
the over-soul, the spirit within nature and culture, 
rather than nature or culture itself. 
Contrary to this perceived view of deep ecology and 
ecofeminism is Wilber's own understanding of social 
evolution. For Wilber the cure for ecological crisis and 
social inequity is not the attainment of unity with the 
whole of· nature, but rather an enlightenment which views 
the separateness of things as an illusion and not a 
reality with which one should seek merger. According to 
Wilber, such new insight can occur by virtue of an 
evolutionary ascent to a higher stage of consciousness 
that integrates all previous stages and represents a 
transpersonal level of awareness. For Wilber, when deep 
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ecologists and ecofeminists encourage a regressive 
identification with the whole of nature, "they are 
committing the 'pre-trans-fallacy', which encourages 
people to regress to an earlier level of consciousness" 
(Zimmerman, 1994, p. 202). In other words, deep 
ecologists and ecof eminists confuse movement toward 
transpersonal levels of consciousness by inadvertently 
suggesting movement toward prepersonal levels. The 
fallacy for Wilber is that deep ecologists and 
ecofeminists ask persons to move forward by first moving 
backward. They "may claim to be transpersonal, [but] in 
fact they are prepersonal to their core" (diZerega, 1996, 
p. 57) . 
Wilber's theoretical framework conceives of an 
ascent through a series of evolutionary stages toward 
full spiritual enlightenment. The current level of 
individual and social consciousness is not to be 
retreated from. In fact despite external appearances to 
the contrary, the secular West exemplifies a higher stage 
of consciousness development than all earlier societies 
and most non-Western societies. The attainment of the 
final, planetary stage of cultural development must first 
precede through a transitional period; what Wilber calls 
the vision-logic stage. This stage of consciousness is a 
more fully realized rationality--the integral-
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aoerspectival mind. 
Wilber writes that "it is the integrative power of 
vision-logic, I believe, and not the indissociation of 
tribal magic or the imperialism of mythic involvement 
that is desperately needed on a global scale. For it is 
vision-logic with its centauric/planetary worldview that, 
in my opinion, holds the only hope for the integration of 
the biosphere and noosphere" (p. 187). Wilber contends 
that the persistent evidence of degradation of nature and 
social inequality visited on humankind by the many 
manifestations of Western rationality are simply stresses 
and wrong turns of modern cultural civilization that must 
be addressed. But, he insists that an emerging world 
culture, though not inevitable, "is being built by 
international markets of material-economic exchange, and 
by the increasingly free exchange of rationality 
structures, particularly empiric-analytic science and 
computer-transmitted information" (p. 197). 
Of particular importance to Wilber in setting the 
groundwork for his critique is the view that deep 
ecology's and ecofeminism's egalitarian view of 
relationships between persons and nature, and 
particularly its attendant non-hierarchial framework, 
represents an ill-conceived understanding of human 
evolutionary development. He observes that deep 
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ecologists and ecof eminists advocate the transformation 
of a fractured worldview that separates mind and body, 
subject and object, human and nonhuman in a dualistic, 
mechanistic and hierarchical manner. And, in its place 
they advocate for a "worldview that is more holistic, 
more relational, more integrative, more Earth-honoring, 
and less arrogantly human-centered" (p. 4). But, the 
problem for Wilber with this conceptualization is that it 
ignores a critical element of both natural and social 
systemic development: the notion of holons. 
The linchpin of Wilber's criticism of eco-romantics 
rests in his belief that they have misunderstood the 
importance of hierarchies in system functioning. He says 
of them: 
All sorts of theorists, from deep ecologists to 
social critics, from ecofeminists to postmodern 
poststructuralists, have found the notion of 
hierarchy not only undesirable but a bona fide cause 
of much social domination, oppression, and 
injustice. (p. 15) 
Wilber says that the opponents of hierarchy, particularly 
social hierarchy, are concerned with the ranking and 
domination associated with the rule of an elite few and 
prefer instead to replace hierarchy with heterarchy--rule 
or governance "established by a pluralistic and 
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egalitarian interplay of all parties" (p. 16) . At issue 
then is whether one 1 s emphasis is on the parts of the 
whole--hierarchy, or on the whole as a whole--heterarchy. 
Wilber maintains that this is a too simplistic either/or 
dualism. He insists that the emphasis on the whole of 
eco-romantics is really not wholistic at all. If one 
were to ask these "Wholists" what is included in their 
wholeness 11 you find out immediately that there are an 
enormous number of things that they do not include in 
their version of 'the Whole'" (p. 37}. 
In order to counter the persistent charge of deep 
ecology and ecofeminism that all hierarchies are wrong 
and should be replaced with heterarchy, Wilber suggests 
the adoption of the concept of halon as a more 
appropriate conceptualization of system functioning. A 
halon is: 
... that which, being a whole in one context, is 
simultaneously a part in another ... The whole, in 
other words, is more than the sum of its parts, and 
that whole can influence and determine, in many 
cases, the function of its parts (and that whole 
itself is, of course, simultaneously a part of some 
other whole ... reality is not composed of things or 
processes; it is not composed of atoms or quarks; it 
is not composed of wholes nor does it have any 
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parts. Rather, it is composed of whole/parts, or 
holons. (p. 18, 33) 
Wilber concedes, in fact, that his entire book "is a book 
about holons--about wholes that are parts of other 
wholes, indefinitely" (p. viii) . For Wilber perpetually 
emerging holons or what he calls a"holarchy" (p. 21) is 
the best qualitative descriptor of systemic function, 
both naturally and socially. Holarchies represent 
organization of increasing complexity and complex levels 
of consciousness. 
For Wilber attempting to conceive of hierarchies and 
heterarchies as essences of reality is tantamount to 
rejecting holarchies and is at best, self-contradictory 
and at worst, dangerous. Denying hierarchies and 
embracing wholism "is itself a hierarchical judgement" 
(p. 25), according to Wilber. Thus deep ecologists and 
ecofeminists incoherently affirm the very thing they so 
vociferously condemn--the ranking of one thing (wholisms) 
over another (hierarchies). This stance, claims Wilber, 
is simply a polemic with dangerous implications for it 
tends to totalize its own universal claim by rejecting, 
on the grounds of being not universal, the claims of 
others. "It exempts its own universal claims from any 
scrutiny by simply claiming they aren't claims" (p. 29). 
As Wilber sardonically describes it: 
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In essence, their stance amounts to: "I have my 
ranking, but you shall not have yours. And further, 
by pretending that my ranking is not a ranking--that 
move is done unconsciously--"! will say that I am 
without ranking altogether: and I shall then, in the 
name of compassion and equality, despise and attack 
ranking wherever I find it, because ranking is very 
bad". p. 25) 
The upshot of Wilber's argument is that "deep 
ecologists and ecofeminists reject the notion of 
holarchy, for rather confused reasons" (p. 50), though 
much earlier he admits the difference between his view 
and that of deep ecologists and ecofeminists is partly a 
matter of "semantic confusion" (p. 16) that needs to be 
clarified. 
Only a very few radical ecophilosophers have 
attempted to specifically address Wilber's criticism. It 
appears clears however, that a full and fair reading of 
deep ecology and ecofeminism on the above points can 
clarify much of the confusion. A few brief points shall 
be made in that regard. 
Deep ecologist Gus diZerega (1996) suggests that 
Wilber's reading of much of deep ecology's philosophical 
premises is taken grossly out of context and relies too 
much on secondary sources--those who have attempted to 
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develop and expand the earliest propositions--rather than 
on the original ideas developed by Arne Naess. Wilber 
(1995), in fact, champions Naess's thought and suggests 
that "if deep ecologists and ecofeminists would follow 
Naess's lead, the whole discussion could move forward 
much more rapidly" (p. 51) . 
With regard to Wilber's critique that deep 
ecologists and ecofeminists are somehow mired in a nec-
romantic longing for an earlier, mystic union with 
nature, diZerega (1996) correctly observes that deep 
ecology never suggests the regressive dissolution of 
"self into a primordial ooze" (p.58). Previous 
discussions in the current work make it patently clear 
that deep ecology's and ecofeminism's conceptualization 
of identification of person with nature is not a romantic 
longing for what was, but is rather an optimistic 
anticipation for what can be. The differences lies in 
what Wilber himself has suggested to be semantics. 
It ·appears clear that what Wilber views as a 
regression to some pre-egoic stage of undifferentiated 
individual/organic nexus, deep ecology and ecofeminism 
view as widening expansion of individual self to include 
the nonhuman other. For while sharing similarities with 
more atavistic conceptualizations of human/nature merger 
they are not synonymous. As Naess (1989) observes, "Self 
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realization .... breaks in and reinstates the central 
position of the individual--even as the capital ~ is used 
to express something beyond narrow selves. The widening 
and deepening of the individual selves somehow never 
makes them into one mass" (p. 173). To this ecofeminist 
theorist Marti Kheel (1990) adds that ecofeminism's 
interconnectedness is not based on some regressive 
longing but on current ''lived awareness that we 
experience in relation to particular beings as well as 
the larger whole'' (p. 137). 
In summing up Wilber's misinterpretation of Naess on 
this point diZerega says: "Naess is hardly advocating a 
return to paleolithic hunting and gathering--which is one 
of Wilber's favorite [though unfounded] characterizations 
of 'deep ecology'" (p. 59). And the sentiment could be 
applied equally well to his misrepresentation of 
ecofeminism. 
Wilber's second criticism of deep ecology's and 
ecofeminism's non-hierarchical perceptual framework also 
obscures the essential meaning of both movements on this 
point. Interestingly, Wilber (1995) actually quotes 
Naess approvingly as supporting his insistence upon the 
existence of hierarchical/holons. His lament is that 
other deep ecologists--Naess's followers, "have such a 
difficult time grasping his notion" (p. 50). 
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Deep ecology's and ecofeminism's non-hierarchical 
perceptual frameworks have been discussed earlier in some 
detail so only a few additional points will be necessary. 
Neither deep ecology or ecofeminism are suggesting, as 
Wilber contends, that somehow wholism is all good and 
hierarchy is all bad. What deep ecology means from its 
hierarchy/wholism distinction--its focus on the whole 
rather than the parts--is a point of emphasis, a 
perspective at a given moment of observation but never a 
denial of the existence of the parts or even that their 
ordering in relation to one another is morally deplorable 
(i.e. bad). Naess (1989), referring to the work of David 
Bohm (1980), makes the relevant point: 
... that the work with the 'unfolding' of a view of 
the 'totality of all that is', is itself a part, a 
subordinate gestalt, of that very totality. We are, 
when active in unfolding our views, creative in 
shaping and creating 'what there is' at any moment. 
(p .· 8 0) 
Similarly ecofeminism's non-hierarchical perceptual 
framework also does not propose the kinds of things 
suggested of it by Wilber. In an insightful essay on 
feminism and ecology, ecofeminist Patsy Hallen (1995) 
suggests that ecofeminists do recognize that the systemic 
whole is more than the some of the parts, but there is no 
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suggestion that the parts do not exist or should not 
count. Again, as with deep ecology, this is a point of 
emphasis. Acknowledging that the parts exists and far 
from saying that the parts of system are bad in 
preference to the whole, Ballen (1995, p. 213) suggests 
simply that "the parts take their meaning from the 
whole". This does not deny the existence or importance 
of hierarchies but rather the inseparability of both 
whole and part. For Hallen, just as it "is valid to 
interpret the higher in terms of the lower, so it is also 
valid to interpret the lower in terms of the higher" 
(p.213). 
One could conclude from this brief review that 
sometimes deep ecology's and ecofeminism's language of 
wholism and hierarchy is unfortunate in the sense that it 
is not always clear, lacks specificity and has some 
considerable way to go in fully explicating these ideas. 
But, one should not conclude, like Wilber (1995), that 
deep ecology and ecof eminism support a view that 
"hierarchy and atomism are 'bad' and that their 'wholism' 
is the opposite of both" (p. 50). Like diZerega (1996) 
any honest attempt to grasp their meaning on this point 
"would show that one can indeed make distinctions between 
human beings and others while respecting and honoring all 
life" (p. 59). 
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Additional criticisms 
In addition to Wilber's specific criticism of both 
deep ecology and ecofeminism and criticisms arising from 
the ongoing debate between deep ecology and ecof eminism 
other general criticisms of each movement have been 
suggested. They have come from a wide range of 
historians, social ecologists, postmodern theorists, and 
social critics. They range from simple caustic 
rejoinders like Bookchin's (1987) suggestion that deep 
ecology is a "eco-la-la, a blackhole of half-digested, 
ill-formed, and half-baked ideas" (cited in Zimmerman, 
1994, p. 166) to very lengthy and detailed philosophical 
discourse (Biehl, 1991). The following overview makes no 
attempt to discuss the validity of these criticisms for 
that lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. Neither 
is there any attempt to distinguish between them and 
similar critiques highlighted in our previous 
discussions. The inventory is offered as a means to help 
the reader appreciate the broad scope of current 
critiques as well as identify and distinguish between the 
salient issues. The hope is to stimulate thought and 
ongoing dialogue. 
The reader will note some commonality between the 
criticisms of each group and should be aware that 
generally the tenor of these critiques are on the 
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political manifestations of deep ecology and ecofeminism 
rather than on specific philosophical principles. The 
following points are a distillation of the more detailed 
discussions offered by Zimmerman (1987, 1990, 1994), 
Biehl (1991), Merchant (1992), Fox (1989, 1995) and 
Dobson (1995) . 
Deep ecology has been criticized for being an 
immature ecological movement which engages in 
questionable forms of earth worship to the point of being 
an idolatrous religion. It has been accused of being 
willfully ignorant of new developments in ecological 
science that undermine its reliance on traditional 
systems thinking and for advocating a view of wholism 
that sacrifices individuals for the good of the larger 
natural whole. It has also been scolded for claiming to 
be more radical and revolutionary than contemporary 
environmentalism while supporting many of its reform 
efforts, and for projecting its own voice onto nature and 
then claiming that it is nature itself speaking. 
Some deep ecology critics see it as being an 
extension of modernism's rights-based, democratic 
liberalism even though criticizing modernity and its more 
oppressive manifestations. On the other hand, others 
criticize it for uncritically exporting unrelated, 
postmodernist ideas into a unified but questionable 
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conceptual frame. Many disapprove of its rhetorical 
support to individual self-realization while at the same 
time suggesting that individual development only occurs 
by regressing to a preindividualistic level of 
consciousness. This psychological and sociological 
regressive proclivity ignores the dangers of tribalism 
while demanding unqualified conformity to laws of nature. 
Deep ecology has also been harshly denounced by 
those suggesting that it shares theoretical similarity 
with National Socialism because of its heavy reliance on 
the thinking of Heidegger. Similarly, others suggest 
that it propagates a vision of transformed humanity 
dwelling in harmony with nature which parallels the 
mystical features of German Nazism. 
Some political activists have suggested that deep 
ecology is nothing more than a wilderness cult that 
separates the ecology movement from struggles of women, 
gays, the poor and oppressed, and Third World nations 
while relying on personal transformation rather than 
political action to usher in a new epoch. Similarly, 
others have chided it for turning Asian and Tribal 
peoples into mystical Other, thus marginalizing their 
socioeconomic and political needs. 
The criticisms of ecofeminism share some of the same 
features as those of deep ecology. It has been blamed 
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for having reversed the previous dualism between men and 
women such that this time women are on top of the 
hierarchical ladder because they are essentially kinder, 
more life-affirming and relational than men. This belief 
has been supported by a kind of biological essentialism 
(i.e. women are biologically more attuned to nature than 
men) which makes their message ineffective and 
politically dangerous. Ecofeminism has also been 
criticized for having alienated Third World women by 
subtlely asserting that experiences of educated, Western, 
middle-class, ecologically conscious women are 
representative of all women. This seeks to give voice to 
common experiences of women but is in fact totalizing and 
imperialistic because it does not adequately take into 
account racial and ethnic diversity of Third world 
peoples. 
Some have found fault with ecofeminism for 
concentrating on the internal, wholistic character of all 
female.experiences thus leading to a kind of feminist 
totalitarianism where individual expression is sacrificed 
for the sake of communal meaning. Their religious-like 
goddess worship, some say, also promotes a mystic escape 
from real social and ecological problems. From a 
political perspective some rebuke ecofeminism for not 
being more forceful in demanding the end of political 
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domination expressed in patriarchal capitalism and state 
socialism. Others suggest that they have thoroughly 
shunned political involvement in favor of a mythical 
narrative; thus potentially leading to a fascist society 
where secular rationality, clothed in spiritual garb, is 
pandered in order to minimize collective political 
action. Finally, ecofeminism has been chided for 
ignoring the emancipatory aspects of modernism like 
individual freedom, justice and peace, in favor of a 
strident critique of its mechanistic rationality. 
Conclusion 
This exploratory analysis has demonstrated the 
unique and diverse ways in which deep ecology and 
ecofeminism have emerged from the inability of 
conventional thought to address the underlying reasons 
for social discord and environmental degradation. These 
are seen, from the perspective of deep ecology and 
ecofeminism, as individual and institutional 
manifestations of the oppressive and dominating features 
of modernity. Modernity conceives of natural processes 
as lifeless, inert collections of material which can be 
manipulated for the perpetuation of its project; to 
increase its knowledge of and to exert its control over 
all which is natural. Deep ecology and ecofeminism have 
responded to this domination penchant on at least two 
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levels. 
For deep ecology and ecof eminism the solution to 
human and environmental crisis first lies in addressing 
the fundamental assumptions of modernity; particularly 
its worldview and conceptions of knowledge. That is, 
they radically bring into question those notions which 
are embedded in modern human consciousness. The second 
level of response is the worldview deep ecology and 
ecofeminism offer in place of the existing tradition. 
Each attempts to re-enliven a lifeless, meaningless world 
of matter, albeit each with somewhat different emphases. 
Both see a interconnected person/nature world. This is a 
place that offers a rich and creative source of life and 
being; where all reality is developing, changing, in a 
constant state of becoming. 
For deep ecology and ecofeminism this re-enlivened 
worldview is the matrix for a new ethos of person and 
nature which is based on a way of being or identification 
rather ·than on a set of rationalistic principles and 
narrowly developed concepts. As the world is re-created, 
new attitudes, new actions, new applications shall 
emerge; all changing the very face of conventional 
ideology and consciousness. 
The next chapter of this work shall explore the ways 
deep ecology and ecof eminism may assist social work in 
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reconceptualizing its own person-in-environment 
perspective. This reconceptualization will then be 
discussed in the context of its impact on various 




DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Introduction 
This study's previous discussions have suggested 
that social work's of person-in-environment construct is 
conceptually troubled. Person-in-environment has been 
largely influenced by the profession's embeddedness in 
the logic and methodology of the modernist worldview. 
The philosophical assumptions of modernism have typically 
narrowed the definition of person and environment and 
disengaged the concept of nature from both constructs. 
The result has been an conceptual alienation of 
person from nature. Person tends to mean almost solely, 
a psychodynamically,derived, narrowly defined ego self 
which adapts to environmental constraints and changes. 
Environment tends to be roughly defined as the immediate 
personal, social, human-to-human relationships affecting 
the individual. Direct concern for relationships between 
humans and the natural world is thus superseded by 
concerns for specific interhuman and intrahuman issues. 
The natural, nonhuman world remains the background 
against which more fundamentally important intrapsychic 
and interpersonal action take place. Nature and person 
become essentially other--separated, isolated, surrounded 
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by impermeable barriers. 
The current chapter presents a revised theoretical 
proposal of person-in-environment. This is the 
centerpiece of the present research project. It is a 
response to the first of two central research questions 
involving key themes in deep ecology and ecofeminism 
important in reconfiguring person-in-environment. This 
revised theoretical framework also represents the 
culmination of the concept generating components of this 
project that were discussed in conjunction with 
methodological concerns (see Chapter 4). In particular 
it relies on the themes developed in the analysis of 
textual sources as well as the researcher's own intuitive 
experiences and insight, exploratory interviews with key, 
social work theorists and conversations with members of 
the researcher's dissertation committee. Each of these 
sources contributed varying degrees of creative and 
corrective insight that enhanced the development of this 
theoretical reconceptualization and the implications that 
derive from it. 
The current chapter will also, in response to 
research question two, specify implications of person-
with-environment on a range of social work activities. 
The organization of this chapter shall be around one, the 
specification of a reconceptualized person-in-environment 
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perspective and two, implications for social work 
ontology/epistemology, practice, social justice, ethics 
and values, research and education. 
Reconceptualizing Person-In-Environment 
In a general sense the findings of this study 
suggest the need to replace the current person-in-
environment formulation with, from the author 1 s 
perspective, the more appropriate terminology of person-
with-environment. My intent is to suggest that by 
changing in to with a conceptual marker is being placed 
on a commonly accepted social work perspective. This 
marker centers the profession's attention toward the need 
for a radical shift of focus. Person-with-environment 
derives from a revised theoretical basis for thought and 
action which differentiates it from conventional notions 
of person-in-environment. It aims to encourage social 
workers to consider the connections between this revised 
framework and concrete social work activities. 
The reconceptualized framework will be presented in 
the following pages by focusing on the three component 
parts of the construct; person, environment, and the 
relationship between them. 
Expanding the view of person 
Deep ecology and ecof eminism off er social work the 
important insight that modernism 1 s understanding of 
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person as an isolated, ego bound self alienated from body 
and nature, is no longer tenable. In its place deep 
ecology and ecofeminism propose an expanded view of self 
that replaces separated self with ecological self. 
Conventional notions of human development consider 
the maturation of self from the perspective of individual 
ego expanding toward the social realm. But, this 
conceptualization largely ignores identification with 
nature and with all other nonhuman beings. The 
ecological self suggests that persons are not just in 
nature but are in fact of nature. Nature is that which 
constitutes both the beginning and the ongoing essence of 
human self. 
The ecological self posits the importance of 
individual and social relationships, but suggests that 
the self has much richer psychological, emotional, and 
transcendent potentialities. Self is capable of 
extending beyond the narrow, egoic/social self. Neither 
the physical boundary of one's skin or one's purely 
abstract reasoning capacity can define the frontier of 
self. The ecological self reveals a self enlivened and 
extended by nature rather than threatened by it. 
The unique contributions of deep ecology and 
ecofeminism to expanding the self construct are 
important. Deep ecology's emphasis is on breaking down 
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the barriers that maintain an anthropocentric--a strictly 
human-centered--conceptualization of self. For deep 
ecologists the ecological self is a deep, philosophical 
identification centered in increasingly wider levels of 
maturational development. That is, a maturing ecological 
self sees itself as linked in complex patterns of 
relationship with others, both in the human and the non-
human realm. 
Self-realization, the term deep ecologists use for 
the gradually maturing self, is hindered when the self-
realization of others, to whom self is inextricably 
linked, is also hindered. Deep ecologists conclude from 
this that beneficent action toward other, whether human 
or nonhuman, should not come grudgingly. Action toward 
other is not a dutiful sacrifice of a self which needs to 
be guarded and defended from onslaught. But, in 
enhancing the actualization of other, persons 
simultaneously widen and deepen themselves. 
Ecof eminist contributions to expanding the construct 
of self is best understood in the context of gender 
oppression. Their androcentric analysis shows that since 
women have been traditionally identified with devalued 
aspects of the natural world, expanding the concept of 
self must first be sensitive to an appreciation that men 
and women experience themselves and the natural world in 
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dissimilar ways. 
For ecofeminists, conventional notions of self do 
not imply a gender-neutral, rather universally 
understood, alienated ego seeking to regain deep 
identification with nature. This is typically a male 
perception and does not necessarily represent that of 
women. For ecofeminists the traditional, western idea of 
the male self has been viewed in opposition to nature. 
Self expansion toward ecological self represents a move 
to connect with nature for perhaps the first time in male 
psychosocial development. In contrast, the feminine self 
has always been more experientially connected to nature. 
Yet women have experienced the same alienation from 
nature as men, not because of any inherent gulf, but 
because they have accepted the patriarchal schema that 
identified women and nature in cynical terms. 
For ecofeminists self-expansion cannot be based on 
the masculine model of overcoming opposition. Rather, 
the task for women is to remember and reclaim the past 
and the connections they as women had with the earth. 
The ecof eminist sense of ecological self implies a 
recognition that self is most fully realized not by a 
drive to fuse an alienated self with nature but rather by 
reinstituting the felt sense of connection women shared 
with the natural world. Ecological self is understood as 
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self realized in the context of communal membership in a 
wider family of life. These kinship ties between self 
and both human and natural other motivates action toward 
other out of a sense of maternal care and consideration. 
While the debate between deep ecology and 
ecofeminism on expanding definitions of self has been 
considerable there are complementary elements in both 
positions from which social work may draw. Whether 
social work understands the newly emerging idea of 
ecological self in anthropocentric or androcentric terms, 
does not necessarily detract from the fact that, 
fundamentally, both deep ecology and ecofeminism seek to 
deepen conscious awareness of and reanimate connection 
between self and the natural world. 
In summary, there are a number of important elements 
which can be derived from the previous discussion. 
First, attempting to demarcate self apart from nature is 
an arbitrary external distinction. Two, self and nature 
constitute a network of internal relationship. Three, 
this internal relationship of self and nature is such 
that they together constitute the fundamental norm of 
reality--the ecological self. Four, the ecological self 
is an ontologically essential component of human 
development and personal identity. Five, by attempting 
to ignore or alter conceptualizations of self with nature 
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humans alter the very essence of self since it does not 
fully exist apart from this relationship. 
Expanding the view of environment 
Previous discussions has suggested that social 
work's notion of environment is unnecessarily constricted 
in several ways. First, social work tends to define its 
nexus of activity in terms of the immediate personal and 
social environment of the individual. This notion of 
environment tends to obscure broader elements of the 
environment. Secondly, though not totally ignoring the 
concept of natural environment in its understanding of 
human purpose and function, social work tends to accept 
the modernist conceptualization of the natural realm. 
This conceptualization views nature as other, something 
quite separate from human beings. 
Ecof eminism and deep ecology offer a radically 
different view of the environmental construct. They 
suggest the necessity of discussing questions of human 
meaning not in the context of relationship between 
persons and the environment but in the context of 
relationship between persons and nature. For them human 
crisis and environmental crisis are problems of the 
androcentric (ecofeminists) or the anthropocentric (deep 
ecologists) ethos of nature. Both understand that the 
way persons conceive of nature and portray it through 
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language have serious implications for the natural and 
human world. 
For ecofeminists, patriarchal conceptual frameworks 
confer similar characteristics on women and nature, and 
then systematically devalue both. Each are seen as 
irrational, uncertain and difficult to control. This 
often unacknowledged negative association between women 
and nature in environmental and social discourse 
perpetuates constricted and largely oppressive views of 
both constructs. 
Deep ecologists believe that the anthropocentric or 
human-centered norm of reality, which has been thoroughly 
shaped and maintained by the modernist worldview, is 
generally responsible for the exploitive and dominating 
view of nature. Modernity makes the claim that nature is 
mechanistic, wholly void of purpose and meaning and that 
humans are in large measure separate from nature. Such 
claims, according to deep ecologists, have led to a view 
of nature understood as object and resource, separated 
from human purpose. 
Together, deep ecology and ecofeminism argue that 
human and nonhuman survival necessitates a renewed 
appreciation of human relationship to nature. This means 
a substantial reorientation of human consciousness from 
being in environment to being with nature. Since 
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language plays a significant role in constructing 
experiences and actions, it is important to grasp that 
use of the abstract, and narrowly defined terms in 
environment in social work's theoretical discourse in 
many ways perpetuates the devalued and objectivist views 
of nature. The way social work conceives of environment 
has serious implications for how the profession 
understands relationships between persons, the natural 
realm, and how the profession goes about its activities. 
In summary, there are a number of important elements 
which can be derived from the previous discussion. One, 
by defining nature as essentially hostile or by 
separating it into benign other, humanity simultaneously 
defines itself in a way which severely constricts its 
ability to create individual and collective meaning. 
Two, there is no natural enmity and separation between 
humans and nature. Nature is one with and beneficial for 
humanity. Three, in large measure social, political, 
economic and environmental problems are associated with 
humanity's philosophical understanding of its 
relationship with nature and the practices that stem from 
it. Four, by constructing a new language of environment, 
one that fully incorporates the powerful dynamic of 
human/nature relationship, all aspects of society 
(including social work) enhance their ability to 
. 337 
understand and thus act upon a broader range of human 
issues. Five, adopting an alternative metaphor of 
human/nature relationship, for example that of a 
nurturing mother who kindly provides for the needs of her 
children, suggests something uniquely different and 
transformative in the ways humans sense their place with 
the larger natural environment. It dramatically 
reconstructs inimical nature toward a nature which 
provides life giving and life sustaining sustenance. 
Expanding the view of relationship 
Social work's conventional notion of person-in-
environment is insufficient to capture the deeper sense 
of interrelationship between person and nature. Most 
definitions of the concept, even by the most notable of 
social work's ecological theorists (Germain, 1979; 
Germain & Gitterman, 1980), are not untypical of that 
found in an influential Human Behavior and the Social 
Environment (HBSE) textbook written by Zastrow and Kirst-
Ashman (1987) . Here person-in-environment is defined as 
a conceptual perspective where: 
... a person is thought of as being involved in 
constant interaction with various systems in the 
environment. These systems include the family, 
friends, work, social service, politics, religious, 
goods and services and educational systems .... Social 
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work practice, then, is directed at improving the 
interactions between the person and the various 
systems in the environment. (p. 8) 
This view of interaction, suggested by the use of 
in, creates a state of consciousness that identifies a 
person as already existing on a plane of profound 
division between her/himself and a narrowly defined 
environment. Person-in-environment becomes a kind of 
euphemism for person-apart from-environment. Identity 
with nature is excluded or becomes a mere abstraction. 
This leads to ideas and actions that cannot be harmonized 
with either the well being of person or nature. 
By contrast, the person-with-environment construct 
suggests that social work's conventional ideas of 
interaction are based on incomplete theoretical models. 
Modern, western ideas of relatedness imply a linear, 
causal connectedness. That is, things are interrelated 
in the sense that the energy/force necessary to affect a 
change in one element is directly proportional to the 
energy/force necessary to affect a linear and predictable 
change in the other. An example of this would be 
touching one side of a child's mobile which affects a 
change in the other component parts directly proportional 
to the energy applied initially. 
For deep ecologists and ecofeminists, relationships 
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between person and nature require viewing reality though 
a new set of conceptual lenses. Their view of 
interconnectedness goes beyond simple, linear models and 
implies far more than a trivial acknowledgement of some 
ethereal oneness of nature and humanity. It stresses a 
commitment to ideas and practices that are greater than 
the individual's own pleasure, material gain, ego 
enhancement and sense of separateness from other. 
Interrelationship understood in this way necessarily 
calls into question the way in which human development 
has been traditionally understood and the criteria by 
which its ongoing advancement is assessed. 
There are several integral components to a new view 
of interrelationship inherent in a person-with-
environment perspective. First, this view rejects the 
conventional notion of relationship purely in terms of 
spatiotemporal location and linear causality. Humans 
exist in complex human/nature relationship patterns that 
involve a continuous flow of interaction, biologically, 
psychologically, and sociologically, which humans can 
understand and for which they are responsible. Second, 
persons can no longer be understood as just living in 
environment. Living in environment gives way to living 
with environment--with nature. Third, interrelationship 
is defined more from an internal, intuitive perspective 
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rather than from the perspective of loose associations 
between external phenomena. Fourth, self and nature are 
not two separate entities joined by external relation. 
They are part of a relational field, a complex web; 
neither of which can be isolated from their milieu. 
Finally, once humans understand, but more importantly 
experience, this new meaning of interrelationship they 
begin to sense, deeply, intuitively that what is good for 
one part of the relational field, the communal web, will 
be good for the another. Conversely, humans may not 
sacrifice any part without affecting every other. 
Implications for a New Ecological Social Work 
The contribution of person-with-environment is its 
focus on a new language of person, nature and 
interrelationship. This is a language providing 
alternative understandings of these constructs which 
diverge significantly from the profession's conventional 
conceptualizations. The continuing task is to suggest in 
what.ways person-with-environment potentially alters, in 
some respects significantly, social work thought and 
activity. The question becomes what would social work 
operating out of a person-with-environment perspective be 
like? That is, how would it be different in thought and 
action from the way the profession currently configures 
itself? 
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The current section will develop implications of 
person-with-environment for social work thought and 
activity. It is the last of seven major themes 
identified in the previous chapter (see p. 187). It will 
concentrate in the areas of ontology/epistemology, 
practice, social consciousness, ethics and values, 
research and education. The following implications are 
offered as general statements of initial ideas. The 
advantage of general statements is that they allow the 
opportunity for people unacquainted with new concepts to 
feel more comfortable with unfamiliar ideas. They ask 
persons to explore and shape these ideas and to seek 
their relevance in their own way. 
In addition, the implications that follow confirm 
and build upon the work of current and earlier social 
work theorists who have developed alternative views on 
the content domains mentioned above. For instance, Weick 
(1987) and Canda (1986, 1991) have previously explored 
important ontological and epistemological concerns of 
social work, particularly those emerging in the fields of 
philosophy and spirituality. McNutt (1994) and McNutt 
and Hoff (1994) address the issue of social justice from 
the vista of new environmental thought while Cataldo 
(1979) formerly explored utilizing wilderness in social 
work practice settings. Weick (1991), Saleebey (1990, 
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1992), and Rogge (1994a) have also generated implications 
of differing social work perspectives on research and 
education. Roberts (1990) and Tester (1994) have 
confronted values and ethical interests of social work 
form alternative, theoretical viewpoints. 
This section will include concrete examples, where 
appropriate, to enhance clarity. There is no claim that 
these are the only possible implications or that they are 
necessarily the most important for social work. They 
are, however, the ones which seem most apparent and 
pertinent. 
A spiritual ontology and epistemology 
A new ecological, person-with-environment social 
work would be an extended profession. The emphasis would 
shift from a limited person-in-social environment 
centered dynamic to one of expanding interrelationship. 
This means in a broad sense an acknowledgement that 
humans are in fact involved in a deep, experiential 
connection with the earth that extends beyond the bounds 
of mere instrumental association. The implication: how 
social work understands the essence of being and what it 
values as appropriate for its knowledge base must be 
conceptually reoriented to recognize the existence of a 
powerful intuitive, spiritual element that binds humans 
to the natural realm. 
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Recognizing the spiritual connection between humans 
and nature means more than adding another dimension to 
the way social work understands human identity. It 
challenges the very core of assumptions and distinctions 
that have principally shaped the social work agenda. 
For the most part the modernist, western worldview 
rejects the language and experience of spirituality. It 
is especially suspicious of attempts to articulate a 
spiritual connection between a reanimated nature and 
resacralized humanity. Social work is in large measure a 
professional reflection of the modern mindset. It has 
become predominantly a profession of mechanisms, secular 
rationality, and linear relationships. 
Social work has, in line with most aspects of modern 
society, gradually grown suspicious of knowledge and 
experiences which cannot be quantified or rationally 
derived. It has endeavored to free itself from the so-
called imprecision of philosophy, and the irrationality 
of spirituality, in order to secure for itself the status 
of scientific profession. The result is a profession 
that tends to distrust the language of mystical 
connection, reverence and intuition. Direct knowing, 
intuitive grasp, and subjective experience of the other, 
especially nature, has been replaced with a reverence for 
numbers and mechanistic metaphors. 
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Social work has often kept from itself and from its 
clients the explicit reasons for the modern sense of 
alienated existence. A person-with-environment 
perspective demands that social work must no longer 
ignore that it has, sometimes unwittingly but often 
deliberately, cooperated in creating a disenchanted world 
and desacralized humanity characterized by a kind of 
synthetic, spiritually muted, alienated feeling and 
lifestyle. Person-with-environment clearly identifies 
the modern proclivity to sever the spiritual bonds 
between humans and nature as the quintessence, the 
epicenter of an alienated humanity. 
Alienated, desacralized humanity has led to a broad 
range of ecological problems, but is also extended to 
individual and social problems including emotional, 
familial, economic, and class issues. A person-with-
environment perspective suggests that the profession can 
no longer look at these in isolation or separate them 
from the domain of human/nature relationship. Many of 
these issues are where the profession finds itself 
intimately involved. It has an obligation to open itself 
and those it serves to a realm of deeper connection; 
grounded in nature and experienced spiritually. 
A practice of reconnection 
A new ecological social work implies that the 
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profession abandon iis reliance on modernist metaphors 
and acknowledge the spiritual interconnection between 
persons and nature. By extension this implies that 
social work must develop practice methods that alter 
traditional conceptualizations of human identity by 
encouraging greater identification with nature. It is a 
very literal revisioning of a previously held social work 
commitment to the idea of outdoor relief (personal 
communication with Consultant 1, November 12, 1996). 
Deep ecologists, ecofeminists and particularly 
ecopsychologists have been in the vanguard of creating 
methods for helping people reconnect with nature from 
which social work can draw. For instance ecopsychologist 
Steven Harper (1995) suggests utilizing the experiential, 
imaginative and consciousness altering properties of 
wilderness as a way to help people realize a deeper sense 
of interconnectedness. As Harper suggests, the 
experience of wilderness undercuts the dualistic 
categories of civilized versus primitive and challenges 
prabtice wisdom that restricts helping to a fifty-minute 
hour within the confines of agency or office. 
Wilderness practice is a powerful encounter that 
seeks to restore overall physical, emotional and social 
health and wholeness rather than seeking to cure specific 
psychological ills. It embraces experience with 
346 
wilderness as having a unique potential for providing 
transformative engagement impacting a wide array of 
personal and social issues. Its focus is not on 
analysis, interpretation or advice but rather that a 
whole, reconnected self reemerges as one experiences the 
instinctual basis of identity found in wilderness. 
For example, wilderness practice shifts attending 
skills toward a more complete sensory awareness of the 
rhythmic/cyclical character of life. It alters 
perceptions of time and space by seeing both as cycles to 
be experienced rather than to be linearly measured by 
clocks or calculations of acreage. Wilderness breaks 
down familiar patterns of individual, cultural and gender 
separateness by viewing diversity as a fundamentally 
important and absolutely necessary part of system health. 
From the perspective of gender, for example, wilderness 
evokes the often unacknowledged feminine/masculine 
dynamic of women and men. It challenges gender-bound 
role identity by observing that in nature there is often 
an obscuring of these humanly derived boundaries. 
Additionally, wilderness practice challenges the 
romanticized and stylized idea of being in nature. It 
contests the image of wilderness conveyed in recent 
marketing campaigns for a popular beer portraying 
mountain vistas as the diminutive backdrop for colossal, 
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athletically endowed and scantily clad young men and 
women frolicking over and around peak and precipice in a 
playful pursuit of football, frisbee or bowling ball. 
Rather, wilderness practice recognizes that feeling at 
home with nature is a recognition of its wholeness, of 
both life and death, darkness and light, sunshine and 
rain. In Harper's (1995) words wilderness practice: 
breaks down the emphasis on the Disneyland 
sense of "beauty". The look of the land often 
determines that response. Many tourists, for 
example, confronted by a scene that is "pretty as a 
picture", react to natural beauty by rushing for 
their cameras. But sight is only one of our senses. 
I try to encourage letting the wilderness in through 
all the senses: touch, hearing, smell and taste. 
Above all, I try to make the experience whole and 
honest. It must include what happens and what you 
feel when night falls, when the weather turns hot or 
cold or rainy, when the bugs come out, or when the 
cute little rabbit you have been watching screams a 
death-call as it is whisked away in the talons of an 
eagle. (p. 187) 
Wilderness practice is a clear example of how a new 
ecological social work could promote human well-being by 
seeking ways to heal the split between humans and nature. 
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It alters conventional forms and strategies of social 
work helping. It is a recognition that humans and nature 
share a core state of being which transcends cultural and 
individual boundaries. In one sense humans do not need 
to have more nature, but must fully recognize that they 
are nature. Humans don't come into this world they come 
out of it and must begin again to live with it. 
One population group, of particular interest to 
social workers, who stand to benefit from wildness 
practice are children living in large urban centers. 
There is ample evidence suggesting that interventive 
methods based on the healing effects of nature have 
important social and psychological effects (Marx, 1988; 
Nebbe, 1991; Lovell & Johnson, 1994). Wilderness 
practice does not necessarily require busing large groups 
of children to the High Sierras. It can be as simple as 
bringing the natural environment to children through the 
introduction of household pets, or horticultural 
interests in the environments where the children live. 
Caring for and playful interaction with small animals, 
tending flowers or gardens, or experiencing urban green 
spaces can facilitate empathetic capacities, develop 
responsibility, inner confidence and relaxation skills. 
Additionally, even the largest urban environment 
has, within driving distance, surrounding rural settings 
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which could be visited and experienced. For instance, 
introducing a group of inner city children to the 
lifestyle experienced on a small farm can be an exciting, 
moving and lasting experience: petting the soft, velvety 
nose of a dairy cow, watching a mother sow gently nursing 
her piglets, burying small hands into the warm, woolly 
sheep's coat, seeing the close bond between a mother 
horse and the wobbly new colt. These simple, yet 
meaningful encounters can have profound impact on anyone, 
young or old. Yet children, by virtue of their 
innocence, are curious and open learners. Their first 
experience with a grove of trees, a prairie preserve or a 
small farm setting can foster an enduring sense of 
connection with the earth and its nonhuman creatures. 
A commitment to social justice 
Deepening conscious awareness of and reanimating 
spiritual connection with nature and developing practice 
methods to accomplish this are important implications for 
a social work operating out of a person-with-environment 
perspective. But, for social work to be a truly 
ecological profession it must also address those powerful 
systemic realities which maintain human alienation. 
Person-with-environment recognizes that just as humanity 
and nature need to be interrelatedly understood, so too 
must modern social, political and economic realities. 
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That is, issues of environmental degradation and concerns 
for a reanimated human/nature consciousness cannot be 
separated from those systemic forces which function to 
maintain all forms of injustice, whether toward nature or 
other human beings (personal communication with 
Consultant 2, February 3, 1997). 
There is a strong social justice logic inherent in 
the person-with-environment perspective. Its premise of 
interrelationship suggests that struggles against 
oppressive, systemic forces which denigrate nature are 
intertwined with struggles against all forces which also 
oppress humans. The oppression which keeps realization 
of a dynamic, harmonious human/nature relationship out of 
consciousness is connected to other forms of human 
oppression including economic exploitation, racism, 
sexism and patriarchy. Oppressive social institutions 
are an expression of an alienated collective psyche but 
also structure and maintain an alienated collective 
psyche. Though human oppression and oppression of nature 
appear to exist in separate form, struggle against any 
one in isolation cannot be effective. Concern for any 
oppression necessitates concern for all oppression. 
The justice logic of person-with-environment 
portends nothing short of radical change in the social, 
political, and economic structures of modern, industrial 
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society. Adopting this new ecological framework changes 
the identity of conventional social work. It suggests 
that the profession must return to and significantly 
expand upon its progressive, activist roots. 
Person-with-environment establishes the foundation 
of a new socio-political mandate. It suggests the 
profession has an obligation to examine all oppressive 
political, social and economic structures of modern 
society and the policies which extend them. It requires 
that social workers become professionally involved and 
personally committed both within and outside the confines 
of office, agency and academy to implementing change. 
Though there are many exemplars of how a newly 
activist social work can collaborate in fundamental 
change, there are at least two areas where systemic 
change is essential if social work is to challenge the 
oppression of both humanity and nature. The first of 
these is economics. 
Western economic ideology tends to appreciate only 
those ~ntities and practices which have market value; 
material things and the flow of goods and services to 
satisfy consumptive need. Industrial economies, whether 
capitalistic or socialistic, tend to create need for 
products even if needs for such things do not 
legitimately exist or they turn natural things and 
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experiences into commodities. Needs and wants become 
relatively indistinguishable. This practice tends to 
foster the illusion that consumption and human happiness 
are essentially equivalent. 
This illusion of consumer happiness creates 
inequality as an ever increasing number of people 
scramble to get their piece of the relatively scarce, 
good life (happy=materialistic) pie. In an effort to 
keep pace with an ever growing, consumptive penchant 
natural resources are systematically destroyed. Fewer 
people are able to realistically share in this good life 
vision. More and more are marginalized as they are 
recruited to fuel the productive fires which feed the 
material appetites of an ever smaller elite few. 
There are several ways social workers may think 
about altering this malevolent cycle. In the short term 
advocating a commitment to the value of material 
equality, in their own and their client's personal and 
social life, would be important. Until individuals and 
societies can agree to a new collective vision of the 
good life, the idea of material equality offers a limited 
corrective to the individual and social demand for 
economic expansion. If material equality becomes 
recognized as a social priority, then the incessant 
process of trying to achieve higher and higher privilege 
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though material possession and consumption would be 
diminished. In a society where having more devices, or 
at least having more than others, is regarded as 
impertinent and tawdry, rather than an identifier of 
merit and status, demands for economic growth and its 
resulting inequality and depletion of natural resources 
would be slowed, though not eliminated. 
Ultimately, however, economic principles of the kind 
envisioned by a person-with-environment perspective must 
extend beyond a equitable redistribution of material 
wealth. This redistributive focus of justice does not 
change the underlying reliance on resource expropriation 
to satisfy human need/want. What becomes necessary is an 
alternative vision of the good life. That is, a new 
insight ~nto what constitutes a joyous and satisfying, 
rather than satiated, life. It is a vision which must be 
compatible with a natural environment that can support 
the continuation of human life and well being. 
This alternative vision must reflect a long-term 
commitment to identifying sources of human satisfaction 
that can intergenerationally flourish in harmony with 
nature. The focus of human satisfaction changes from 
quantity of life's possessions to quality of life. This 
will not be an easy undertaking because Western society 
has lost or has yet to develop the language and capacity 
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to assess satisfaction apart from material 
consumptionism. 
Social work can contribute to a new view of human 
satisfaction by helping people appraise ways of being 
that are rewarding, not damaging to nature, and not based 
on consumptive materialism. Things to be considered 
would include simple conversations, spiritual rituals, 
neighborhood/community gatherings, family outings, 
artistic pursuits, music, dance, literature, experiencing 
nature. All are ways of life and being which can endure 
through countless generations. This is a kind of simple 
life vision adorned with nonmaterial sources of 
fulfillment. It includes the kinds of activities and 
associations which most people would admit are the main 
determinants of happiness. 
For example, one might visualize an inner city 
neighborhood that has been depleted, polluted and 
virtually destroyed in the wake of modern 
economic/consumptive policies and practices. The 
question would then be how might a new vision operate in 
this setting? An initial step would be for social 
workers to again take on the role of becoming 
community/neighborhood organizers in an effort to 
confront current economic and/or environmental issues. 
This would mean developing mechanisms that promote 
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participation by every member of the neighborhood and 
acting as advocates who apply pressure and call attention 
to the need for both local and national intervention. It 
also would mean social workers would function as 
facilitators of skill development in order to allow 
residents to act on behalf of themselves and their 
neighborhood. 
Eventually, however, social workers would need to 
recognize that the crisis of this neighborhood is a 
crisis of vision. Social workers would need to take an 
active lead in helping residents construct a new 
conceptual vision of a revitalized and satisfying 
neighborhood. This is a vision of neighborhood that, 
though not complete or perfect in any utopian sense, 
fosters local strength and interdependence, and that is 
not continually subject to the debilitating economic 
cycles and social inequities associated with the modern, 
consumer oriented culture. There are many models of 
economically viable, personally satisfying and socially 
flourishing alternative community/neighborhoods, both 
traditional (i.e. the Amish and Bruderhof communities) 
and contemporary (i.e. the St. Martin's community of 
Minneapolis and Urban Habitat program of San Francisco) , 
that social work may effectively draw from (Sine, 1991; 
Anthony, 1995). 
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A second way social work can collaborate in systemic 
change is in the realm of technology. Modern 
technocratic culture is often a reflection of how people 
perceive the character of their existence--their 
relationship to themselves, to others and to their place 
in the world. The consciousness of modernism is 
predominantly mechanistici prizing rationality, 
specialization, utility, efficiency and detachment. The 
kinds of technology that result reflect these factors and 
functions to maintain individual and collective 
oppression by disengaging humans from one another and 
from the natural realm. Technological culture 
enfranchises a social order inherently conservative and 
centralized while consolidating existing power structures 
that are harmful to both communities and nature. 
Modern culture, individually and professionally, is 
enamored with technical solutions to problems. The 
message is seductively simple. With the application of 
enough money and intelligence over enough time technical 
solutions emerge. The appeal of the "technological fix" 
(Saleebey, 1991) is on one level its promise to cure a 
whole range of human problems without requiring society 
or its institutional structures to consider the habits or 
ideas that may have caused the problems in the first 
place. As social work critical theorist Frank Tester 
357 
(1994) has observed, the essential ideology and practice 
of "Western-style liberal democracy has become a matter 
of technique" (p. 92) . 
The advantages of technology and the reign of 
technique in the professions are in most cases illusory. 
Each carry a price tag and penalties for use and 
maintenance that are at least equal to the problems they 
tend to ameliorate. For example, the toxic by-products 
of technological advancement pose increasing threats to 
the physical, mental and social health of many 
populations in this country and around the world. Many, 
including some social workers, are beginning to recognize 
that one of the most harmful crises facing many people 
are the efforts to dispose of the toxic by-products of 
technology in poor and exploited communities of color. 
These communities have traditionally had little voice in 
protecting their local place against the marginalizing 
influences and disposal practices of the larger culture 
(Rogge , 19 9 4 ) . 
A new activist conscious social work can collaborate 
in fundamental systemic change in several ways. First, 
by making a commitment to challenge contemporary 
technological ideology and secondly, by pledging itself 
to a principle of appropriate technology. 
Challenging conventional technological culture 
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suggests there must be an appreciation that technologies 
are never separate from the prevailing political and 
economic culture. The conventional belief that a 
technology is neutral and therefore dependent only on how 
people employ it must be understood as a fiction. 
Rather, social work must recognize that all technologies 
are structured to reflect and serve specific, powerful 
interests. The reality is that often only a small, 
affluent group enjoy the benefits of technologies while 
larger, less affluent groups are exposed to its risks and 
relatively high human and environmental cost. 
Challenging conventional technological culture also 
suggests that social work must be attentive to the often 
unacknowledged, personal view of modern technological 
devices as fundamental requisites to human self-
fulfillment. A person's insistence on the 
indispensability of some personal technology (i.e. 
computers, high-definition television) often denies the 
wider individual, social and environmental consequences 
of that technology's use. 
As suggested social work must also pledge itself to 
a principle of appropriate technology. This is not to 
suggest that social work is to become a anti-
technological profession. But, is rather a belief that 
social work must stand in opposition to those kinds of 
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technologies that degrade people and diminish their 
freedom and control. Technologies that are destructive 
to individuals, communities and the environment or which 
promote material acquisition as the central aspiration of 
life must be opposed. Any new technology must be 
evaluated on the basis of how it affects environmental 
health, and how it impacts human dignity, social 
institutions, traditions, and values. 
For example, social work has become enamored, along 
with other professions and most in contemporary western 
society, with the potential of the new computer driven, 
information age to enhance and simplify its professional 
activities. The allure of the information super highway 
and personal computers are powerful. This new technology 
clearly has the potential of making valuable 
contributions to human communication, professional 
development and the distribution of knowledge. However, 
what seems to be lost in the promise of a new cyber-world 
is the fact that this technology also carries with it 
many potential risks. 
The production of computer circuits and cabinetry 
require toxic acids and solvents that present a variety 
of disposal problems for manufacturers. Computer 
automation provides a limited number of high-paid, high-
skilled jobs, but for many workers it leads to 
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unemployment or a proliferation of low-skilled jobs. 
Additionally, problems of cost and access to computers 
and information technology also tend to widen the gap 
between the information rich and the information poor 
thus restricting opportunities for developing personal, 
social and political power. Social work will need to 
seriously consider the impact of this technology upon its 
professional ideas and activities as well as the impact 
on the clients it serves. 
An ecocentric ethical and value standard 
A social work informed by a person-with-environment 
perspective must consider a new standard for assessing 
ethical conduct and establishing value priorities. This 
standard must be ecologically informed. Traditional 
social work ethics are grounded in intra-human 
relationships; person to person, professional to client, 
professional to professional. They, however, tend to 
ignore that humans are tied to and have relational 
obligations to all other beings in the natural world. 
Social work ethics are construed as an arena of 
human enterprise where only humans have inherent value. 
A casual reading of social work's Code of Ethics 
illustrates this point. The categories of conduct 
included in the profession's ethical statement include 
such things as social worker's responsibility to client, 
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to colleagues, to employers and employing organizations, 
to the profession and to society. But, there is no 
statement in the code concerning the profession's 
responsibility to matters beyond the human-to-human 
world. Responsibilities to non-human entities and beings 
in the natural world are ignored. 
An ecocentric ethic of the kind envisioned here for 
social work is a radically different orientation. It is 
not simply a reordering of professional commitments and 
tasks applied to an ecological context. An ecocentric 
ethic stresses that humans are social beings and they 
have ethical responsibilities to other human beings. 
More essentially, however, humans are ecological beings 
whose ethical responsibilities extend to all non-human 
beings. 
For example, the current ecological crisis is on one 
level clearly a problem of social ethics. There are 
disastrous potentials in the ways pollution, 
overpopulation, and excessive consumption impact human 
interact~on. But, the ecological crisis is also a moral 
issue of a different order. The broader context of the 
ecological crisis is also biological, biospherical and 
atmospherical. Its potential negative impact extends to 
all beings, to all spheres of the ecological order. It is 
not simply an anthropological issue. 
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While a social work ecocentric ethic cannot be 
separated from the profession's traditional ethical focus 
on social interactions, neither should it be subsumed 
under this as simply a subdivision or an additional focus 
of attention. Social work ethics must now think in terms 
of interrelationships among social, professional and 
ecological responsibility. In all its activities it must 
consider moral responsibility to all existence. For 
instance, a ecocentric ethic understands that social and 
ecological problems can no longer be just problems 
requiring refined technical solutions. They are moral 
issues that have to do with all beings, both human and 
nonhuman. They pose a severe threat to human welfare, 
but they are also a form of oppression destroying the 
space, sustenance and diversity of all other non-human 
life forms. 
An ecocentrically informed social work also has an 
impact on the profession's value system. Social work has 
traditionally advocated for core values that are 
personally and socially relevant. For example human 
dignity, self-determination, and client autonomy are 
basic value orientations of the social work profession. 
An ecocentrically informed social work must advocate for 
a broader range of values that are not only personally 
and socially relevant but which are ecologically relevant 
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and compatible. 
One example of a core value important for social 
work's consideration is the concept of sustainability. 
Given the current state of ecological crisis a social 
work ethic is not adequate until it supports the idea of 
sustainability. Though perhaps not an all-encompassing 
norm, sustainability does suggest a number of 
complementary values and activities that extend it. One 
of these is, what might be called, biospherical 
responsibility. 
Bio-responsibility means valuing the diversity and 
otherness of nature for its own sake. It suggests non-
human entities are ends in themselves rather than 
instruments for human need or wealth. It involves a 
commitment to sustaining ecosystems and other species in 
healthy habitats. Bio-responsibility means that all 
species human and nonhuman alike are entitled to an 
equality of existence that ensures their inherent well 
being and ability to thrive. It recognizes that there is 
no genuine human existence, in fact no human existence at 
all, without a moral imperative to protect and sustain 
the diversity of the biospherical order of which all 
human life depends. 
Another extension of the idea of sustainability has 
been suggested by social work theorist John McNutt 
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(1994) . He has elaborated on several principles that 
would be the hallmark of what he calls a sustainable 
social welfare system. One feature of this system is its 
emphasis on local community, decentralization, and 
grassroots organization. The suggestion is that in order 
for the world to survive, in order for it to sustain 
itself into the future, human culture must be 
conceptualized and lived out at a different level. 
This emphasis on localized, decentralized, 
participatory community life brings it into conflict with 
the prevailing trend to conceive of human and 
environmental issues on a global scale. A sustainable 
social welfare system does not ignore global thinking but 
it does advocate for a philosophy suggesting that 
effective action always begins locally. It understands, 
as many social critics have observed, that the most 
effective and ultimately most oppressive global thinkers 
have traditionally been imperialistic governments and 
multi-national corporations. 
Ref erring to human-to-human and human-to-nature 
problems as global problems defines them in ways that 
makes their solution highly improbable. This is so 
partly because global problems have a shadowy aura 
surrounding them. They don 1 t seem real. They are 
reduced to a kind of shallow statistical description. 
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This opens the door to solutions fashioned by the same 
organizational patterns and institutional thought which 
have created many of the problems initially. 
Social workers have a role in a sustainable social 
welfare system as activists and facilitators. One 
facilitative role might be assisting people in defining 
solutions which are modest and which begin communally. 
People must think, feel, and act locally in order to 
bring issues within the scale of human competence. By 
considering such concerns as how will this effect 
community, neighborhood, one's local place, answers will 
be generated which have global significance. Effective 
action begins as people develop the affection, the 
knowledge, the skills that make good local sense. 
An alternative research process 
Social work, operating out of a person-with-
environment frame, must attend to new ways of knowing and 
experiencing the world. It must challenge the 
assumptions of the modern, scientific project and its 
heavy re~iance on quantitative method. Conventional 
modes of scientific inquiry and research stratagems have 
developed within the context of modernism. This has 
resulted in a social science, and by extension a social 
work, which neglects or distorts the study of 
human/nature relationships. Modern science's insistence 
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upon control, predictability and distance of the knower 
and known continues an epistemological oppression which 
subordinates the interests of nature and other 
marginalized groups. 
The contours of new strategies of inquiry for 
social work are not yet fully developed. Some within the 
profession (Weick, 1991; Sherman, 1991; Hudson & Nurius, 
1994) and in allied disciplines (Gergen, 1988; Riger, 
1992; Mack, 1992) have been actively involved in 
formulating guidelines for an alternative research 
perspective which are consistent with a new ecological 
view of person-with-environment. In general these 
suggest a number of priorities. First, social work must 
replace the implicit hierarchial tradition in the 
profession that values empirical evidence and methods 
over more intuitive knowledge. This has led to a 
distinction between quantitative method as being more 
scientific or objective than qualitative method. 
Secondly, social work research must recognize the 
interrelationship between subject and researcher. This 
suggests that the subject of study as well as the 
researcher reside within a relational field (to use a 
concept from deep ecology.) Attempts to study discreet 
aspects of phenomena independent of the whole context 
provides an incomplete picture of the phenomena. There 
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is a part/whole interrelationship existing within the 
natural and social world requiring that research methods 
recognize this relationship and develop rules of inquiry 
that systematically take this into account. 
Finally, social work research must cooperate in 
developing and utilizing research methodologies that 
explore the multi-dimensional aspects of human's 
relationship to the earth. A new priority must become 
understanding how alienated humanity and degraded nature 
interact and impact all aspects of human well being. 
Linguistically, this might mean helping to configure a 
new language of non-linearity. This new language would 
supplant terms such as orderly, predictable, and 
completely knowable with such terms as openness, 
interrelatedness, co-determined, and multiplicity. A new 
language of non-linearity is indispensable in 
understanding complex individual, social and natural 
problems from a holistic, more egalitarian perspective. 
Exploring the multi-dimensional aspects of human's 
relationship to the earth might also mean that social 
work will need to become more actively involved in 
creative research to assess the impact of environmental 
destruction and disaster on various populations. For 
example social worker Susan Dawson (1994) has recently 
utilized an innovative case study/empowerment methodology 
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investigating the impact of long-term exposure to uranium 
on Navajo mine-workers. She recognized that merely 
documenting, through statistical data, the toxic, long-
term health consequences of uranium exposure was not 
enough to understand this situation. In order to gain a 
more complete grasp of these worker's situation, Dawson 
incorporated an analysis of governmental and industry 
assumptions and policies which openly encouraged 
employees to work in dangerous uranium mines while 
knowing well in advance that miners could incur serious 
illness and death. She also collaboratively studied and 
suggested ways indigenous workers could promote social 
change and alter their environment rather than teaching 
people how to accommodate to their illnesses. 
A framework for education 
According to Berry (1988) traditional educational 
philosophy at all levels in western society is a 
reflection of the larger socio-political culture. It is: 
... more an external conditioning than interior 
di~cipline, more a training in manipulative 
techniques than initiation into religious rituals. 
The skills to be mastered were not the contemplative 
skills or imaginative capacities for dealing with 
numinous presence or with the aesthetic insight into 
the inner structure of reality; they are rather 
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skills needed by industry to bring forth the natural 
resources from the hidden depths of the planet, the 
skills to shape them in the manufacturing 
establishments and to make them available to a 
consumer-oriented society. (p. 94) 
From Berry's perspective modern western· culture is 
an all encompassing ideology. For one to live, to 
prosper, to find genuine fulfillment, one must first 
learn and then live within the confines of this system. 
Education is particularly involved in the support of this 
system. Its primary concern becomes developing and 
refining technological definitions and controls over all 
human and natural function. This typically diminishes 
spiritual values, philosophical insight, and perspectives 
on the character of life which do not fit easily within a 
technoscientific framework. 
Professional and graduate education in modern 
culture has become primarily concerned with producing 
specialized experts who become society's sanctioned 
bearers of authoritative knowledge and skill. Social 
work has not escaped this trend toward specialization. 
Unfortunately, specialization tends to fragment 
professions and knowledge into narrowly defined 
compartments. Disciplines lose sight of the effects of 
their work on allied professions as well as losing sight 
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of how knowledge development impacts and is impacted by 
others. Professional training of knowledgeable 
specialists values the gathering of information for 
immediate use, while ignoring the potential long-term 
effects of such information on both the human and non-
human environment. The dynamic of specialization is also 
fragmentary and alienating. It becomes an issue of 
control and predictability within a isolated, linear 
framework. 
The logic of person-with~environment challenges 
modern notions of educational philosophy and practice and 
offers a number of potential implications for social 
work. First, person-with-environment suggests that 
social work's educational philosophy must be 
reconfigured. It must change from being grounded in a 
human-centered, linear, techno-specialized dynamic toward 
being grounded in the natural/systemic reality of earth. 
This suggests a role for a new generation of skilled, 
ecologically informed, generalist social work educators 
whose task becomes preparing ecologically reflective 
theorists, researchers and practitioners. 
A recent work by Mitchell Thomashow (1995) offers 
some important insight concerning the reorientation of 
the modern, educational project. He describes six 
foundations of a new ecological, earth/oriented 
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education. First, all education is 
environmental/ecological education. That is, the 
educational enterprise, no matter what the disciplinary 
focus or subject matter, must emphasize the kinds of 
creative thought and learning activity that integrate 
ecological principles into the core of its instructional 
processes. Two, the way education occurs is as important 
as its content. Three, experience in the natural world 
is both an essential part of understanding the 
environment, and conducive to good thinking. Four, human 
and environmental issues are complex and interrelated and 
cannot be understood through a single discipline or 
department. Five, education occurs in part as a dialogue 
with a place and has characteristics of a good 
conversation. Six, all education must be relevant to the 
challenge of building a sustainable society and must 
enhance the learner's competence with natural systems. 
These foundations suggest that the challenge for social 
work education, whether in the classroom or any of its 
other structured educational environments, is to 
integrate all aspects of human activity--linking 
professional practice, personal growth, community 
participation into a dynamic web of reflective learning. 
A second potential implication for social work 
education is adaptation of its practicum placements and 
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curriculum to reflect a focus on issues of the natural 
environment. For example, social worker Mary Rogge 
(1994a) offers ways to integrate issues of environmental 
hazard into field practicum experiences. She suggests 
that multiple opportunities already exist for social 
workers to integrate issues of the natural environment. 
Traditional social work settings in health care, 
community practice, and mental health offer a starting 
point for the profession. For instance, Rogge suggests 
that at the community level problem assessment must give 
attention to the relationship between poverty, 
discrimination and environmental hazard. Incidents of 
environmental racism have increased significantly where 
low-income groups and people of color reside. 
In a similar manner, Kauffman, Walter, Nissly and 
Walker (1994) critically review social work's human 
behavior in the social environment (HBSE) curriculum. 
They offer suggestions for its enhancement by 
incorporating issues of environment degradation. They 
suggest that environmental problems are experienced at 
each stage of human development and carry a high human 




The current project has substantially met the 
research goals established in chapter one for 
reconceptualizing social work's person-in-environment 
perspective and specifying implications for social work 
thought and activity. It has briefly reviewed the socio-
political context and historical trajectory of 
conventional notions of person/environment and 
incorporated ideas and insights from several eco-
philosophical perspectives. 
Conclusions generally intend closure and some degree 
of finality, a coming to "The End". The conclusion of 
this project, however, is an invitation for a new 
beginning in social work. It is a call for the 
profession to revitalize itself through a profound 
questioning of its deepest assumptions and a re-imagining 
of the world in which its professional endeavors take 
place. This is and will be a pivotal task that the 
current project seeks to assist. The results are offered 
to the p~ofession as a challenge to its creative and 
critical faculties. They are submitted with a fervent 
expectation that the profession can continue to make a 
difference. 
As the global environmental crises grows and as the 
world continues to shift toward a different mode of 
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collective understanding and social organization; the 
profession of social work must also adjust. The next 
millennium will bring new, perhaps unprecedented, demands 
and opportunities. Whether the profession is prepared to 
meet these depends in large measure on the flexibility 
and innovation of its theoretical frameworks to guide its 
tasks. This project is one step toward helping the 
profession intellectually prepare itself for the 
challenges that lie ahead. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
This dissertation began with a conviction that 
social work has long ignored its responsibility to both 
the demands and possibilities of nature in its operating 
paradigms. The current project has been an attempt to 
change that. My hope was and still is that the 
profession can reorient itself, that it can re-enliven 
its own professional consciousness to an appreciation for 
the attractiveness and effectualness of the natural world 
in the way it speaks and in what it does. My role and 
the goal of this project has been to provide a 
theoretical framework by which the profession could 
consider at least one possible alternative that would 
better correspond to the reality of a changing world. 
The challenge for me personally in developing this 
framework has been to move beyond the purely abstract, 
toward a merger of intellect and experience, reason and 
emotion, science and art, in the construction of a 
meaningful framework of understanding. The 
methodolqgical design and specific activities of this 
dissertation were intended to provide a mechanism for my 
accomplishing this challenge. Yet, I am struck with a 
degree of uncertainty as to whether my efforts to merge 
intellect and experience, reason and emotion, have been 
successful. At this moment the best I can say is that I 
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believe I have done so. It remains for you, the social 
work reader, to determine how successful my efforts have 
been. Perhaps it will be by virtue of what you find here 
to be helpful or inspiring that will be the ultimate 
gauge of my success. 
One of the unfortunate realities of our culture is 
the fascination we maintain for the end product, the 
culmination, the final outcome of any human endeavor. It 
is as if we find the process to be somehow unimportant; 
we often ignore the value of the process required to 
inspire real change. I view this dissertation as far 
more a process than a outcome. So, though the body of 
work is complete, and there is indeed an end product--the 
task is yet unfinished. This work represents many 
things, but from my perspective it is a work in progress 
and perhaps shall be so for quite some time to come. In 
fact one could say that our profession is a work in 
progress. The challenge to you is to join with me and 
other dedicated social workers in the process. 
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APPENDIX I: EXPLORATORY INTERVIEW LETTER 
Fred H. Besthorn 
School of Social Welfare 
The University of Kansas 
Lawrence, Kansas 66045 
I am currently conducting doctoral research on the 
meaning and importance of deep ecology and ecological 
feminism for informing a reconceptualized view of social 
work's person-in-environment perspective. During the 
literature review, I have discovered that you have made 
significant contributions to understanding the 
connections between human well-being and environmental 
factors within the social work context. In particular, 
your contribution to the work The Global Environmental 
Crisis: Implications for Social Welfare and Social Work 
has been very helpful. Since there is a scarcity of 
published material on this topic, I am seeking to 
interview several persons such as yourself who are able 
to contribute further insights to my research interests. 
Your contribution would be extremely valuable to my 
study. Given your knowledge and experience on this 
topic, I would be deeply grateful for your assistance. 
I would like the opportunity to interview you by phone 
for 45 to 60 minutes. In the overall study, I am 
exploring eco-philosophical viewpoints of deep ecology 
and ecological feminism particularly as they relate to 
the expansion of conventional notions of the person and 
environment constructs. The historical tendency in 
social work has been to ignore or limit the inclusion of 
nature in the way the profession defines one of its most 
basic paradigms. The unstructured interview with you 
would primarily explore your ideas, both practically and 
philosophically, on the interdependency of person and 
natural environment and the relationship of this to 
social work knowledge, values, practice, education and 
research. I hope, however, to keep the conversation very 
flexible in order to address related issues should they 
arise. I would like to be able to cite your ideas in the 
study, but your remarks will be kept strictly 
confidential if desired. With your permission, the 
interview would be tape recorded for future reflection 
and concept generation. I will be happy to provide you 
with a more detailed explanation of the study and a 
summary of the research results upon its completion in 
spring of 1997. 
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APPENDIX I (continued) 
If you are able to assist me with this study, please 
complete the enclosed card and return it with the 
stamped, self-addressed envelope by December 15 
indicating a phone number(s} and times which are most 
convenient for you to be contacted. I will contact you 
by phone shortly after receiving your reply to schedule a 
time to conduct the interview. I have enclosed a brief 
description of my dissertation topic and tentative open-
ended questions in order to give you some idea how my 
thinking on this topic has evolved thusfar. Thank you 
very much for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
Fred H. Besthorn 
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APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW OREINTATION PAGE 
Dissertation Topic Summary 
Fred H. Besthorn, M.Div., MSW, Ph.D. candidate 
Early on social workers began to separate themselves 
from other helping professionals by claiming as their 
particular jurisdiction a unique and dual concern for 
both person and environment. In practice, however, the 
person-environment orientation has become problematic. 
The persistent tendency has been to focus on personal 
constructs while the breadth of knowledge concerning 
environment has become constricted. 
This problem is most profoundly illustrated in 
social work's nearly complete disregard for integrating a 
comprehensive understanding of the natural environment 
and its influence on human development. While social 
work's person-environment focus is routinely affirmed in 
the literature, few explicit discussions of the natural 
environment are found. With the exception of a few 
recent contributions, the concept of natural environment 
is rarely developed in the literature. Social work has 
tended to view the natural environment as the broad and 
benign backdrop for more fundamentally important personal 
processes. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to broaden and 
clarify the way social work conceptualizes person and 
environment by focusing on the character of the 
relationship between person and the natural realm, and on 
the way we derive individual and collective meaning from 
this connection. The goal will be to develop a 
comprehensive reconceptualization of the relationship 
between person and environment. This goal will be 
undertaken through a careful critique and analysis 
utilizing insight from two contemporary ecophilosophies: 
deep ecology and ecological feminism. It will also 
address issues and present implications for social work 
knowledge, theory and professional practice. 
This dissertation is organized around two central 
research questions: (1) What are the key themes in deep 
ecology and ecological feminism that may be useful in 
reconceptualizing social work's person-in-environment 
perspective? (2) What are the specific implications of a 
reconceptualized person-in-environment perspective for 
social work knowledge, theory and practice? 
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APPENDIX II (continued) 
Since the telephone interviews I have requested with 
you will be brief, I have structured several open-ended 
questions to help promote thorough and concise answers 
while allowing for some degree of flexibility. Several 
specific questions will also be tailored to your 
professional interests as indicated by your publications. 
The open-ended questions are: 
(1) Interviewee's most important conclusions about 
concepts of person/self, natural environment and 
relationships between them. 
(2) Sources and development of your own interest in 
natural environment and social work. 
(3) Interviewee's ideas concerning important 
philosophical themes of deep ecology and ecological 
feminism (for example connectedness, complexity, 
control/domination, intrinsic value) . 
(4) Views of most important skills and practice 
strategies as applications of a "re-natured" person-in-
environment perspective. 
(5) Concluding reflections on reconceptualizing person-
in-environment and implications for social work theory, 
values, practice, policy, research and education. 
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APPENDIX III: CODING CATEGORIES (THEMES & AUTHORS) 
A. Contemporary Environmental Thought 
1- Reform environmentalism 
2- The New Right 
3- The New Age 
4- Revised Libertarianism 
B. Historical and Theoretical Influences 
1- Historical/Political Critique 
2- Nature Spirituality 
3- Activism of 1960s 
4- Feminist Movement 
5- Liberal Feminist Thought 
6- Marxist Feminist Thought 






1- Body of Ideas 
2- Theoretical Movement 
3- Critical Theory 
4- Experiential Philosophy 
5- Radical Eco-philosophy 




3- Modern Societal Critique 
4- Contemporary Environmentalism Critique 
5- Social Domination Critique 
6- Experientially Focused 
7- New Vision of Nature 
8- New Vision of Self 
9- New Vision of Interrealtionship/Connectedness 
10- Societal Transformation 
11- Limited Human Interference with Nature 
12- Inherent Value in Nature 
13- Local Structure 
14- Political Activism 
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CONDING CATEGORIES (continued by theme) 
E. Unique Distinctives 
1- Critique of Power 
2- Self-realization 
3- Biocentric-equality 
F. Contesting Modernism 
1- Human-centeredness 
2- Strict Rationalism 
3- Secularism 
4- Linear Hierarchies 
5- Limited Relationalism 
6- Denial 
G. Comparisons and Criticisms 
1- General Similarities 
2- Anthropocentrism/Androcentrism Difference 
3- Communal/Self Interconnectedness Diferences 
4- Regressive/Progressive Criticism 
5- Wholism/Hierarchy Criticism 







6- Social Policy 
7- Ethics and Values 
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CODING CATEGORIES (continued by author) 
A. Alpa Group: (Deep Ecology) 
1- Berry, 1988 
2- Bodian, 1995 
3- Capra, 1996 
4- Devall, 1995 
5- Devall and Sessions, 1984 
6- Devall and Sessions, 1985 
7- diZerega, 1996 
8- Dobson, 1995 
9- Drengson, 1995 
10- Drengson and Inoue, 1995 
11- Drew, 1995 
12- Ferkiss, 1993 
13- Foreman, 1995 
14- Fox, 1984 
15- Fox, 1989 
16- Fox, 1990 
17- Fox, 1995a 
18- Fox, 1995b 
19- Gaunt, 1992 
20- Glasser, 1995 
21- Jung, 1990 
22- LeMay and Pitts, 1994 
23- List, 1993 
24- Marx, 1964 
25- Marx, 1970 
26- McLaughlin, 1987 
27- McLaughlin, 1995 
28- Metzner, 1993 
29- Meyers, 1993 
30- Naess, 1973 
31- Naess, 1988 
32- Naess, 1989 
33- Naess, 1995a 
34- Naess, 1995b 
35- Naess, 1995c 
36- Naess, 1995d 
37- Naess, 1995e 
38- Naess, 1995£ 
39- Naess, 1995g 
40- Naess, 1995h 
41- Naess and Sessions, 1995 
42- Restoring the Vision, 1995 
43- Rodman, 1883 
44- Rothenberg, 1995 
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CODING CATEGORIES (continued by author) 
45- Sessions, 1995a 
46- Sessions, 1995c 
47- Sessions, 1995d 
48- Sessions, 1995e 
49- Sessions, 1995f 
50- Sessions, 1995g 
51- Skolimowski, 1990 
52- Spretnak and Capra, 1986 
53- Swartz, 1986 
54- Turner, 1995 
55- Wilber, 1995 
56- Wittbecker, 1994 
57- Zimmerman, 1987 
58- Zimmerman, 1990 
59- Zimmerman, 1993 
60- Zimmerman, 1994 
B. Beta Group: (Ecofeminism) 
1- Berman, 1994 
2- Biehl, 1991 
3- Birkeland, 1991 
4- Cheney, 1987 
5- Christ, 1990 
6- d'Eaubonne, 1994 
7- Eisler, 1990 
8- Griffin, 1989 
9- Griff in, 1990 
10- Griff in, 1995 
11- Gunn-Allen, 1990 
12- Hall en, 1995 
13- Kelly, 1989 
14- Kheel, 1990 
15- Kheel, 1991 
16- King, 1983 
17- King, 1989 
18- King, 1990 
19- Lachapelle, 1989 
20- Lachapelle, 1995 
21- Macy, 1989 
22- Mathews, 1994 
23- Mathews, 1995 
24- Merchant, 1990 
25- Merchant, 1992 
26- Plant, 1990 
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CODING CATEGORIES (continued by author) 
27- Plumwood, 1986 
28- Plumwood, 1994 
29- Razak, 1990 
30- Ruether, 1989 
31- Salleh, 1984 
32- Sandilands, 1991 
33- Sandilands, 1994 
34- Shiva, 1990 
35- Spretnak, 1989 
36- Spretnak, 1990 
37- Starhawk, 1989 
38- Starhawk, 1990 
39- Swimme, 1990 
40- Warren, 1987 
41- Warren, 1988 
42- Warren, 1990 
43- Warren, 1994 
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